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How will people use the Internet and other emerging information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) to shape their exposure to political information?  The 
Internet has established itself as a significant source of news, and its users have an 
unprecedented ability to be selective about their political information exposure.  Will 
Internet users be inclined to fashion an information environment that reflects their own 
political predispositions, or will they continue to encounter a range of perspectives 
online? 
It has been nearly a decade since Neuman (1996: 15) first remarked on the 
concern that wide-scale adoption of special-interes online media–media tailored to the 
ideologies of small groups of citizens–could lead to angerous social and ideological 
divisions.  Sunstein’s Republic.com (2001) is among the most prominent articulations of 
this skepticism to date.  Sunstein offers a compelling narrative of how control over 
information exposure can translate into social fragmentation and political polarization, 
and asserts that these could lead to the breakdown of productive political discourse and 
the demise of democracy, ultimately culminating in violence.   
Many scholars question, however, whether citizens will actually use technology 
as Sunstein predicts.  The consequences of individual control over one’s information 
environment are thus an important subject of contemporary debate (Iyengar et al. 2003; 
DiMaggio and Sato 2003; Neuman 2000; DiMaggio and Sato 2003: 321).  Although this 
 
2 
round of controversy has been prompted by the new phenomenon of online news use, it 
in fact re-ignites a longstanding debate over individual preferences in political exposure. i    
Ideologically-motivated selective exposure, the tendency to craft an information 
environment that reflects one’s political beliefs, has been a topic of debate for several 
decades (Sears and Freedman 1967; Frey 1986).  According to selective exposure theory, 
individuals’ prefer exposure to arguments supporting heir position over those supporting 
other positions (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Sweeney and Gruber 1984).  
Scholars argue that this preference also leads individuals to prefer information sources 
that are more supportive of their opinions over less supportive alternatives (Mutz and 
Martin 2001; Lowin 1967). For example, recent empirical investigations indicate that 
                                                
i This debate occurs within the context of a much larger controversy regarding political 
polarization within the United States, the “culture war” first articulated by James Davison 
Hunter (1991).  On one side of the culture war debate, scholars decry the increasing 
polarization which they say has characterized the political landscape of the U.S. over the 
last few decades.  They claim that Democrats/liberals and Republicans/conservatives, are 
diverging in terms of their social and political attitudes.  The Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press has been a prominent advocate of these ideas, offering a substantial 
body of survey data in support of these claims (Kohut et al. 2005b; Kohut et al. 2005a; 
Kohut et al. 2003).  The polarization claim has been amplified by the mainstream news 
media, becoming one of the defining narratives for describing the 2000 and 2004 
presidential elections (e.g., see Anonymous 2002b; Anonymous 2002a; Dionne Jr. 2003; 
Fineman 2003).  
On the other side of the culture war debate, scholars such as Fiorina (2005) and Baker 
(2005) argue that the evidence for polarization among U.S. citizens is weak.  To the 
contrary, Baker argues that Americans’ views are converging (108).  Fiorina claims that 
to the extent that polarization is occurring, it is among political elites.  If citizens are 
supporting more polarized candidates, Fiorina argues that this is only because less-
partisan alternatives are unavailable. 
The claims I make in this dissertation are relevant to the culture war debate: how people 
shape their exposure to political information has the potential to influence their political 
attitudes, either exacerbating or defusing political polarization. High levels of exposure to 
others’ views, however, could coexist with strong political positions. My concern is 
primarily with people’s exposure to viewpoints, espcially those with which they 
disagree, and not with the extent of political polariz tion in society. 
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readers of conservative political books rarely read liberal books (Krebs 2004b; Krebs 
2004a; Krebs 2003), and that popular political blogs tend to interlink with other blogs 
expressing similar viewpoints (Adamic and Glance 2005). 
Critics of the theory of ideological selective exposure question the existence of an 
underlying psychological tendency to seek support and avoid challenge.  According to 
these scholars, the data do not support the claim that citizens are disproportionately aware 
of viewpoint-supporting information (Sears and Freedman 1967; Chaffee t al. 2001).  
Furthermore, they offer evidence that individual exposure choices are largely 
uninfluenced by ideology: when asked to choose among p litical information options, 
citizens do not systematically avoid challenge (DiMaggio and Sato 2003; Iyengar et al. 
2003).  The theory’s detractors also argue that choices that do yield exposure to mostly 
viewpoint-reinforcing information are not necessarily motivated by viewpoint selectivity 
per se, but may instead be secondary consequences of d cisions unrelated to ideology 
(Sears and Freedman 1967).   
Scholars on both sides of the debate have tended to treat a preference for support 
and an aversion to challenge as linked aspects of a single psychological preference.  I 
argue that by conceiving of these preferences as separate phenomena we can reconcile 
seemingly contradictory evidence regarding citizens’ political information acquisition 
practices.  Most prior research results can be explained in terms of a systematic 
preference for viewpoint reinforcement paired with a weaker and less consistent attitude 
toward viewpoint challenge.  I therefore suggest tha most individuals will be drawn to 
viewpoint-reinforcing information, while their use of viewpoint-challenging information 
will fluctuate.  Depending on the context of the information search and the ideological 
characteristics of the individual, some will exhibit a slight aversion to challenge, while 
others will remain largely indifferent toward it.  In a few circumstances, individuals may 
even seek out novel arguments with which they disagree. 
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These hypothesized preferences have important implications for citizens’ use of 
new ICTs for political information acquisition.  Technologies such as the Internet play a 
potentially important role because they augment people’s ability to selectively acquire 
political information, allowing them to more effectively find information on either side of 
a controversy (DiMaggio et al. 2001; Bimber and Davis 2003: 152).  Two characteris ics 
of the technology are particularly important.  First, the range of viewpoints accessible 
online is wider than with traditional news media, such as television or newspapers.  
Groups representing the full range of the political spectrum have a significant online 
presence (e.g., Zook 1996; Cleaver 1999), whereas mainstream sources tend to represent 
a narrower band of interests toward the middle of the spectrum.  Second, the mechanisms 
for controlling which viewpoints one encounters, though imperfect, are increasingly 
effective.  Search engines, news aggregations services (such as Google News), and 
partisan news sites each afford opportunities for sea ching and filtering information that 
are unparalleled in traditional news media. 
New technologies afford users unprecedented control over their information 
exposure, but even if people do adopt these capabilities the political information 
preferences suggested here cast doubt on the claim th t citizens will consistently filter out 
all other viewpoints.  I argue that individuals who rely on the Internet for political 
information will be better informed about their own opinions, but they will also continue 
to encounter arguments justifying other positions.  This is an important distinction, 
because continued exposure to other viewpoints makes  crucial difference in whether or 
not we realize the future suggested by Sunstein and others (e.g., Sunstein 2001; Mutz and 
Martin 2001). 
Exposure to political difference is a defining element of effective deliberation and 
it has important consequences for society at large.  The presence of other political 
viewpoints can stimulate groups to engage in more thorough information searches and 
more careful scrutiny of alternatives (Mendelberg 200 ; Nemeth 1986; Nemeth and 
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Rogers 1996; Delli Carpini et al. 2004).  Exposure to other perspectives also increases 
people’s familiarity with the rationales that motivate opposing views, which can in turn 
foster political tolerance (Mutz 2002; Price et al. 2002).  Conversely, if individuals 
effectively avoid opinion-challenging information, the society to which they belong is 
likely to become more politically fragmented (Sunstein 2002).  Absent contact with other 
viewpoints, groups of citizens will become more polarized, and their ability to find 
common ground and to reach political agreement will dwindle.  In light of the important 
stakes for political deliberation and democratic soiety, it is critical that we understand 
what choices people will make in the changing landscape of political news. 
This dissertation is composed of two interconnected research projects.  Taken 
together, these projects clarify the contemporary dynamic of selective political exposure, 
providing evidence about individuals’ underlying preferences regarding political 
information.   
The first project uses nationally representative survey data to examine how 
contemporary use of the Internet is influencing citizens’ overall exposure to political 
information.  Although information services do not allow automatic filtering based on 
ideology, users of these services do have more control than those who rely on the more 
traditional media for their news and information.  Changes in overall exposure that 
correlate to the use of these technologies are sugge tive of what citizens’ ideal news diet 
might look like. 
The second project focuses on individual choices regarding exposure to news 
items.  I examined factors that influence the decision to look at, and the time spent 
reading, news items in an online environment that affords enhanced, albeit imperfect, 
control over viewpoint exposure.  This environment makes it easier for subjects to review 
a politically diverse set of news items, and provides cues about the items’ political biases, 
but subjects are responsible for assessing them and deci ing which items to examine.  
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The relationship between readers’ perceptions and use of news items in such an 
environment is indicative of the preferences shaping individual exposure decisions. 
Background 
Both projects of this dissertation regard the signif cance of online news; hence, 
this section provides important background about indiv duals whose political information 
universe includes online sources.  Internet users, though increasingly representative of the 
American population, still differ in a number of ways from those who have not embraced 
the technology.  Online news users, especially those who consider the medium a 
prominent source of political information, are an even more distinct subpopulation. 
Americans Online 
The number of Americans who use the Internet crossed th  50% mark around the 
year 2000, and the number continues to grow steadily (Table 1).  Research has also 
shown that Internet users with high-speed access are a particularly active segment of the 
online population.  These individuals are more likely to have integrated their use of the 
communication network into their daily lives, and are more likely to rely on it for a wide 
range of informational needs (Horrigan and Rainie 2002).  (The relationship between 
high-speed access and online news use is discussed in more detail in the next section.)  
Though high-speed Internet users are still in the minority, their numbers are growing as 
well: broadband access at home has increased several-fold in the past four years, more 
than doubling in the last year alone.  The numbers are even larger when you include those 
who have high-speed Internet access from work.  By 2004, more than half of all Internet 
users went online using high-speed connections either at home or at work. 
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Table 1. Percentage of adult Americans who use the Internet, have broadband 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Internet user 49% 59% 59% 63% 67% 
Broadband at home 3 6 12 16 25 
Source :  Pew Internet & American Life survey data 2000-2004 
These percentages represent many millions of users in the continental U.S., but 
Internet users are a distinct subpopulation in terms of several key demographics (see 
Table 2).  Compared to non-users, they are disproporti nately male, and they tend to be 
younger, wealthier, and more educated.  They are also less likely to live in a rural area.  
Groups of Internet users with different levels of access also differ from one another 
significantly.  The patterns described above are even more pronounced when we 
differentiate between broadband users and those with slower access.  More than half of 
all broadband users are male; fully a third report an income of over $75,000; slightly less 
than half hold a college degree; and only about one in six live in rural America.   
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users Dial-up users 
Non-Internet 
users 
Unweighted base 1510 581 382 474 
(n) 1510 552 385 493 
Sex     
Male 47% 52% 50 42 
Female 53 48 50 58 
Community type     
Urban 29 34 27 25 
Suburban 48 53 46 43 
Rural 24 13 28 33 
Age     
18-27 18 21 21 10 
28-39 22 26 23 16 
40-49 22 26 23 15 
50-58 14 17 13 11 
59-68 11 7 10 16 
69+ 13 2 7 31 
Education     
High school or less 46 25 48 68 
Some college 27 31 26 23 
College grad or more 27 44 25 9 
Race/ethnicity     
White 72 73 75 72 
Black 10 7 10 13 
Hispanic 11 11 10 10 
Other 6 8 4 5 
Income     
Less than $30K 28 13 23 49 
Between $30-$50K 22 19 26 22 
Between $50-$75K 14 20 18 6 
More than $75K 18 33 16 5 
Internet experience     
Online in last 6 months 1 1 2 * 
Online for about 1 year 3 1 7 * 
Online for 2-3 years 9 8 19 * 
Online for 4-5 years 17 20 32 * 
Online for 6+ years 37 69 39 * 
Openness mindedness     
High 26 34 27 16 
Medium 53 54 54 49 
Low 21 12 18 35 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey 2004 
Note: Sum of (n) for different access types is not equal to total because some respondents did 
not answer the access type questions.  Non-responses account for response categories not 
summing to 100% 
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News media usage 
Internet users have access to a unique new medium for acquiring news, and many 
are using it.  In 2000 Pew estimated that about 30 million Americans were getting news 
online on a typical day.  By the year 2004 that number had more than doubled to 64 
million, or about 34% of adult Americans.  Use of traditional media does not differ much 
between Internet users and the population at large: in all groups similarly high 
percentages of individuals use television, newspapers, radio, and magazines as news 
sources.  Among those who do use the Internet, however, broadband users are more 
likely to get news online than those with slower Inter et access (Table 3).  Use of online 
news by these individuals is quite high–nearly 90%–surpassing every other news medium 
except television news. 
Table 3. Percentage who ever use news media online and off 
 All Respondents Broadband 
users 
Dial-up users Non-Internet 
users 
Unweighted base 1510 581 382 474 
(n) 1510 552 385 493 
Television 92% 92% 92% 91% 
Newspaper 85 84 89 84 
Radio 73 79 78 61 
Magazines 56 65 62 42 
Email or the Web 54 89 71 * 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey 2004 
There are some early indications that users may be su stituting online news for 
more traditional news media.  Though television is one of the most popular sources of 
campaign information for Internet users and non-users alike, the number of individuals 
who rank it among the most important sources of information drops as Internet access 
speeds increase (Table 4).  Broadband users, the group most likely to get their news 
online, are also least likely to use older media.   
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Table 4. Percentage for whom specified medium is on e of top two sources of campaign 
information 
 All Respondents Broadband 
users 
Dial-up users Non-Internet 
users 
Unweighted base 1510 581 382 474 
(n) 1510 552 385 493 
Television 78% 71% 74% 88 
Newspaper 38 35 40 40 
Radio 16 15 18 12 
Email or the Web 15 29 13 1** 
Magazines 4 5 6 2 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey 2004 
In terms of demographics, those who use online news as a supplemental source of 
campaign information are almost indistinguishable from Internet users as a whole.  Those 
for whom the Internet is a primary source of campaign information, however, have a few 
unique characteristics (Table 5 and Table 6).  Compared to Internet users in general, this 
group is disproportionately male, Republican, and college educated.  These individuals 
also tend to be younger, and to have the most Interne  experience. 
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Table 5. Demographics of online news users – Non-po litical  
 Internet users 
Online news a 
primary source 
Online news a 
supplement 
Unweighted base 1036 223 619 
(n) 1036 214 603 
Sex    
Male 50% 61% 46% 
Female 50 39 54 
Community type    
Urban 31 33 32 
Suburban 50 51 49 
Rural 19 16 19 
Age    
18-27 21 24 20 
28-39 25 29 24 
40-49 25 20 26 
50-58 15 13 16 
59-68 8 10 8 
69+ 4 2 4 
Education    
High school or less 35 31 32 
Some college 29 24 32 
College grad or more 35 44 36 
Race/ethnicity    
White 73 70 74 
Black 9 10 7 
Hispanic 11 10 12 
Other 6 7 6 
Income    
Less than $30K 18 17 20 
Between $30-$50K 22 22 22 
Between $50-$75K 18 20 19 
More than $75K 25 25 38 
Internet experience    
Online in last 6 months 2 * 1 
Online for about 1 year 4 1 4 
Online for 2-3 years 13 7 13 
Online for 4-5 years 25 22 26 
Online for 6+ years 55 69 55 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey 2004 
Note: Response categories do not sum to 100% because of non-responses.   
* denotes less than 1%. 
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Table 6. Demographics of online news users – Politi cal 
 Internet users 
Online news a 
primary source 
Online news a 
supplement 
Unweighted base 1036 223 619 
(n) 1036 214 603 
Party Affiliation    
Democrat 29 26 31 
Independent 32 30 32 
Republican 32 38 31 
Other/no party 4 1 * 
Political Ideology    
Very liberal 7 9 7 
Somewhat liberal 21 23 21 
Moderate 31 27 33 
Somewhat conservative 26 24 25 
Very conservative 12 13 11 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey 2004 
Note: Response categories do not sum to 100% because of non-responses.   
* denotes less than 1%. 
Outline 
In the context of the large and growing number of Americans getting their news 
through the Internet and the resulting potential for m re purposeful choices about the 
news they read, this dissertation encompasses two studie  that contribute to our 
understanding of people’s propensity to engage in slective exposure.  Chapter 2 reviews 
the relevant research on ideologically-motivated selective exposure and the online 
political information environment, and outlines a series of related hypotheses.  Broadly 
speaking, I claim that individuals are drawn to viewpoint-reinforcing information, but 
that they do not seek to exclude all exposure to viewpoint-challenging information.  
There are, however, certain ideological and social attributes that make avoiding other 
perspectives more likely.  Chapter 3 describes the two methodologies I use to test these 
claims.  First, I employ a national telephone survey of 1,510 adult Americans designed to 
assess the significance of the Internet for both the types of information sources 
individuals report using and their familiarity with arguments that either reinforce or 
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challenge their views.  Second, I describe the experimental design employed to study 
individuals’ preferences regarding political information, as well as the recruitment 
strategy and data analyses techniques for this experiment.   
Chapters 4 and 5 describe the analyses and findings of these studies.  I find that 
Web sites featuring partisan political information are an important complement to the 
news products of major news organizations, not a substit te.  I also show that as a source 
of political information, the Internet is enhancing i dividuals’ familiarity with consonant 
and dissonant information.  In other words, people who use online sources of political 
news are exposed to both more information that supports their views and more 
information that challenges these pre-existing opini ns.  When operating in an online 
environment that facilitates ideological selectivity, however, people demonstrate a 
tendency to seek viewpoint-reinforcing information and to avoid viewpoint-challenging 
information, though the effect of the latter is subtantially smaller.  Finally, Chapter 6 
makes sense of the findings in the two related projects and ties this research back to the 
core theoretical debate about political communication.  The key to this resolution lies in 
distinguishing between a desire to exclude all contact with other viewpoints, and a 
tendency to avoid repeated contact. This understanding sets the stage for a discussion of 
the design and implications of future news acquisition systems.  I end by examining the 
limitations of the study and suggesting a number of future research opportunities. 
 
Over the course of this dissertation, I make four major contributions to the 
academic theorizing and empirical study of selectiv exposure.  I make two related 
arguments about ideologically-motivated selectivity.  First, I assert that it is necessary to 
distinguish between seeking out viewpoint-reinforcing nformation and avoiding 
viewpoint-challenging information.  This distinction allows us to reconcile several 
contradictory conclusions evident in prior research.  Second, based on the results of these 
studies, I argue that it is useful to distinguish between avoiding all contact with 
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viewpoint-challenging information, and avoiding repeated exposure with such 
information.  This research suggests that individuals v lue awareness of other 
perspectives, while simultaneously wanting to limit their contact with them.  Our 
understanding of these preferences has profound implications for the choices individuals 
are likely to make about their use of political news in the future.  As technology evolves, 
further augmenting the ability to be selective, citizens’ preferences will have an 
increasingly important influence on their political information environment. 
The dissertation makes two additional methodological contributions.  First, it 
offers a unique approach to studying individuals’ selective exposure preferences.  The 
survey measures exposure to viewpoint-reinforcement and viewpoint-challenge 
separately by focusing on concrete questions about readily recalled argument exposure 
and information source use.  Answers to these questions are easy for respondents to 
generate, and can be unambiguously interpreted.  This provides a technique for assessing 
individuals’ overall political exposure that is practical and reliable.  Second, the 
experiment takes data collection out of the lab and into the field.  By conducting an 
online experiment, I am able to observe the behavior of individuals who regularly use 
online news in the process of engaging with real, current news stories.  Data collected in 
this way is more likely to reflect individuals’ typical news consumption behavior than 
data collected in a traditional lab setting. 
15 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATIONS AND BACKGROUND 
The subject of this research project is the relationship between new information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) and citizens’ exposure to political information.  
The concern motivating the work is that users of these technologies will engage in 
ideologically-motivated selective exposure, creating a personalized information 
environment that reinforces their political attitudes.  Such behavior, it has been argued, 
would undermine the democratic process, fostering political polarization, radicalization, 
and intolerance (Sunstein 2001). 
This chapter sets the stage for the research that follows, describing prior work on 
the subject and highlighting important unanswered questions.  The review of literature is 
divided into four parts.  First, I consider the consequences of selective exposure.  I begin 
this section by reviewing the significant evidence that citizens’ attitudes are informed by 
the information they encounter.  Next I turn to thelit rature on political tolerance and 
minority influence in order to demonstrate that different types of selectivity–namely, 
seeking viewpoint reinforcement and avoiding viewpoint challenge–carry different 
implications for mass opinion and political discourse. 
Second, I examine available empirical evidence on the selective exposure 
phenomenon.  Though this topic has been extensively researched, the empirical results 
are inconclusive.  Some contemporary scholars are convinced that ideological selectivity 
is a powerful factor shaping citizens’ experience of the political world (e.g., Mutz and 
Martin 2001; Sunstein 2001), while others are equally certain that selective exposure 
does not occur (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2003; Knobloch et al. 2003).  I propose to reconcile 
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these findings by treating separately the preference for consonant information, 
information that supports one’s viewpoint, and the av rsion to dissonant information, 
information that challenges one’s viewpoint.  Available data are consistent with the 
hypothesis that citizens engage in behaviors to realize the former, but not the latter. 
Third, I consider the relationship between new ICTs and citizens’ ability to 
engage in ideological selectivity.  Though online news tools have augmented citizens’ 
control of their political information exposure, this capacity for control is limited both 
technically and socially.  Technologies for automatically filtering information based on 
political viewpoints do not yet exist, and, furthermore, online information seekers are not 
consistently effective users of available capabilities.  Thus, citizens’ use of the Internet 
today is an imperfect predictor of their behavior in the future.  As new technologies that 
make ideological selectivity more feasible continue to merge, users will have new 
opportunities to realize their political exposure pferences. 
I conclude the chapter by summarizing my hypotheses regarding selective 
exposure and new ICTs.  These hypotheses are divide into two groups.  One regards the 
influence of online news today on political information exposure.  The other set concerns 
individual behavior in an environment suggestive of the kinds of control that might be 
taken for granted in the future. 
Consequences of selective exposure 
Concern about the consequences of new ICTs for the body politic stems from the 
belief that citizens will, if given the opportunity, create an information environment 
mirroring their own beliefs, and that this will have harmful political ramifications.  
Individuals whose viewpoints are reinforced in the absence of challenging ideas will hold 
more extreme views and be less capable of understanding the views of others, while 
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groups of like-minded people are more likely to become socially fragmented and 
politically polarized (Sunstein 2001; Sunstein 2002: 186).  
This section begins with an overview of two important theoretical models of 
opinion formation, RAS and the on-line information-processing model.  Both models 
demonstrate that altering the flow of political information such that it reflects a particular 
viewpoint will have a polarizing effect.  Neither model, however, distinguishes between 
the potentially different consequences of support seeking and challenge avoidance.  To 
demonstrate the significance of this distinction, I turn to the literatures on political 
tolerance and minority influences.  According to research in these areas, the benefits of 
exposure to other viewpoints include increased politica  tolerance and more thorough 
consideration of political alternatives, which ultimately lead to better deliberative 
decision-making.  Thus, maintaining some exposure to challenging viewpoints while 
seeking out viewpoint-reinforcing information significantly undermines the polarizing 
influence of ideological selective exposure. 
Opinion formation 
Individuals do not have well-established, clearly-defined opinions about every 
political issue.  Such a mental state would require immense time and effort, as well as 
mastery of a volume of information beyond the grasp of an individual human being.  This 
is the premise of Zaller’s (1992) work on mass opinion.  Instead, he posits that 
individuals dynamically construct opinions based on the information at hand. 
Zaller describes a model that explains how various competing considerations 
come to inform the decision-making process.   Named for its three stages, Zaller’s RAS 
model predicts that statements of opinion are the product of a process in which 
individuals receive new information, evaluate it in order to decide whether to accept it as 
a valid consideration in future decision-making, and sample from the universe of 
 
18 
legitimate considerations when asked to make a decision. This process is guided by the 
model’s four axioms regarding how people respond when exposed to new political 
information. 
The first axiom is that the greater an individual’s interest in a topic, the more 
information on the topic that individual will seek out and comprehend.  Thus, an 
individual who cares deeply about gay marriage, whether in support or opposition, will 
tend to encounter more information about this issue than someone who does not.  Second, 
Zaller asserts that individuals resist arguments that run contrary to their political 
predilections to the extent that they are able to recognize the discrepancy.  For example, 
someone who generally believes that the state already xerts too much influence over 
individual rights would resist the argument that gay marriage is a social ill that should be 
prohibited by law.  On the other hand, a person whofirmly believes that citizens deserve 
equal treatment under the law might be inclined to accept the argument that banning gay 
marriage would unfairly discriminate against people who are gay.  Third, the more 
recently an individual’s experiences have evoked a consideration, the more quickly that 
information will come to mind.  Thus, having just read the aforementioned arguments 
regarding gay marriage, the reader will be more likly to think of them if asked about this 
issue in the near future.  Fourth, and finally, faced with a question of attitude, an 
individual forms an opinion statement by weighing the considerations that come to mind 
readily against one another. ii  In the example used here, an individual would decide 
                                                
ii The fourth axiom of RAS, that individuals form attitudes by weighing argument readily 
at hand, closely resembles an informational-process-ba ed explanation of group 
polarization.  Group polarization occurs when an individual’s initial tendencies are 
reinforced through group discussion.  According to persuasive argument theory (PAT), 
this shift occurs because individuals encounter novel arguments supporting their 
viewpoint during group deliberation (Burnstein and Vinokur 1977).  The other 
mechanism that contributes to group polarization is ba ed on social comparison 
processes, and is unrelated to argument exposure (Isenberg 1986). 
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whether to support or oppose gay marriage by weighing arguments they have already 
accepted in favor of gay marriage against those they have accepted which oppose it. 
Though Zaller readily accepts that individuals are resistant to ideas that run 
counter to their political predispositions, he explicitly discounts the role of selectivity in 
the reception stage based on the evidence available n 1992 (139).  He argues that news 
practices have historically made selective exposure, the act of intentionally constraining 
exposure to political information based on one’s political viewpoint, unlikely for two 
reasons.  First, most people have tended to use a variety of news outlets, especially 
mainstream news media.  Second, being selective about news content has required more 
vigilance than most people are willing to exert.  New information and communication 
technologies, however, make selectivity based on political predispositions more feasible.  
Individuals who get news online today have more outlets to choose from, including many 
that have clear ideological orientations, and more c ntrol over what content they are 
exposed to from their chosen sources. 
In the context of Zaller’s model, different forms of selectivity carry similar 
implications for opinion formation.  Consider, first, reinforcement seeking.  Seeking out 
viewpoint-reinforcing information translates to increased exposure to position-supporting 
arguments and ways of framing these arguments that connect them to political 
predispositions.  This combination leads to increasing acceptance and internalization of 
viewpoint-consistent arguments.  Reinforcement seeking, compared to information 
seeking that ignores political predispositions, will also result in more frequent encounters 
with situations that evoke the accepted arguments, increasing their salience.  Ultimately, 
individuals who enact this behavior will tend to develop more stable positions that are 
more consistent with their other opinions than those who do not.  Their attitudes will be 
stable because overcoming accepted supportive considerations will be more difficult.  For 
example, an individual who regularly seeks out information that supports his current 
views on gay marriage will know more arguments favoring this position, and these 
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arguments will come to mind more immediately.  Consistency across attitudes will occur 
because individuals will have more contextual cues about how various opinions align 
with their political predispositions.  For example, if an individual accepts the argument 
that gay marriage is a civil rights issue, his positi n on gay marriage is more likely to be 
ideologically consistent with his views on other issues related to civil rights. 
The effects of viewpoint-challenge avoidance will be similar to those of seeking 
out viewpoint-reinforcing information, although the interim steps differ.  Individuals 
engaging in this behavior will encounter fewer challenging arguments and will encounter 
them with lower frequency.  The consequence will again be the emergence of more stable 
positions.  The gay marriage advocate in this hypothetical example will hear fewer 
arguments opposing his position, and will hear them l ss often.  When asked to give an 
opinion, the individual will simply have fewer opposing arguments to consider. 
A second prominent model of opinion formation is the on-line information-
processing model (Hastie and Park 1986; McGraw et al. 1990; Lodge et al. 1989).  The 
fundamental difference between the on-line and RAS models regards the nature of 
opinion.  Contrary to RAS, which asserts that citizens do not have “true” opinions, 
citizens in the on-line model hold well-formed opinio s about political issues.  When 
asked for an opinion, an individual simply recalls the judgment he has already made, 
rather than surveying all the relevant arguments to create a new opinion statement.  As a 
consequence, the mechanisms of opinion change are necessarily different.  According to 
the on-line model, a person faced with a new argument retrieves the previously held 
opinion from memory, adjusts it “on-line” to reflect the new information, and then stores 
the resulting opinion for future use.  Individuals do not exert significant effort to 
remember individual arguments.  On this view, attitudes are immediately available, but 
the underlying justifications are harder to produce.  For example, when asked to recall a 
candidate’s issue positions, individuals will tend to indicate that favored candidates share 
their views, while that those they oppose do not.  Finally, in the on-line model, initial 
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impressions carry extra weight.  Individuals do revis  their attitudes based on new 
information, but their opinions are relatively stable compared to the predictions of RAS.   
Despite these differences between RAS and the on-line models, the consequences 
of selective exposure are similar.  Whether seeking v ewpoint reinforcement or filtering 
out viewpoint challenges, the information that indivi uals encounter is more likely to 
justify their prior judgment than to undercut it.  In either case, selective-exposure induced 
changes to a citizen’s information environment will reinforce his or her existing attitudes.   
It is also possible for the two models to coexist.  Though the on-line model is 
generally portrayed as a competing alternative to RAS, scholars on both sides 
acknowledge that the models can function in complementary ways (Zaller 1992: 279; 
Hastie and Park 1986: 262; Lodge et al. 1989: 415; McGraw et al. 1990: 42).  RAS is 
generally a more effective predictor of opinions when citizens are unconcerned about an 
issue and have not anticipated needing a well-formed opinion.  For example, respondents’ 
are unlikely to be interested in all political topics covered in an opinion survey, and in 
these cases attitude statements are likely to be gen rated in the moment based on the 
readily available considerations.  On-line processing, on the other hand, is probably a 
more accurate model when citizens are actively interes d in an issue, and want to be able 
to articulate a stable opinion.  For example, an individual with a keen interest in the 
debate over gay marriage will be more likely to behave in a manner consistent with the 
on-line model, forming an initial opinion and updating it as new information comes to 
light. 
In some situations, both models may interact to shape opinion.  For example, 
when current events raise a previously obscure issue to national prominence, citizens may 
wish to develop an opinion about it. They would like y form this impression by surveying 
relevant considerations, as predicted by RAS; however, since the issue is highly salient 
they might then remember this assessment so that they can re-access it without needing to 
review the relevant evidence every time the issue resurfaces. 
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Whichever view of opinion formation we take, whether based on RAS, on-line, or 
a combination of the two, the consequences of selective exposure are the same.  If 
individuals use new technologies to shape their political information exposure so that it is 
more consistent with their political predispositions, their attitudes will become more 
stable and ideologically consistent. 
Political tolerance and minority influences 
Both RAS and on-line information processing models l ad to the conclusion that 
selective exposure makes a difference in how opinions are formed at the level of 
individual psychology.  Although neither distinguishes between the effects of different 
types of selectivity for any one person, other research suggests that seeking support and 
avoiding challenge may lead to distinct results at the group or societal level.  In 
particular, two areas of scholarship point to exposure to viewpoint-challenging 
information as particularly important for facilitating political tolerance and improving 
group deliberation processes.   
The first of these bodies of work finds that indiviuals who engage in selective 
avoidance have lower levels of political tolerance.  The mechanism underlying this 
relationship is that avoiding viewpoint-challenging i formation makes individuals (a) less 
aware of the rationales behind other opinions and therefore (b) less likely to recognize 
those opinions as legitimate.  Price, Cappella, and Nir’s (2002) research demonstrates 
that the more people encounter disagreement in political conversation, the better they are 
able to identify justifications for their own opinions, and for the opinions of others.  
Using survey data collected in the lead up to the 2000 U.S. presidential election, Price 
and his colleagues examined the relationship between the frequency and intensity of 
political disagreement in respondents’ political conversations and respondents’ ability to 
describe rationales favoring the two major parties.  They found that citizens who more 
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frequently encountered other viewpoints in their political conversations were better able 
to explain why others might prefer the Democratic or Republican Party. 
Mutz’s (2002) work offers additional evidence that exposure to dissonant 
viewpoints enhances people’s familiarity with arguments that support those views.  
Furthermore, her analysis shows that such familiarity is positively correlated with 
political tolerance.  Using survey data collected bfore the 1996 presidential election, 
Mutz shows that the frequency and intensity of exposure to dissonant views is positively 
related to awareness of rationales for other opinions.  She goes on to show that 
individuals who are more aware of these arguments are more willing to extend civil 
liberties to groups with which they disagree.  Employing a three-step experimental design 
to confirm these tolerance effects, Mutz found thatsubjects exposed to dissonant political 
views exhibited statistically higher levels of political tolerance than those exposed to 
consonant information or to no information. 
The second body of research identifies a positive relationship between exposure 
to viewpoint-challenging information and group delib ration through the mechanism of 
minority influence.  In a group setting, the presence of minority views stimulates 
attention to more diverse set of considerations, leading group members to more carefully 
consider a wider range of options.  As a consequence, participants in groups in which 
minority views are expressed tend to identify a larger number of legitimate alternative 
solutions to problems. 
A study by Nemeth (1986) demonstrates this effect.  In the experiment, subjects 
were asked to assess whether a simple figure composed of straight lines was embedded 
within any of several more complex figures.  Subjects were allowed to deliberate in 
groups in order to reach a conclusion, but several members of each group were paid 
confederates.  In the experimental condition where r s archers used confederates to 
create a minority subgroup arguing for a solution not identified by the majority, subjects 
identified significantly more correct responses.  Research has also shown that when 
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members of a group encounter a minority viewpoint tha differs from their own, they tend 
to engage in a more thorough information search (Nemeth 1986; Nemeth and Rogers 
1996).  These studies demonstrate that opinion-challenging information, especially when 
it represents a minority view within the context of a group, has significant benefits for the 
deliberative process. 
A parallel, independent stream of research on group problem solving reaches a 
similar conclusion.  Hong and Page (1998; 2001) describe a formal model of problem 
solvers’ behavior, and implement a series of computational models based on it.  In their 
mathematical representation, individuals are differentiated in terms of their perspective 
and the heuristics they use for finding a solution.  In these models, heterogeneous groups 
of actors with limited capabilities consistently outperform homogeneous groups 
composed entirely of highly-effective actors.  This reaffirms the conclusion that diversity 
is highly beneficial when searching for solutions to difficult problems. 
In addition to their direct influence on current group decisions, minority 
influences can also be indirect, leading group members to think more divergently about a 
topic in the future.  In another experimental study (Nemeth 1986), subjects were shown a 
series of blue slides and then asked to complete a word association exercise.  Prior to 
viewing the slides, subjects were told that either 80% or 20% of others who view the 
slides judge them to be green.  Subjects who heard th t a sizable minority of people 
tended to disagree with their own assessment of the color subsequently generated less 
common word associations than subjects in the other condition.  For example, these 
subjects would be more likely to think of “jeans”, or “jazz”, which are both statistically 
less common responses in the context of this experiment than “sky” or “green”.  Thus, 
the presence of a minority opinion during a period of eliberation influenced subjects’ 
subsequent thought processes.  Indirect effects such as these appear to be even more 
common than direct effects (Wood et al. 1994). 
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Though the research on minority influence has not yet focused on political 
deliberation, they may indeed have important implications for democratic processes.  The 
phenomenon suggests that exposure to opinions held by a minority may lead to the 
recognition of novel alternative perspectives and indirect attitude changes, ultimately 
enhancing the deliberative process (Mendelberg 2002: 164). 
Seeking viewpoint-reinforcing information and filtering out viewpoint-contrary 
information have similar effects on individual opinio  formation.  When these individuals 
come together in groups, however, their selective exposure behaviors have profoundly 
different implications for the well-being of the political process.  Individuals who use 
new ICTs to effectively reduce their familiarity with attitudes different from their own 
are likely to be more certain of their position and less tolerant of those with whom they 
disagree.  Groups devoid of disagreement are less able to generate multiple or creative 
problem solutions.  Given the broad importance of selective exposure to individual 
opinions and the specific impact of exposure to viewpoint-challenging information on the 
political process, it is crucial that we understand the choices individuals make about 
exposure to political information. 
Selective exposure theory and research 
The first theoretical predictions that selective exposure occurs were based on 
dissonance theory, which asserts that people who seek post-decision information prefer 
consonant information, which supports their viewpoint, over dissonant information, 
which challenges it (Festinger 1957).  As suggested above, preferences may be manifest 
in the form of greater attention to consonant content, avoidance of dissonant content, or 
both.   Selectivity occurs when people exercise a capa ity to shape their information 
exposure to match these preferences. 
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Research on ideologically-motivated selectivity dates back to the 1940s.  One of 
the most striking features of this literature is the inconsistency of the results.  In the more 
than half century since the topic was first considere , support for selective exposure has 
shifted radically, swinging from near-universal acceptance to outright dismissal and 
finally settling in a still-contested middle ground.  I review these contradictory findings in 
this section, and argue that they can be reconciled if we accept that political information 
seekers are drawn to viewpoint-reinforcing information but do not exhibit a 
corresponding aversion to political difference. 
Conflicting claims regarding ideologically-motivated selective exposure 
  Among the most influential and well-known studies r lated to the topic is 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet’s (1944) Erie County study.  The study used survey 
panel data to capture changes in the attitudes and behavior of 600 voters in Erie county, 
Ohio during the seven months leading up to the 1940 presidential election.  One of the 
most striking findings in terms of selective exposure was that about two-thirds of those 
who consistently expressed an intention to vote encou tered more information that 
supported their viewpoint than challenged it. 
Several experimental studies helped the theory of selective exposure gain 
acceptance over the next two decades.  For example, Brock and Balloun (1967) asked 
subjects to listen to an audio recording containing arguments for and against their 
opinion.  During playback the recording was mixed with noise.  Subjects could indicate 
their desire for clarification, thereby removing the noise, by pressing a button.  The study 
was conducted twice, once on the topic of religion, and the second on smoking.  The 
results showed that subjects were more likely to clarify messages that supported their 
viewpoint.  Returning to political information, Sears and Freedman (1963) found that 
given a choice, citizens opt to examine viewpoint supporting information prior to 
 
27 
viewpoint-challenging information.  Subjects were psented with a collection of 
pamphlets about the candidates in the 1962 California gubernatorial race.  Fifty-eight 
percent of the subjects choose a pamphlet supporting their favored candidate first.   
In 1967, however, Sears and Freedman  published a comprehensive review of the 
literature which suggests that empirical evidence for intentional ideological selectivity 
was weak.  For example, they observe that the evidence presented by Lazarsfeld et al. 
could be reinterpreted in light of the availability of partisan information in Erie County.  
Given that nearly 70% of the available political material supported the Republican 
candidate, “[i]t is…hardly surprising that 69.7% of those with Republican predispositions 
were exposed primarily to pro-Republican information…  The exposure of those with 
Republican predispositions almost exactly matched t partisan division of available 
information” (199).  On this view, the disproportionate exposure to Republican 
information was not a product of selectivity, but a reflection of the political information 
environment. 
In addition to this reinterpretation, Sears and Freedman identify several 
subsequent studies that further undermine claims regarding a general psychological 
preference for supportive information.  Two of these studies compare smokers’ and non-
smokers’ use of information on the relationship between smoking and lung cancer.  In 
these studies, subjects were asked to rank thirteen articles, including one that either 
supported or denied this relationship, according to their interest in reading them.  Feather 
(1962; 1963) found that smokers were generally more interested in reading about 
smoking and lung cancer, but they did not demonstrate a consistent preference for one 
type of information over the other.  In another frequ ntly used scenario for testing 
whether individuals tend to prefer viewpoint consonant information, subjects read 
transcript excerpts from a fictitious murder trial.  Participants were asked to assess the 
evidence and reach a verdict.  Once they had committed themselves to a position, 
subjects were presented with a collection of articles about the case, some favoring 
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acquittal and others, conviction.  The results from three of these studies suggest that 
subjects had no preference with regard to the relationship between the position espoused 
by the article and their decision:  they were equally likely to read viewpoint-supporting 
and viewpoint-challenging articles (Sears 1966; Freedman and Sears 1963; Sears and 
Freedman 1965).  In a fourth study, about a third of the subjects exhibited a preference 
for articles supporting their verdict (Sears 1965).  Taken as a whole, these experimental 
results, like the reinterpretation of the Erie County study data, lead Sears and Freedman 
to question the claim that individuals favor supportive information over challenging 
information. 
Sears and Freedman conclude that there is little consistent support for a general 
psychological preference for supportive information.  Of the 18 studies reviewed, five 
suggested a preference for supportive information, f ve a preference for nonsupportive 
information, and eight showed no evidence of preference.  They argued that to the extent 
that people do encounter less viewpoint-challenging information than viewpoint-
supporting information, the phenomenon is limited to e facto selectivity, whereby 
relatively greater exposure to consonant information is a byproduct of decisions unrelated 
to ideology.  For example, financial analysts may prefer to read the Wall Street Journal 
because of its coverage of financial news.  Their tendency to agree with the paper’s 
political views is not motivated by an effort to find support or avoid challenge; instead, it 
is a reflection of their political similarity with those who write about financial news. 
Though research dropped off significantly in the wake of Sears and Freedman’s 
(1965; 1967) work, new research supporting the selective exposure phenomenon 
continued to emerge.  In a variation of Feather’s smoker studies (1962, 1963), Brock 
(1965) presented subjects with articles supportive, unsupportive, or unrelated to the 
smoking-lung-cancer link, but told subjects they would be required to read their top-
ranked item.  Under these conditions, smokers were more likely to read information 
denying the relationship, though they exhibited no aversion to information supporting it.  
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There were also a few results supporting the influece of partisan selectivity in the 
acquisition of political information.  Lowin (1967) mailed letters to supporters of each of 
the two major candidates in the 1964 presidential election offering to send either of two 
brochures.  Some subjects were asked to choose betwen a brochure that strongly 
supported their preferred candidate and one that strongly supported the opponent, while 
others were asked to choose between a brochure that strongly criticized the opponent and 
one that strongly criticized their preferred candidate.  In both cases, subjects were much 
more likely to choose the brochure that positively r inforced their existing preferences.  
Another survey, which provided one of the few examples of dissonance avoidance, 
focused on people’s attention to the Watergate scandal.  In this study, Sweeney and 
Grubin (1984) found that committed Nixon supporters r ported being less interested in 
and less attentive to Watergate news than respondents who were undecided or who 
supported McGovern. 
In a second major review of literature on selective exposure, Frey (1986) sought 
to reestablish the legitimacy of the phenomenon.  He argued that the lack of support for 
selectivity prior to 1967 could be explained by Festinger’s (1964) later articulations of 
dissonance theory.  In his revised version, Festinger specified that selective exposure only 
occurs if an individual’s position is a product of choice and if the individual is personally 
committed to this position.  Festinger also identified several conditions under which 
dissonant information would be desirable, such as when dissonant information might be 
useful for future decisions.  Frey argued that earli r experiments failed to account for 
these important considerations.  Reviewing research that attended to these factors, he 
concluded that when individuals are selecting information about decisions reached on 
their own accord and to which they are committed, they exhibit a consistently strong 
preference for viewpoint-reinforcement.  Frey also argued that individuals engage in 




In addition to emphasizing support-seeking behavior, recent selective exposure 
research demonstrates that in many cases the same factors predict attention to consonant 
and dissonant information.  Cross-sectional survey data collected during the 1998 
gubernatorial race in California demonstrated that political knowledge, political curiosity, 
political activity, and education are all correlated with increased exposure to both types of 
information (Chaffee et al. 2001).  These results are similar to Feather’s (1962; Feather 
1963) finding, suggesting that interest in an issue can lead to increased exposure to the 
topic irrelevant of the position held. 
In terms of political information seeking, this revi w suggests that when seeking 
news about an issue of personal importance, an individual will be drawn to information 
supporting his or her viewpoint while remaining largely indifferent to, and sometimes 
desiring, exposure to other perspectives.  The important theoretical contribution here is 
disaggregating reinforcement seeking and challenge avoidance, treating the two 
phenomena as distinct.  This approach allows me to r c ncile the contradictory claims in 
contemporary research regarding selective exposure media effects.  On this view, an 
imbalance in exposure would result from differential investment in seeking activity, 
whereby an individual exerts relatively greater effort to find support, not from significant 
challenge avoidance.  This perspective also has important implications for the 
consequences of selective exposure on political tolerance and deliberation. 
Other factors influencing ideologically-motivated selective exposure 
There is some evidence that political ideology is related to an individual’s 
tendency to engage in selective exposure.  Data from the Erie County Study, when 
broken down in terms of political affiliation, show that only Republicans exhibited 
behaviors that could be described as selective avoid nce: Democrats were exposed 
equally to pro-Democratic and pro-Republican information (Sears and Freedman 1967).  
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Recent scholarship affirms this trend.  Data collected in the 2000 General Social Survey 
suggests that conservatives are more likely to engage in challenge avoidance than any 
other group (DiMaggio and Sato 2003; Baruh 2004).   
Though not historically connected to selective exposure practices, there is some 
reason to expect religious activity to have an influence as well.  Religious attendance has 
been shown to influence voting behavior (Peterson 1992; Harris 1994; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995), and political activity more broadly (Wuthnow 1999).  
Particularly relevant, research has also shown that religious attendance is correlated with 
political intolerance (Stouffer 1955; Reimer and Park 2001).  It seems reasonable to 
suggest that individuals who are less tolerant of other opinions might also be more 
inclined to avoid them.  Thus, religious attendance could be linked to selective avoidance. 
Data also suggest that individuals who regularly engage in issue-related activity 
could be more likely to engage in ideological selectivity.  On the whole, these political 
activists are more committed to their position than most Americans, and would therefore 
be expected to experience more cognitive dissonance upon encountering viewpoint-
challenging information (Festinger 1964).  Furthermo e, group polarization effects could 
reinforce member’s perceptions that other viewpoints do not merit consideration, 
increasing pressure to avoid other viewpoints (Sunstei  2002).  As a result, we might 
anticipate that individuals who frequently participate in political activity might be more 
likely to avoid viewpoint-challenging information.   
Selective exposure media effects 
Online news is unique in its ability to facilitate an individual’s search for 
information in accord with his own political preferences if he chooses to do so.  As 
Bimber and Davis observe (2003: 152), the web affords access to a greater volume of 
political information, more diversity of sources, and a higher level of control than any of 
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the other major media.  The significance of this capacity on the selective exposure 
phenomenon is again a subject of debate. 
There are conflicting results regarding the relationship between media-enabled 
capacities to control information exposure and viewpoint selectivity.  Some scholars 
argue that increasing control will be associated with a significant drop in exposure to 
political difference, while others hold that the data do not support such an assertion. 
On one hand, Mutz and Martin (2001) argue that control and exposure to 
challenge are inversely correlated.  They found that among traditional media sources, 
those offering the most partisan content are associated with reduced exposure to 
dissonant information.  For example, people are less likely to encounter viewpoints that 
differ from their own when listening to talk radio than when reading a newspaper or 
watching television.  Similarly, they found that ind viduals who can choose among 
competing local sources of partisan news tend to have less contact with dissonant 
information than those living in areas served by a single (less-partisan) local news source. 
On the other hand, research examining people’s use of campaign information 
sources offering a balanced mix of viewpoints and high levels of control found no 
evidence of one candidate’s supporters avoiding information about the other (Iyengar et 
al. 2003). The study was based on subjects’ use of a multimedia CD containing extensive 
information about the two candidates in the 2000 presidential election.  The CD included 
texts of major speeches, video of televised ads, and texts of the party platforms. 
Similarly, analyses of 2000 and 2002 General Social Survey (GSS) data provide 
little evidence that people are using the Internet to avoid political difference.  Strong 
partisanship is associated with the use of viewpoint-reinforcing sites, but not with a 
reduction in the use of viewpoint-contrary sites (Baruh 2004).  Overall, 2000 GSS 
respondents used sites that are neutral or that challenge their viewpoint as often as they 
use those that reinforce it (DiMaggio and Sato 2003).  Furthermore, they frequently 
report that their use of these sites helped them shape their opinion, not just reinforce it. 
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Another survey conducted in 2000 examining knowledge of the presidential 
campaign offers evidence that the Internet could potentially reduce the effects of partisan 
selectivity.  In her study of this data, Stroud (2004) found that seeking political 
information online was associated with comparable increases in knowledge about both 
presidential candidates, especially among individuals with the lowest levels of political 
knowledge. 
It is, however, possible to reconcile evidence thatpeople engage in selective 
exposure with the evidence that they do not avoid viewpoint-challenging information.  
Mutz and Martin take their findings as evidence that people prefer congruent partisan 
sources to those that include other viewpoints, but there are alternate interpretations.  
First, exposure differences may be another expression of the different purposes 
motivating the use of these news outlets.  For example, individuals may use television or 
newspapers in order to learn about both sides of anissue, and then turn to talk radio to 
obtain more detailed or more thorough viewpoint-reinforcing information.  It may also be 
that for some individuals, highly partisan sources such as talk radio are valued as a source 
of entertainment, not of complete or balanced information.  In either case, individual’s 
media use will vary depending on their purposes.  Second, the difference could reflect the 
fact that the comparisons focus on individuals selecting among partisan sources, not 
between partisan sources and those that are less partisan.  An individual who chooses a 
source in which he can find support for his own viewpoint over one in which his 
viewpoint is absent might most strongly prefer a source representing both perspectives.  
In other words, the data could reflect a form of de acto selective avoidance, motivated by 
something other than an aversion to viewpoint-challenging information.  In this case, we 
would expect that an individual who chooses a viewpoint-consistent partisan publication 
would, given the option, actually prefer a source in which his views are represented 
alongside information about other perspectives. Mutz and Martin’s analyses do not 
contradict these alternative explanations. 
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Most data on the relationship between media-enabled exposure control and 
selectivity are consistent with the hypothesis thatcitizens seek viewpoint reinforcement 
without avoiding challenge.  The widespread adoption of online news provides an 
exceptional opportunity to test this assertion.  As noted above, people who get their news 
online have the opportunity to seek viewpoint support, t  avoid viewpoint challenge, 
both, or neither.  What they choose to do in this environment provides evidence of their 
underlying preferences. 
Limitations of the Internet for viewpoint selectivity 
I have argued that citizens do engage in selective exposure practices, and that 
these practices have significant implications for opinion formation and political tolerance.  
I have also suggested that the ways that users get news online can tell us something about 
their underlying preferences.  Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the 
significance of contemporary online news use.  Citizens who get political information 
online have more opportunities to shape the ideological composition of their news 
environment than ever before, but this capacity has limits.  In practice, contemporary 
information technologies, including online news, afford imperfect control.  Thus, the 
political information exposure practices of online ws users are suggestive, but they are 
far from definitive.  In this section I describe two types of limitations on the selectivity 
afforded by new ICTs, and discuss what they mean for our understanding of the future of 
selective exposure and technology. 
Imperfect searching and filtering 
Despite the obvious sophistication of contemporary c pabilities, information 
technologies today have clear limitations with regad to their ability to facilitate 
viewpoint selectivity.  As noted, online news users have easy access to an immense 
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universe of political sources representing a wider range of viewpoints than found in a 
typical local news market, but the mechanisms by which search engines discover and 
rank pages prevent sources from realizing equal visibility.   
The number of people visiting the most popular web sites is orders of magnitude 
greater than those visiting the less popular sites.  Link structure and search-engine 
mechanisms have resulted in this power-law distribution of web site audiences in general 
(Albert et al. 1999; Huberman and Adamic 1999; Barabasi and Albert 1999) and among 
political news users in particular (Hindman et al. 2003).  Well-known sites have many 
more inlinks (links to it from other sites) and are th refore much more likely to be found, 
whether the user follows links or uses a search engin , such as Google, that ranks pages 
based on incoming links (Page et al. 1998).  So while the Web does offer a variety of 
ideologically-oriented alternative news sites, these sites have nowhere near the visibility 
of the sites of major news organizations or high-profile web portals, such as Yahoo or 
AOL. 
While this does not diminish the claim that radical ontent exists and can be 
accessed via the web, it draws attention to the fact th t finding viewpoint-consistent 
sources, especially those representing views outside of the political mainstream, takes 
time, energy, and skill.  Seeking these sources requir s either prior knowledge of the 
news product itself, or a willingness to engage in what can be an effortful search process.  
If a search is undertaken, it requires appropriately articulated search terms or link-
following strategies, an assessment of search results, and, in many cases, repeated failures 
in order to identify a desirable source. 
Seeking out information that a self-described conservative Republican would find 
supportive is not difficult because there are numerous news sources explicitly espousing 
this ideology; however, many people’s political beliefs are more ambiguous.  Imagine an 
individual whose political identity is defined by a constellation of issue positions:  he 
opposes big government, supports abortion rights, is unsure about gay marriage, is 
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worried about the environment, and has not thought much about social security.  It is 
likely that there is a source–be it a formal news organization, an issue-oriented news site, 
or a blog–that this hypothetical reader would agree with most of the time.  There are, 
however, no tools that allow news seekers to easily identify sources based on their unique 
constellation of political predispositions.  As a result, the sources used by the 
hypothetical semi-libertarian pro-environment hesitant-on-gay-marriage pro-choicer for 
social security reform are more profoundly shaped by the contingencies of the search 
process than his news preferences.   
Automated search technologies further enable individuals to exert control over 
their news diet.  Many news sites allow users to perform keyword searches of the current 
content and archives.  News aggregation services, including those offered by Google, 
Yahoo, and Microsoft, allow users to search across thousands of news sites 
simultaneously.  The results of these searches frequently include content representing a 
diverse range of ideologies.  Contemporary search tools do not, however, allow 
individuals to narrow results based on ideology explicitly.  Though one can search for 
news containing terms that reflect a particular position, this is an imperfect strategy for 
shaping exposure, simultaneously omitting relevant co tent and including viewpoint-
challenging information.  For example, consider some ne seeking abortion news 
consistent with her own political opinion.  Using “pro-choice” as a search term might 
yield results including both pro-choice arguments and pro-life arguments critiquing the 
concept of “choice”, while excluding an extensive amount of relevant news on “abortion 
rights”.  Other topics are even more problematic.  There are no well-established terms 
representing the debate over gay marriage, making it difficult for someone searching for 
information on this topic to easily filter out other views through their choice of search 
terms. 
It should also be noted that such limitations may yet be overcome.  Two research 
areas appear particularly promising with regard to the automatic creation of 
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ideologically-derived indices and filtering.  First, collaborative filtering has been 
successfully deployed in a number of environments.  These systems use the preferences 
of large groups of people to make recommendations fr pecific individuals (Resnick et 
al. 1994).  The recommendations offered to consumers by the online merchant Amazon 
are a particularly well-known example.  This system attempts to impute customers’ book 
preferences based on their prior purchases and on explicit evaluations of items read (if the 
customer volunteers this information).  Using this model of preferences, Amazon can 
offer recommendations by identifying items that other customers with similar interests 
have purchased.    
In another variation on collaborative information filtering, the online technology 
news site Slashdot uses a distributed moderation system to assess news items (Lampe and 
Resnick 2004).  In this system, thousands of users participate in the rating of news and 
commentary, and aggregate ratings can be used to sort and filter results as users browse 
or search the site.  The system does not, however, affo d user-level personalization, so 
selectivity only occurs to the extent that all users agree. 
Research on the topic of collaborative filtering continues apace (e.g., the work of 
the GroupLens project, http://www.grouplens.org/), and the deployment of these 
technologies in the political news market seems likely.  A system that encourages users to 
rate their agreement with news items, and uses the aggregate assessment information to 
recommend news stories that are most closely aligned with an individual’s own 
ideological proclivities is a small variation on what has already been done. 
A second approach is tailored specifically to the task of identifying partisanship.  
Research has shown that political sites tend to be embedded in ideologically-consistent 
networks (Hindman et al. 2003; Adamic and Glance 2005).  Though still preliminary, 
early efforts to construct indices of partisanship based on the networks of links between 
political documents found on the web have been quite effective (Efron 2004).  This 
technique was used to correctly identify whether a document represented liberal or 
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conservative views with 94% accuracy; political blogs were correctly classified with 99% 
accuracy.  Assessing ideology requires more than distinguishing between liberal and 
conservative leaning, but this research provides a powerful proof of concept.  Examining 
political information in the context of other information resources provides an effective 
indicator of ideology. 
The limitations identified here clearly impinge on users’ ability to practice 
ideologically-motivated selectivity online.  There are a variety of technologies on the 
horizon that could enable users to more easily and effectively take political attitudes into 
account when retrieving or filtering political information.  In light of these developments, 
we must be careful not to read too much into contemporary uses of the Internet. 
Technology in practice 
In spite of the limitations described, new ICTs arepowerful enough to enable 
heightened selectivity.  By combining existing capabilities, individuals can theoretically 
filter out political content with which they disagree.   How people actually use new 
information technologies, however, may be an even more powerful limiting factor: there 
is significant evidence that individuals are fairly unsophisticated in their use of online 
search tools.  Though most Internet users have used search engines and feel confident in 
their ability to acquire information online, they do not use these tools frequently and 
often fail to understand important distinctions in search results, such as the difference 
between sponsored results and those ranked based on user-supplied criteria (Fallows 
2005).  Furthermore, most search engine users rely on fairly simple search strategies, and 
ignore the more sophisticated alternatives available (Hargittai 2004).   
Technologies only matter to the extent that they ar integrated into practice 
(Orlikowski 2000).  Many factors, including individual skills, habits, and routines, 
fundamentally shape how new capacities are used.  If people are unaware of the filtering 
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capabilities described, or if they choose not to use them for any reason, then new 
technologies have not significantly altered their exposure practices.   
With time, existing and new capacities may become more widely understood and 
used.  “Search engine” and “Google” have become household words, and the 
technologies are routinely used by most Americans for a wide variety of tasks (Fallows 
2005).  Online news is also rapidly becoming more popular (Kohut et al. 2004).  As 
online news filtering is integrated into individual and organizational routines, people are 
likely to realize a political news environment that more closely matches their preferences. 
Social practices, as much as technical capabilities, constrain how new ICTs are 
used.  If existing or new technologies facilitating deologically-motivated selective 
exposure become more widely used in the future, citizens’ exposure to political 
information could be dramatically different than it is today. 
Hypotheses 
The literature suggests that when seeking political information about issues that 
matter to them, citizens engage in ideological selectiv  exposure.  These practices have 
important consequences, shaping public opinion and potentially altering political 
tolerance levels and the quality of deliberation.  I argue that this selectivity is primarily 
enacted in the form of seeking viewpoint-reinforcing formation, and not as challenge 
avoidance.  I propose to test the following five hypotheses: 
H1. Individuals like being exposed to viewpoint-reinforcing information. 
That is, the more viewpoint-reinforcing information a news item contains, the 
more likely an individual will be to look at it and the more time he will spend reading.  
This also means that individuals who have more control over their news diet will have 




H2. Nonconservatives are indifferent about exposure to viewpoint-challenging 
information. 
That is, the presence of viewpoint-challenging information does not influence the 
likelihood that a moderate or liberal subject will read a news item or how long the subject 
will spend reading.  This also means that moderates and liberals who have more control 
over their news diet will have the same level of familiarity with the arguments 
challenging their viewpoint as those with less contr l. 
H3. Conservatives mildly dislike being exposed to viewpoint-challenging 
information. 
That is, the presence of viewpoint-challenging information negatively influences 
the likelihood that a conservative subject will read a news item or how long the subject 
will spend reading.  This also means that conservatives who have more control over their 
news diet will have the less familiarity with the arguments challenging their viewpoint 
than those with less control. 
H4. Individuals who are more involved in ideologically-oriented activity, such as 
political and religious activity, also mildly dislike being exposed to viewpoint-
challenging information. 
Individuals active in issue-based activism or religious social networks will pay 
less attention to information with which they disagree.  Their overall familiarity with 
opposing opinions will be lower than those who are less active. 
H5. Individuals like viewpoint-challenging information if and only if they have 
exposure to viewpoint-reinforcing information. 
Individuals have little or no aversion to viewpoint-challenging information, and 
recognize that contact with such information can be us ful in some circumstances; 
however, they prefer their exposure to viewpoint challenges to occur when viewpoint-
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supporting information is readily accessible.  As a consequence, nonpartisan sources in 
the online news market will be used more frequently than otherwise comparable partisan 
sources.  Individuals who use partisan sources prefer those that support their viewpoint 
and will generally use nonpartisan sources as well. 
 
Prior research also suggests that many variables aff ct consonant and dissonant 
information exposure similarly.  Factors such as increasing open mindedness, political 
interest, education, and age are all associated with increased exposure to both types of 
information.  When testing the hypotheses above it is necessary to control for these 
potentially confounding factors.  
 
New ICTs, which afford users unprecedented control of the kinds of political 
information they encounter, make it more feasible for individuals to realize these 
preferences.  This affords two opportunities for testing the hypotheses listed above.  First, 
I can compare the political information exposure of online news users to those who do 
not get their news online.  To the extent that technology augments users’ ability to control 
their information environment, an individual’s overall information exposure in this 
environment is likely to better reflect his or her exposure preferences.  Second, I can 
observe decisions that individuals make in an enviro ment that affords significant control 
over political information exposure.  Choices made in such an environment provide 
another source of insight into individual preferencs. 
Conclusion 
The goal of this project is to enhance our understanding of how new ICT-based 
news seeking will affect individual exposure to political information, and to suggest what 
consequences these practices might have for political d scourse around controversial 
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issues.  If these hypotheses are correct, they should allay some of the most pessimistic 
fears regarding the future of political disagreement.  They suggest that citizen users of 
selectivity-enhancing technology will realize a shift in their exposure to political 
information.  It will likely be a shift toward stronger, less arbitrary attitudes that are more 
consistently aligned with a particular ideology.  It will not, however, be a shift toward a 
more polarized or intolerant society. 
In the next chapter I describe two studies designed to assess these hypotheses.  
The first is a survey intended to test the claims rega ding the influence of the Internet on 
political information exposure today.  The second is an experiment created to examine 
how people use political information when seeking news in an environment that offers 




This research project addresses two related sets of questions.  The first regards the 
Internet’s influence on individuals’ overall exposure to political information, while the 
second concerns the decisions they make about their us  of specific news items.  The two 
groups of questions are best addressed with different m thodologies.  In order to examine 
Americans’ news diet overall, I use data collected via a representative national telephone 
survey.  To gain insight into their choices on a story-by-story basis, data were collected 
using a web-administered experiment, with respondents recruited from several well-
known partisan news sites.  This chapter describes each methodology in turn. 
Survey Design 
I collaborated with a team of researchers to design a survey to assess my first set 
of research questions. iii  The national telephone survey was sponsored by the Pew 
Internet and American Life Project and administered by Princeton Survey Research 
Associates (PSRA) between June 14 and July 3 2004, shortly before the party 
conventions.  A pretest of the instrument conducted a few weeks prior to full deployment 
helped ensure that the questions and instructions were clear.   
                                                
iii  Other major contributors included Paul Resnick at the University of Michigan, John 
Horrigan and Lee Rainie at the Pew Internet and American Life Project, and Kristen 
Purcell at Princeton Survey Research Associates. 
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Sampling and administration 
Respondents were contacted via a random digit sample of telephone numbers.  
Following standard PSRA protocol, interviewers asked to speak with the youngest adult 
male at home at the time of the call.  If no males w re present, the interview was 
conducted with the oldest adult female present.  This is a standard randomization 
technique used in the survey industry, and has beenshown to produce samples very close 
to the actual distribution of the general public (Keeter et al. 2000).  Young males and 
older females are the hardest subsamples of the population to get in a telephone survey; 
asking for them first helps to balance out this know  nonresponse bias. The overall 
response rate was 31.2% (77% contact, 43% cooperation, nd 94% completion).  The 
result is a representative sample of English-speaking non-incarcerated adults Americans.  
The final sample included 1,510 adults from across the continental United States.   
Variables: measurement and scale construction 
The survey included several types of questions relevant to this research (see Table 
7; the complete survey is included in Appendix A).   battery of questions assessed 
respondents’ Internet use, including the speed of their Internet access at home and at 
work, their use of online news sources, and their Internet experience in years.  These 
items were used as measures of individuals’ ability to shape their information 
environment.  This is based on the fact that those who use online news more frequently 
have greater opportunity to utilize the selectivity-enhancing capabilities of the Internet, 
while more experienced Internet users are also likely to be familiar with some of the 
more sophisticated tools for navigating news online.  From familiar technologies, such as 
web search engines and portals featuring top headlines, to newer and more complex 
services, such as the multi-source news aggregation provided by Google News, 
knowledgeable users have a variety of resources that can help them control their 
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information exposure.  Given these capacities, online news users ought to be able to 
realize a news environment that more closely reflects their preferences.  For example, if 
individuals are systematically avoiding viewpoint-challenging information, then online 
news users should have less contact with such content. 
In reference to the campaign, the survey included a series of items about 
respondents’ candidate preferences for the 2004 presidential election, and their level of 
campaign news surveillance.   
The survey also included five questions designed to assess respondents’ open 
mindedness, which were based on selections from the 36-item California Psychological 
Inventory - Openness scale (CPI-Op) (Hakstian and Farrell 2001).  These items were 
crafted to reflect the study’s focus on politics, decision-making, and information 
exposure.  Though the CPI-Op scale has been tested a  a whole, the set of questions 
created for this study are new and their validity as a scale was untested.  In the analysis 
stage it was determined that these items had very low scale reliability (Cronbach alpha = 
0.28).  Principal component analysis provided additional evidence that these items 
measured different phenomena: two components explained only 52% of the variance, and 
four components were required to explain more than 75% of the variance.  For this 
reason, these items are treated separately in all aalyses.   
Finally, the survey included a collection of demographic questions, including 




Table 7. Survey questions – Internet access, candid ate preferences, campaign activity, 
open-mindedness 
Internet access 
Do you ever go online to access the Internet or World Wide Web or to send and receive email? 
About how many years have you had access to the Internet? 
IF ONLINE UNDER A YEAR: 
About how many months is that? 
ASK IF GO ONLINE AT HOME: 
Does the computer you use at home connect to the Internet through a dial-up telephone line, or 
do you have some other type of connection, such as a DSL-enabled phone line, a cable TV 
modem, a wireless connection, or a T-1 or fiber optic connection? 
ASK IF GO ONLINE FROM WORK:  
Do you happen to know what kind of Internet connection you have at WORK, a high-speed 
connection or dial-up connection through a modem?  
IF HAVE BROADBAND AT HOME: 
About how many years have you had high-speed Internet service at home? 
IF HAVE BROADBAND LESS THAN A YEAR: 
About how many months is that?   
 
Campaign surveillance 
How closely have you been following news about the upcoming Presidential election?  Very 
closely, somewhat closely, not too closely, or not at all closely? 
 
Candidate preferences 
Suppose the election for president were being held TODAY and the candidates were… Who 
would you vote for?  George W. Bush, the Republican; John Kerry, the Democrat; and Ralph 
Nader, an Independent candidate 
As of today, do you lean more toward...  Bush, the Republican; Kerry, the Democrat; or Nader, 
the Independent  
Suppose there were only two presidential candidates on the ballot and you had to choose 
between... (INSERT CHOICES). If the election were held today, who would you vote for?  
FORM A 
George W. Bush, the Republican; and John Kerry, the Democrat 
FORM B 
John Kerry, the Democrat; and George W. Bush, the Republican 
 
Open mindedness 
I’m going to read you a few statements.  For each one, please tell me if this describes you very 
well, somewhat well, not too well, or not at all. 
After I gather all the facts about something, I make up my mind pretty quickly 
I like to read about a lot of different things 
I find it difficult to make up my mind when I have too much information about something 
Once I have my mind made up about something, I seldom change it 
I enjoy hearing about politics and world affairs  
Note:  For analysis, open-mindedness responses have been coded such that larger numbers 
correspond to greater openness.   
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The instrument used two distinct mechanisms to assess information exposure, 
corresponding to the two opportunities that online information seekers have to influence 
their exposure to political information.  Before reviewing the specific measures, consider 
the two forms of influence.  The first is source selectivity.  Once online, individuals have 
access to a range of sources, from those that offer a r latively balanced view to those that 
explicitly reject balance in favor of political bias.  The online publications of news 
organizations such as CNN, the Washington Post, and the New York Times provide a 
ready example of the former, while CNSNews.com (“The Right News. Right Now.”) and 
the left-leaning AlterNet exemplify the latter.  The second is content selectivity.  There 
are a variety of tools for searching and filtering online content.  From familiar 
technologies, such as web search engines and portals featuring top headlines, to newer 
and more complex services, such as the multi-source news search and aggregation 
services provided by Google News, knowledgeable users have a variety of resources that 
can help them control their information exposure.  Capitalizing on these capacities, an 
individual could create a homogeneous media environment out of a collection of 
relatively heterogeneous sources. 
The exposure measures reflected the two modes of online selectivity.  In order to 
identify sources of political information, interview rs asked all respondents to indicate 
which of several types of media they used, and asked Int rnet users about their use of 
online political news generally and several types of political web sites in particular (See 
Table 8).  
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Table 8. Survey questions – Online political inform ation exposure  
Do you ever get news or information about the candidates and the campaign on the Internet or 
through email?   
How often do you get news or information about the candidates and the campaign on the Internet 
or through email – everyday or almost everyday, several times a week, several times a month, or 
less often? 
Where have you gotten MOST of your news and information about the presidential election 
campaigns?  From television, from newspapers, from radio, from magazines, or from the Internet 
and email?   (ACCEPT TWO RESPONSES)   
In the past 12 months, did you happen to visit any of the following websites? 
The website of a major news organization, such as cnn.com or msnbc.com  
The website of an INTERNATIONAL news organization, such as the BBC or Aljazeera 
The website of an ALTERNATIVE news organization, such as AlterNet.org or NewsMax.com 
The website of a politically LIBERAL organization, such as People for the American Way or 
Moveon.org 
The website of a politically CONSERVATIVE organization, such as the Christian Coalition or 
the American Enterprise Institute 
Form A 
GeorgeWBush.com, the President’s official reelection website  
JohnKerry.com, the official website of the Kerry campaign 
Form B: 
RNC.com, the official website of the Republican National Committee 
DNC.com, the official website of the Democratic National Committee 
The survey also included measures of the number of opinion-reinforcing and 
opinion-challenging arguments individuals had encoutered.  Interviewers asked 
respondents about their familiarity with a series of arguments about the candidates in the 
2004 presidential election.  The research team identified two arguments supporting and 
two challenging each candidate, for a total of eight arguments in all (See Table 9).  The 
viewpoint-reinforcement score was a summative measur  based on individuals’ 
familiarity with the statements favoring their preferred candidate or criticizing the 
opponent, with respondents receiving one point for each argument they heard at least 
once in a while.  The viewpoint-challenge score wascomputed using the other four items.  
The resultant scores are summarized in Table 10. 
The summary of exposure scores demonstrates that the distributions of exposure 
are different for Bush and Kerry supporters.  This reflects the fact that the opinion 
statements were interpreted differently for the twoypes of voters–an argument that was 
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treated as reinforcing for Bush supporters was said to be challenging for Kerry supporters 
and vice versa–and that Bush arguments were better known overall (t=2.042, df=1369, 
p<.05).  Given the difference in the interpretation and distribution of the dependent 
variables for Bush and Kerry supporters, the two groups are treated separately in all 
analyses. 
Table 9. Survey questions – Exposure to opinion sta tements  
I’m going to read different arguments people make about the Presidential candidates and their 
policies.  Please tell me how often you have heard or read each argument – frequently, just once 
in a while, or never.  Here’s the (first/next) one… 
IF R SUPPORTS BUSH, ASK BLOCK 1 FIRST, OTHERWISE ASK BLOCK 2 FIRST. 
BLOCK 1 
The Bush administration’s policies have helped the country’s economy begin to recover 
George Bush is a stronger leader than John Kerry in the war against terrorism 
John Kerry changes his positions on the issues when he thinks it will help him win an election 
John Kerry has a history of accepting money from special interest groups 
BLOCK 2 
John Kerry will end special treatment for corporations and wealthy Americans 
The Bush administration misled the American public about the reasons for going to war with Iraq  
John Kerry has a better strategy than George Bush for creating peace in Iraq 
Some Bush administration policies are a threat to basic civil rights and civil liberties 
Creating the list of arguments on which to base the exposure measures was a 
multistage process.  A preliminary list of statements was selected from items used in 
other recent political surveys.  Next I identified two high-profile campaign-oriented web 
sites for each side of each debate using Google’s directory service.  I selected sites with 
the highest PageRank score, a relevance measure based on a variety of factors including 
how many other sites link to it, and found arguments by seeking out relevant sections.  
These sections were listed under heading such as “information about candidate”, “talking 
points”, “advertisements”, “action alerts”, and so forth.  I then coded this text and video 
using open-ended codes, placing no limit on the number of codes assigned to an item.  As 
coding progressed, codes were grouped into conceptual clusters and labeled, and these 
clusters were iteratively revised as new codes were added.  Finally, the list of statements 
was modified to more closely match the concepts ident fi d in the coding process.  In the 
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final list, we intentionally selected a mix of high- and low-prominence statements to help 
ensure that some arguments would be unfamiliar evento those who regularly followed 
the campaign. 
Table 10. Exposure scores 
Exposure scores N Min Max Mean SD 
Bush supporters      
Opinion-reinforcing 694 0 4 3.04 1.07 
Opinion-challenging 694 0 4 2.41 1.19 
Kerry supporters      
Opinion-reinforcing 676 0 4 2.83 1.06 
Opinion-challenging 676 0 4 2.33 1.36 
Bush and Kerry supporters overall  
Favoring Bush 1370 0 4 2.69 1.27 
Favoring Kerry 1370 0 4 2.62 1.15 
Source: Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
Focusing on respondents’ exposure to arguments has advantages over asking them 
to describe the mental processes influencing their exposure decisions.  Individuals are 
notoriously bad at identifying the mental processes that influence their behavior based on 
introspection.  Research suggests that people are incapable of such insight (Nisbett and 
Wilson 1977): they can report what they know but not how they know it.   
Asking about exposure to particular arguments also has advantages over relying 
on respondents’ impressions of their aggregate political information exposure. It is easier 
for individuals to assess whether a particular argument is familiar than their overall 
exposure levels to a class of arguments.  I sum respondents’ familiarity with specific 
arguments for both sides in order to assign aggregate scores for consonant and dissonant 
exposure. 
This approach differs somewhat from those used in the s udies reviewed in 
Chapter 2, meriting a brief comparison.  Mutz and Martin (2001) asked respondents to 
assess the extent to which they agree with the political leanings of their preferred news 
outlets.  Their survey focused on attitudes related to the 1996 presidential election and to 
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political news more generally.  Like the approach taken in this study, their technique 
relies on respondents’ ability to recall contact with political information.  There are, 
however, a few important differences.  Their instrument asked respondents to broadly 
characterize a source as providing predominantly consonant or dissonant information.  
This technique offers no detailed information about the relative level of exposure to 
consonant and dissonant information.  As a consequence, a news outlet providing high 
levels of exposure to consonant a d dissonant information, with only slightly more 
consonant exposure, is treated as equivalent to one that provides consonant information 
to the exclusion of dissonant information.  The survey instrument used here provides 
separate consonant and dissonant exposure measures. 
Stroud’s (2004) analysis employs another interesting alternative to the approach 
used here.  She focuses on respondents’ knowledge about the positions held by the two 
leading candidates in the 2000 election.  Knowledge about the supported candidate is 
treated as evidence of consonant information exposure, while knowledge about the 
opponent is a measure of dissonant information exposure.  An advantage of this 
technique is that it greatly reduces the risk that respondents are attempting to provide 
responses that reflect normative social values; it i  more difficult to guess the correct 
answer to a factual question than to falsely claim to have heard a statement.  On the other 
hand, notions of consonance and dissonance are more complicated in the context of 
candidate positions than in the context of opinion statements.  For example, in Stroud’s 
study knowing that George W. Bush supports the death penalty was treated as evidence 
of exposure to dissonant information for a respondent supporting Al Gore because it 
reflected contact with information about the opposing candidate.  If the individual also 
opposed the death penalty, however, knowledge of Bush’s position could be construed as 
consonant because it helps justify the individual’s opposition to Bush.  In this study 
questions about argument familiarity were unambiguously supportive of a single 
candidate.  For example, the statement, “Bush administration’s policies have helped the 
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country’s economy begin to recover” would in no way reinforce a Kerry supporter’s 
position. 
A few prior studies have, however, used measures similar to those used in this 
study to assess respondents’ argument repertoires both for and against their position.  In 
at least two surveys examining the causes and consequences of cross-cutting information 
exposure, researchers asked open-ended questions abut respondents’ awareness of 
opinion rationales (Price t al. 2002: 99; Mutz 2002: 115).  As with Stroud’s study, this 
open-ended approach reduces the likelihood that social desirability will influence 
individual responses.  At the same time, however, this approach has at least two 
disadvantages.  It is much more burdensome, requiring more time for data collection and 
subsequent coding, and it increases the risk that respondents will fail to recall the full 
range of arguments heard. 
Memory is fallible, and any technique that relies on respondent-provided accounts 
of information exposure risks introducing error.  There is evidence that people are 
selective with regard to what information they retain, nd are more likely to remember 
encountering information that runs counter to their expectations (Stangor and McMillan 
1992; Koriat et al. 2000).  Attitude, however, does not consistently influence memory.  
Individuals exhibit no bias toward either attitude-consistent or attitude-inconsistent 
information (Eagly et al. 1999; Holbrook et al. 2005: 750).  Even if individuals did 
engage in attitude-based selective retention, there is no reason to expect that this would 
affect those who get news online more than those who get news offline, and it would not 
make a correlation between online news use and a change in exposure to disagreement 
any more likely.  Thus, this measurement inaccuracy should not affect my ability to 




The hypotheses described in Chapter 2 describe individual preferences and 
behaviors in broad terms.  This chapter spells out the specific methods employed to test 
these assertions.  In light of the methods described in this section, I propose the following 
adaptations of the five high-level hypotheses.  These more specific claims reflect the 
survey’s focus on overall information exposure. 
 
H1a. Individuals who have more control over their news diet will have greater 
familiarity with the arguments supporting their viewpoint than those with 
less control. 
H1b. Individuals who use online partisan sources will prefer those that support 
their viewpoint to those that do not. 
H2a. Nonconservatives who have more control over their news diet will have the 
same level of familiarity with the arguments challenging their viewpoint as 
those with less control. 
H3a. Conservatives who have more control over their news diet will have slightly 
less familiarity with the arguments challenging their viewpoint then those 
with less control. 
H4a. Individuals active in religious social networks will have slightly less 
familiarity with opposing opinions than those who are less active. 
H5a. Online news users will prefer nonpartisan sources to otherwise comparable 
partisan sources. 
H5b. Individuals who use online partisan sources will generally also use sources 
that provide more balance. 
H5c. Individuals who use online partisan sources will only use viewpoint-




A variety of statistical techniques are used in the analysis of the survey, including 
confidence interval comparisons, chi-square tests, and linear regression.  In all cases, 
analyses were conducted using population weights to correct for known sampling biases 
in random digit dial telephone surveys.  PSRA explains their procedure for calculating 
these weights as follows:  “The demographic weighting parameters are derived from a 
special analysis of the Census Bureau’s March 2003 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement Survey. This analysis produced population parameters for the demographic 
characteristics of adults age 18 or older, living i households that contain a telephone. 
These parameters were then compared with the sample characteristics to construct sample 
weights. The weights were derived using an iterative technique that simultaneously 
balances the distribution of all weighting parameters.” 
Experimental Design 
I conducted a web-based experiment to test whether making ideologically-
motivated selectivity easier influences people’s political information exposure.  The 
experimental environment afforded subjects a significant level of control over their news 
exposure.  Participants were presented with a political y diverse collection of news items, 
they had a variety of cues to help them identify the ideological orientation of each item (a 
headline, source, and synopsis), and they had complete control over which items they 
used, in what order they looked at them, and how long they spent reading.   
There were two stages to the experiment.  First, I presented subjects with a 
heterogeneous set of news items representing a range of political viewpoints, asking them 
to assess the extent to which the content was supportive f and/or challenging to their 
viewpoint on the basis of a brief description of each item. I then observed subjects’ use of 
the items, recording which they chose to read and how long they spent reading them.  In 
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my analysis I use linear and logistic regression to examine the factors influencing 
variations in use across the pool of subjects. 
This methodology was developed in the context of a l ng history of experimental 
research on selective exposure.  Between-subjects experimental designs, which compare 
different subjects under different conditions (as opp sed to comparing behaviors of a 
single subject under a variety of conditions), have oft n been employed to study how 
individuals use political information (Cook and Campbell 1979).  Computer-administered 
studies of news use also have precedent.  For example, several researcher have invited 
subjects into a lab to use a custom-built online newspapers or newsmagazines that 
automatically manipulate and/or log use of the news content (Althaus and Tewksbury 
2000; Althaus and Tewksbury 2002; Knobloch et al. 2003a Knobloch et al. 2003b 
Knobloch 2004; Sundar 1998; Sundar and Nass 2001; Valentino et al. 2004).  Other 
researchers have provided subjects with computer-based resources in their homes and 
recorded information about their use of these information tools (Iyengar et al. 2003; 
Lupia and Baird 2003; Neuman et al. 1996). 
The study described here, however, is unique in two regards.  First, the 
experiment was conducted online, which afforded a number of valuable opportunities.  It 
allowed me to recruit online news users from across the country rather than relying on 
locally accessible subjects to obtain data.  It also meant that subjects could participate 
using the same computer they would normally use to access online news, meaning that 
the environment in which the experiment was conducted was quite similar to the one in 
which the behavior of interest normally occurs.  The second unique attribute of the study 
is that its administration was fully automated, furthe  expanding the benefits of 
conducting it online.  Subjects could complete the study at any time, day or night, just as 
they might use any other online news.  Automation also greatly reduced the burden on the 
researcher, which translated into many more completions than would otherwise be 
possible.  Nearly 1,000 people participated in the 30-minute experiment.  Finally, the 
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experiment used actual news items selected in real-time from the online news media.  
There was no need to ask subjects to imagine that storie  were timely or to select topics 
were timeliness was unimportant.  This was the content that subjects would choose 
among if they used contemporary news-search tools.  Though none of these attributes is 
entirely unique in itself, taken together they represent a novel methodology for studying 
how real online news users make decisions about current news. 
Sampling 
I recruited subjects from two distinct populations: (1) English-speaking adult 
Americans who use partisan online news services, and, more broadly, (2) the general 
population of English speaking adults living in thecontinental United States.  I selected 
the first group because I anticipated that these individuals, who were already using the 
online news environment to shape their exposure to political information, would be 
particularly likely to engage in ideological selective exposure.  The second group, on the 
other hand, was intended to be more representative of the U.S. population at large.  As 
explained below, however, the response rate for the second group was very low and I 
ultimately chose to omit them from the analyses. 
I had several partners for subject recruitment.  To recruit online newsreaders, I 
collaborated with four high-profile partisan news services.  Two of the organizations, 
AlterNet–A Project of the Independent Media Institute–and MovingIdeas, align 
themselves with the political left, while the other two, WorldNetDaily and The 
Washington Dispatch, tend toward the political right.  I worked with staff members to 
select a recruitment strategy appropriate to each community.  All four organizations 
included a brief (75 word) recruitment statement in their weekly newsletter distributed 
via email (see Appendix C).  These materials were snt out between February 5 and 
February 16, 2005.  One group, WorldNetDaily, also included the statement in the news 
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headlines listed on its web site on February 15.  The exact number of individuals 
encountering the recruitment material is unknown because the author did not have direct 
access to information about the email list size or web site traffic.  Conversations with 
news service staff suggest that as many 20,000 people may have seen the material sent by 
AlterNet, and that material posted to the WorldNetDaily site and sent via its email list 
could have been seen by 100,000 people.   
For the more representative sample, the Pew Internet & American Life Project 
included a request for volunteers at the end of a random-digit-dial telephone survey 
administered in November 2004.  A total of 416 respondents were willing to hear more 
about the project, and voluntarily provided their email address; however about 15% of the 
addresses were invalid.  I assume that most of the remaining 357 recruitment messages 
reached the intended recipient. 
I sent all volunteers from both the online newsreader and general population 
groups an email briefly describing the purpose of the study, the time required to 
participate, and the incentive–entry into a $100 gift certificate lottery–and explaining how 
to participate (Appendix C).  Volunteers who had not completed the study after two 
weeks were sent an email reminder.  As shown in Table 11, the overall completion rate 
was high, with more than half those who volunteered to participate completing the study 
(55%).   
Table 11.  Experiment response rates 
Recruitment site Volunteers Valid emails Completions % Completions 
AlterNet 704 700 358 51% 
WorldNetDaily 774 762 369 48% 
Included in study 1478 1462 727 50% 
Washington Dispatch a 10 10 8 80% 
Moving Ideas a 2 2 8 d N/A 
Pew survey follow-up b 416 357 24 7% 
Unknown referrer – 
Skipped recruitment 
question c 
  21  
Unknown referrer – 
Skipped demographic 





Overall 1906 1831 1010 55% 
a. Omitted on account of low volunteer rate 
b. Omitted on account of low response rate 
c. Omitted on account of missing referrer information 
d. Some subjects incorrectly identified the referring site 
There were some problems identifying how subjects learned of the study.  Due to 
an oversight in my design for software used to administer the experiment, referring sites 
were not automatically recorded when subjects volunteered; instead, participants were 
asked to identify where they learned of the project as a part of the demographic survey at 
the end of the experiment.  This resulted in a number of errors.  First, about 22% of the 
subjects skipped the demographic section entirely, and another 2% declined to specify 
where they had learned of the project.  Overall, there were 243 subjects who completed 
the study but could not be linked with any of the recruitment sites, and are omitted from 
the analyses that follow. iv  As a consequence, the number of individuals successfully 
recruited to complete the study via each site is a conservative estimate.  Second, a few 
individuals may have incorrectly identified the referrer.  For example, more subjects 
indicated that they had learned of the experiment through the Moving Ideas Network than 
responded to the recruitment materials sent through this organization.  
Looking at those for whom recruitment information is available, we see that the 
completion rate was highest (about 50%) among those recruited via partisan news sites.  
Two factors may help explain this fact.  First, only individuals who were interested in 
learning more about the project would be expected to volunteer.  Second, users of these 
news services have an unusually high level of interest in the news, which may have 
                                                
iv I suspect that the unknown-referrer group includes individuals from each of the 
recruitment sites.  That the distribution of responses to questions about political ideology 
and political affiliation for this group did not match any of the three groups with known 
recruitment provides some evidence for this.  
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enhanced the project’s appeal.  That I received several unsolicited emails from 
participants detailing their news reading practices supports this belief.  In contrast, the 
response rate among those recruited via the telephon  survey follow-up was surprisingly 
low.  Only 7% of those who volunteered a valid email address actually completed the 
study. v  One probable explanation is that, in contrast to the other recruitment strategy, 
volunteers had no knowledge about the project when t y agreed to be contacted.  As 
previously mentioned, because of the low response rate individuals recruited via the 
telephone survey are also omitted from the analyses that follow. 
The effectiveness of the web-based strategy for soliciting volunteers varied 
significantly across the four sites.  AlterNet and the WorldNetDaily generated the most 
responses, with 700 and 762 volunteers respectively.  In contrast, the efforts to recruit 
Moving Ideas Network and Washington Dispatch readers were almost completely 
unsuccessful.  There were a total of twelve volunteers from these two groups, only a few 
of whom completed the study.  I do not have systemaic d ta for analyzing the reasons for 
the different volunteer rates, but I suspect that tey reflect differences in readers’ use of 
the news products.  Though all four sites send newsletters on a weekly basis, AlterNet 
and WorldNetDaily are unique in several regards.  They are among the most linked-to 
partisan news sites according to Google, their mission i  to produce and distribute online 
news, and their emails tend to highlight site-specific ontent.  Moving Ideas, in contrast, 
focuses on providing easy access to policy information, not necessarily news, and its 
emails include pointers to many other sources.  Thoug  focused on news, the Washington 
Dispatch has a much lower profile than the other three sites according to its ranking in the 
Google directory, and its email subscriber base is significantly smaller.  Given the small 
                                                
v As noted above, some of these individuals may not have identified the referrer, which 
could make the actual number slightly higher.   
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number of respondents recruited from these sites and the uncertainty regarding the 
reasons for this, I have also omitted these individuals from the analysis.   
Administration 
Subjects participated in the experiment over a six week period between February 
9 and March 20, 2005.  As previously indicated, the experiment was automatically 
administered over the web.  Participants accessed the site through a user-specific URL 
included in their email invitation.  Once a subject completed the study, that URL was 
disabled.  As a result, only one individual was allowed to complete the study for each 
invitation.  If a subject left the site before completing the study, that individual could use 
the URL provided to return to the site at any time, choosing either to continue from 
where s/he left off or to start over. 
The site software used a web interface to guide subjects through the experiment, 
presenting them with a series of web pages, tracking their actions, and recording their 
responses.  The overall organization of the site is pre ented in Figure 1.  Navigation 
between these pages was accomplished using buttons located at the bottom of the screen 
(see Appendix D for sample screenshots).  When a subject opted to continue to the next 
page, the software automatically checked for unanswered questions.  If a question was 
left blank, the subject was given the opportunity to complete it before proceeding.  
Subjects were also allowed to return to the previous page (although there were two 
exceptions, described below).  
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Figure 1: Experiment – site organization  
 
Upon arriving, subjects first indicated which of three political issues–gay 
marriage, social security reform, or civil liberties–was of the greatest personal interest, 
and provided information about their familiarity with the topic, including how much they 
had heard about it, how often had they participated in related political activity, and 
whether their position had changed over time (a complete list of questions is included in 
Appendix E).  Next the system presented users with a web page describing five relevant 
news items automatically selected from a diverse coll tion of recently published online 
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news. vi  Each item listing included a headline, source, and two-line excerpt.  Subjects 
were asked to use checkboxes to indicate which, if any, of the items they were interested 
in reading.  Subjects were allowed to select as many as they desired, and were informed 
that they would be given an opportunity to read the stories later in the experiment.  
Having submitted their answers to this page, subject w re not allowed to go back.  This 
was intended to minimize the possibility that subject choices would be influenced by the 
assessment questions that followed.   
In the next section, subjects answered a series of questions about each of the five 
news items based on the brief synopses provided. The automated story selection was not 
perfect, so the first few questions were designed to i entify duplicate or irrelevant news 
stories.  The remaining questions, which are described n more detail below, addressed 
subjects’ perceptions of the news item.  After submitting these responses, subjects were 
again prevented from returning to prior sections of the study.  Having completed this 
assessment, subjects were given the opportunity to read any of the stories in which they 
had expressed interest.  (Items left unchecked in the initial evaluation were not relisted.) 
The instructions informed subjects that they had fifteen minutes to read, that they could 
stop reading at any time, and that they were not requi d to read all the items. The system 
allowed subjects unlimited time to read individual news items, but prevented them from 
starting new items after 15 minutes had passed. The limit was implemented because prior 
research suggests that increased costs–opportunity cos s in this case, since spending time 
on one story reduces the opportunity to spend time on another–would motivate subjects 
to place relatively greater weight on the information they prefer (Frey 1981a).  Stories 
that a subject chose to view were presented in a new window. The subject could not 
select another story or continue to the next stage of the experiment without closing the 
                                                
vi The mechanism by which they were selected is described in the implementation 
section, below.  
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window.  After reading each item, a few follow-up questions were presented.  This 
allowed subjects to indicate whether they had been able to access the content, and to 
revise their assessment based on what they read.  After responding, subjects were allowed 
to view another news item or to continue to the next s ction of the study.  In the last 
section, subjects were presented with a series of demographic questions. 
Variables: measurement and scale construction 
The phenomenon of interest in this study is people’s use of issue-related news.  I 
examined factors influencing both the use of particular news items, and subjects’ overall 
news use.  Item-level use was measured in two ways.  Fir t, subjects were asked to 
indicate which of five news items they were interested in reading.  Story selection was 
used to measure interest in the items because subjects made this decision prior to 
encountering the assessment questions, which could nceivably influence their interest 
level.  Second, the system automatically recorded how much time a subject spent 
accessing each item (in seconds).  Read time for a news item was measured from when a 
subject opened it in a new browser window to when the window was closed.   
Subject-level use was assessed with two comparable measures.  The system 
automatically calculated (1) the total number of stries the subject read and (2) the total 
time the subject spent reading.  I chose to use the to al number of stories read, rather than 
the number selected.  Reading is more burdensome, and should therefore be a more 
accurate expression of people’s preferences.  Althoug  the assessment questions the users 
answered after selecting items of interest might have influenced the decision to read 
individual stories, there is no reason to think that ey would create a systematic bias with 
regard to the total number of stories read.  Though calling attention to the views 
represented in a set of stories is expected to influe ce which items subjects attend to, it is 
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not predicted to influence overall levels of readership.  Analyses based on these two 
measures, items selected and items read, yielded comparable results. 
A variety of factors are potentially associated with news item use.  The variable of 
primary theoretical interest was the perceived level of viewpoint-reinforcing and 
viewpoint-challenging information included in a news item.  These perceptions were 
measured twice during the study:  immediately following the initial selection decision 
(anticipated or prospective perception), and after vi wing the full news item (experienced 
or retrospective perception).  Subjects based theirdecision to select a news item on the 
anticipated information content, while both anticipated and experienced content could 
influence how long subjects spent looking at a news item.  I considered combining the 
before and after measures, but decided against it based on the low inter-item reliability 
scores (Cronbach alpha of .52 for consonant information; .49 for dissonant information.)  
To assess the presence of viewpoint-reinforcing information, subjects were asked 
about the extent to which the news item (1) describes arguments supporting their 
position, and (2) provides evidence that other people agree with them based on the brief 
synopsis provided (see Table 12).  Expectations regarding viewpoint-challenging 
information were measured in a similar fashion.  Responses were summed to create 
reinforcement and challenge scores that fell between two and ten (Cronbach alpha of .88 
and .87 respectively).   
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Table 12. Measures of perceived viewpoint 
Anticipated viewpoint information 
I expect the news report to describe arguments supporting my political viewpoint 
I expect it to demonstrate that others support my political viewpoint 
I expect it to describe arguments opposing my political viewpoint 
I expect it to demonstrate that others oppose my political viewpoint 
Experienced viewpoint information 
The news report described arguments supporting my political viewpoint. 
It demonstrated that others support my political viewpoint. 
It described arguments opposing my political viewpoint. 
It demonstrated that others oppose my political viewpoint. 
As suggested by the hypotheses, the instrument also included several factors 
predicted to interact with viewpoint perceptions, including political ideology, and 
socialization in the form of political or religious activity (see Table 13).  
Table 13. Measures of factors expected to interact with perceived viewpoint 
Would you say your views in most political matters are very liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, 
somewhat conservative, or very conservative? 
In the past 12 months, how often have you participated in meetings, demonstrations, or other 
activities related to the issue? 
How often do you go to church, synagogue, or some other place of worship? 
The instrument also measured several variables that were expected to influence 
people’s news use but were not the central focus of this study.  These included prior 
issue-related news exposure, changes in the subject’s position on the issue, familiarity 
with the news events being reported, and personal salience of the news (Table 14).  
Finally, the experiment included a collection of demographic items that mirror those used 
in the survey, including education, gender, age, sex, and race/ethnicity. 
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Table 14. Control variables  
Have you always held the same position regarding this issue, or has your opinion changed over 
time? 
In the past 12 months, how much have you heard or read about the issue? 
I have heard about this news before/I learned something from this news report 
I expect the news in this report could affect me personally 
Experiment hypotheses 
The experiment complements the survey, providing another opportunity to test the 
hypotheses described in Chapter 2.  The hypotheses that follow are, like those identified 
in the previous section, derived from my initial claims, but are more narrowly-defined to 
reflect the information about individual exposure decisions collected in the experiment. 
 
H1c. The more viewpoint-reinforcing information a news item contains, the more 
likely an individual will be to look at it. 
H1d. The more viewpoint-reinforcing information a news item contains, the more 
time an individual will spend reading. 
H2b. The presence of viewpoint-challenging information does not influence the 
likelihood that a nonconservative subject will read a news item. 
H2c. The presence of viewpoint-challenging information does not influence the 
time that a nonconservative subject will spend reading. 
H3b. The presence of viewpoint-challenging information reduces the likelihood 
that a conservative subject will read a news item. 
H3c. The presence of viewpoint-challenging information reduces the time that a 
conservative subject will spend reading. 
H4b. Individuals active in issue-based activism will be less likely to examine a news 
item with which they disagree. 
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H4c. Individuals active in issue-based activism will spend less time reading a news 
item with which they disagree. 
H4d. Individuals active in religious social networks will be less likely to examine a 
news item with which they disagree. 
H4e. Individuals active in religious social networks will spend less time reading a 
news item with which they disagr 
Hypothesis H5 does not have any implications for the experiment. 
Implementation 
I collaborated with a programmer, a graduate student in computer science named 
Sam King, to create this software, which was written using a combination of PHP, Perl 
and JavaScript, with a MySQL database for storage.  The system included several key 
components (see Table 15).  I specified what operations he software would perform, the 
inputs it would accept, and the output it would generate.  The programmer was 
responsible for creating code that would function t these specifications.  The 
programmer and I shared responsibility for crafting the user interface and navigation 
tools, and for identifying and correcting errors in the software.  Initial coding was 
completed over a two-month period, with testing andminor revisions taking an additional 
month.   
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Table 15. Software component overview 
Email collection :  Web page to which volunteers would submit their email address, linked to a 
Perl script used to record the addresses and send notifications regarding the number of 
registered volunteers. 
Database set-up :  Perl scripts used to initialize databases for storing questions and responses. 
Registration :  Perl script used to add users to the database, and to email access information to 
subjects. 
Reminders :  Perl script used to send email reminders to subjects who had not completed the 
experiment after a specified amount of time.  Email addresses could be automatically purged 
from database after sending reminder. 
Experiment administration :  Web pages using PHP and JavaScript to present questions and 
news links, and record answers and usage information. 
Google News screenscraper :  Perl script that would extract individual news items and produce 
an RSS feed based on a Google News query.  Note that this was done with permission from 
Google News. 
Report generation :  Perl script used to generate a text file containing data collected for all 
subjects. 
There were a few technical restrictions constraining use of the system.  
Participants were required to enable cookies so that the site software could keep track of 
their progress through the experiment, and their web browser had to allow pop-up 
windows from the site.  As a consequence, some volunteers could not, or would not, 
participate.  For example, WebTV users could not complete the experiment because the 
browser does not provide industry-standard pop-up sup ort.  A few volunteers indicated 
that they were unwilling to allow the system to place cookies on their computer, and so 
they declined to participate. 
As indicated in the administration section above, th  system automatically 
selected relevant news results recently published on the web.  To accomplish this, the 
system used Google News, a real-time news aggregation service that provides results 
from an estimated 4,500 sources. vii  A second programmer, Soo-yeong Hwang, built an 
application, called a screenscraper, to retrieve information about the relevant stories from 
the Google News web site.  The screenscraper presented itself to the Google servers like 
                                                
vii This was done with Google’s permission.  
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any other browser.  It would request data from the server using a URL with query 
parameters containing the search string.  For purposes f this study, the screenscraper 
used one of three query strings that corresponded to the three topics from which subjects 
could choose and that restricted results to sources publishing in the United States.  Upon 
receiving the results, the software parsed the page, isolating the individual stories and 
generating RSS-format output that could be presented to subjects.   
Testing and validation 
The online experiment underwent four rounds of testing.  In the first round I 
focused on how people responded to the system and the questions with an eye toward 
reducing ambiguity and confusion.  In this stage, I had a dozen friends and family 
complete the study using a talk-aloud protocol, folowed by brief interviews.  This lead to 
numerous changes in the system’s interface and the question wording.  The second and 
third rounds provided additional usability testing and preliminary validation of the 
instrument.  These tests were conducted with the assist nce of graduate students in the 
School of Information, 16 in the doctoral program and 18 in the Master’s degree 
program.  These tests led to further refinements in he software, and the data were used to 
test the viability of the analytic techniques and the magnitude of the effect.  The fourth 
and final round was a large-scale pilot, administered to 197 subjects recruited via an 
email sent to a separate AlterNet email list.  I used this data to finalize the selection of 
topics, choosing the three most popular of several high-profile issues.  Analyses of pilot 
data yielded significant model coefficients despite th  small sample size, confirming that 
the sample size would be adequate. 
After stripping identifying information from registration data I discovered that 
four subjects signed up for both the pilot and the final study, and that at least two of these 
individuals completed the study twice.  Since the identifying information had been 
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removed from the results data, I was unable to remov  these subjects from the analyses.  I 
have assumed that this small number of repeat participants will not significantly influence 
the results 
Conclusion 
The methodologies described in this chapter provide a means of testing the 
hypotheses regarding selective exposure to political nformation posited in Chapter 2.  
The resultant data provide evidence that individuals seek viewpoint-reinforcement more 
commonly and more actively than they avoid viewpoint-challenging information.  The 
next two chapters describe these results in more detail.  Chapter 4 deals with the analysis 




This chapter describes the analyses and findings of a 2004 nationally-
representative telephone survey of 1510 adult Americans on the topic of online news use.  
First, I briefly examine respondents’ stated prefernces regarding news bias.  The data 
suggest that most individuals prefer sources that are neutral, but a substantial number say 
they prefer viewpoint-challenging sources.  The minority who state a preference for 
biased sources are demographically distinct in several r gards.  Next, I look at the types 
of sources online news users are turning to for political information.  I examine whether 
these individuals, who have easy access to a range of id ologically-biased sources, are 
using online alternatives as frequently as they use more balanced mainstream news 
sources, and consider whether those who do make use of alternatives are abandoning 
mainstream sources.  The data show that individuals, even those who are actively aware 
of partisan news sites, are not abandoning the mainstream news media for online 
alternatives.  Next, I consider whether, when selecting among strictly biased sources, 
individuals use viewpoint-reinforcing sites exclusively.  The data suggest that though 
people with strong political viewpoints are motivated to seek out support, a significant 
number of partisans also seek exposure to challenging information.  I conclude with a 
series of regression analyses examining the factors associated with exposure to consonant 
and dissonant arguments.  These analyses suggest that use of the Internet and online news 




Before examining people’s use of political information, it is useful to understand 
how they perceive their preferences.  Do people cons i usly value exposure to other 
opinions, or is homogeneity their stated preference?  If it is the latter, this may help 
explain why it is so widely accepted that people are actively filtering out challenging 
viewpoints on the Internet and elsewhere, despite the lack of consistent empirical 
evidence.  Whether people act on the preference they espouse is a separate question, 
which I address in subsequent analyses. 
The survey asked individuals to indicate whether thy preferred sources that 
shared their point of view, challenged their point of view, or had no point of view.  The 
sample was split so that we could ask this question in two different ways.  In one version, 
respondents chose between sources that shared their point of view and those that did not 
have a particular point of view.  In the other, respondents had a third choice: sources that 
challenged their point of view. 
In both versions of the question most respondents reported that they prefer 
unbiased sources (Table 16).  When allowed to statea pr ference for challenging 
information fewer subjects indicated a preference for shared or neutral sources, and as a 
result the percentage preferring shared and challenging sources was almost equal. 
Table 16. Respondents’ preferences regarding news s ource bias 
 Battery 1 Battery 2 
SHARE my political point of view 27% 22% 
DON’T HAVE a political point of view 61 50 
CHALLENGE my political point of view N/A 18 
Don’t know/refused 12 10 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004 
In terms of demographic characteristics, individuals who preferred challenging 
sources and those who preferred supportive sources were similar, and both differed from 
those who preferred neutral sources (Table 17).  Individuals who preferred biased sources 
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were more likely to live in an urban area, to have less education, to attend religious 
services more frequently, and to have lower incomes.  They were also more likely to be 
Black, and tended to be less politically moderate.  Those preferring viewpoint-
reinforcement, the most troubling group from the pers ctive of political information 
exposure, were disproportionately Republican, conservative, and less educated compared 
to the population at large (Table 18).  These results suggest that while most people prefer 
nonpartisan news sources, a significant minority want to consider their own viewpoint 
when choosing where they get their news. 
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Table 17. Demographics of respondents with differen t preferences regarding news bias 












SOURCE      
Unweighted base 378 161 133 483 193 
(n) 371 166 134 466 205 
Sex      
Male 49 20 17 61 26 
Female 50 24 19 62 28 
Community type      
Urban 43 27 23 57 30 
Suburban 54 18 17 63 26 
Rural 48 25 14 64 26 
Age      
18-27 47 22 26 55 37 
28-39 53 26 14 66 25 
40-49 53 17 17 58 29 
50-58 58 21 11 73 21 
59-68 47 21 18 63 28 
69+ 39 27 19 54 23 
Education      
High school or less 42 25 21 54 33 
Some college 57 20 14 65 26 
College grad or more 56 19 16 70 19 
Race/ethnicity      
White 52 21 16 66 24 
Black 32 34 24 42 43 
Hispanic 46 25 30 47 37 
Other 48 24 12 61 30 
Income      
Less than $30K 42 26 23 54 33 
Between $30-$50K 49 22 16 60 30 
Between $50-$75K 56 18 20 71 18 
More than $75K 61 19 10 72 19 
Internet experience      
Not online 42 29 19 53 32 
Online in last 6 months 33 0 0 46 9 
Online for about 1 year 56 12 20 29 57 
Online for 2-3 years 48 20 23 55 34 
Online for 4-5 years 48 22 18 63 28 
Online for >6 years 57 18 16 71 20 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004 
Note:  Rows do not sum to 100% because some respondent refused to answer. 
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Table 18. Ideology and religious practices of respo ndents with different preferences 












Party Affiliation      
Democrat 50% 22% 19% 59% 29% 
Independent 55 19 19 67 21 
Republican 44 28 16 59 33 
Other/no party 46 10 26 60 16 
Political Ideology      
Very liberal 5 11 9 5 9 
Somewhat liberal 23 16 20 22 19 
Moderate 33 19 32 34 18 
Somewhat conservative 26 27 19 25 27 
Very conservative 9 20 13 9 24 
Religious activity      
Don’t attend worship service 55 21 16 68 25 
Attend several times a year 49 23 19 65 23 
Attend once a week 47 22 18 56 30 
Attend daily 39 18 21 36 52 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004 
Note:  Rows do not sum to 100% because some respondent refused to answer. 
Source selectivity 
Hypothesis five asserts that individuals prefer sources that include both 
viewpoint-reinforcing and viewpoint-challenging information.  Specifically, I claim (a) 
that individuals use nonpartisan sources more than t ey use comparable partisan 
alternates; (b) that when used, partisan sources are only part of a more balanced set of 
sources; (c) that individuals prefer viewpoint-reinforcing ideologically-oriented sources 
to those that lack supporting information; and (d) that individuals only seek viewpoint-
challenging information when viewpoint-supporting iformation is also available.  To 
test these claims I examine the sources used by those who get news online. 
Though online news use appears to be growing at the exp nse of older news 
media, there is no evidence that people are abandoning mainstream news products.  
Among sources of online news, the sites of the major news organizations are by far the 
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most popular (Table 19).  Fully 81% of those who count the Internet as one of their top 
sources of campaign news indicate that they use these sites; only 28% report using the 
partisan alternatives available online.  Including those who consider online news a less 
prominent source of information, the difference is ven more pronounced:  68% get news 
from major news organizations online versus only 13% who use the partisan alternatives. 
Table 19. Percentage using each type of online news  outlet for campaign information 
 
All Respondents Online news users 
Online news a 
primary source 
Unweighted base 1510 842 223 
(n) 1510 817 214 
Web site of major news 
organizations, such as 
CNN.com or MSNBC.com 
40% 68% 81% 
Web site of an international 
news site such as the BBC or 
al Jazeera 
12 21 33 
Web site of alternative news 
site like AlterNet.org or 
NewsMax.com 
7 13 28 
Web site of politically liberal 
group such as People for the 
American Way or MoveOn.org 
7 12 25 
Web site of a politically 
conservative group such as 
the American Enterprise 
Institute or the Christian 
Coalition 
7 12 21 
JohnKerry.com, the 
Democratic nominee’s official 
site 
4 6 25 
GeorgeWBush.com, the 
president’s official re-election 
site 
3 5 24 
RNC.com, the official site of 
the Republican National 
Committee 
2 4 20 
DNC.com, the official site of 
the Democratic National 
Committee 
2 3 15 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey 2004 
Figure 2 presents this web-usage data visually, and shows how usage of online 
news compares to more traditional media.  The figure includes mainstream sources, 
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including television, newspapers, and major new organization web sites, and the more 
partisan news media, including alternative news organizations’ sites, political party-
affiliated sites, and the ideologically-oriented site  of liberal or conservative-leaning 
organizations.  The bars represent the percentage of respondents who indicated using the 
specified source at least occasionally.   
As above, results for two groups of individuals areshown.  The first group 
includes those who answered in the affirmative when asked if they ever got political 
information online.  The second group is defined by a more stringent requirement for 
inclusion; these individuals reported that the Inter et was one of their top two sources of 
news.  The usage trends are the same for the two groups, although, unsurprisingly, 
Internet-based news sources are more popular among embers of the second group.   
As predicted by the first source-related hypothesis (H5a), we can see from this 
figure that more online news users get their news from nonpartisan sources than from 
partisan alternatives available online.  For example, about 93% of those who get news 
online watch television news and 87% read newspapers.  In contrast, only 19% use 
ideologically-oriented sites, the most popular of the partisan information sources.  
Though use of offline sources is lower among those who say the Internet is a primary 
news source, the shift online is not a shift away from the mainstream news products.  
Eighty-one percent of these individuals say that they get news online from the sites of the 
major news organizations, up from 68% among online news users, while only 33% of 
these respondents reported using the sites of partisan organizations.   
I performed a series of logistic regressions examining the influence of news 
source type on news use in order to test whether the differences in usage levels between 
pairs of news sources were statistically significant. (Detailed information about the 
procedure for doing this is included in Appendix B.)  The results of these tests are shown 
in the table immediately following Figure 2.  The overall Wald test (chi-square=1222.94, 
p<.001) demonstrates that the various news sources have different usage levels.  The 
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coefficients listed in the table show whether usage lev ls of the media pair indicated by 
the row and column are significantly different.  For example, the proportion of 
respondents who use television news is significantly different than the proportion that use 
partisan news sites, as shown by the last number in the left-most column of coefficients.  
On the other hand, usage levels for party-affiliated and partisan news sites are not 
significantly different, as shown by the last coefficient on the right.  Speaking broadly, 
the important result here is that mainstream news sources are used significantly more 
frequently than their alternative counterparts.  Thus, I conclude that even among those 
with relatively easy access to partisan information, the most commonly used sources of 
news are the more balanced news outlets.  These results provide evidence that most 
individuals prefer nonpartisan sources over partisan alternatives (H5a), and do not 
intentionally exclude other viewpoints through their choice of news outlets. 
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All online news users (n=817) Respondents for whom Internet is one of top two sources (n=224)
Alternative News Sources Mainstream News Sources 
 
 TV News Newspaper News Site Ideo. Site Party Site 
Newspaper -0.69***     
News Site -1.85*** -1.16***    
Ideological -4.05*** -3.35*** -2.20***   
Party site -4.36*** -3.66*** -2.50*** -.31  
Partisan news site -4.49*** -3.80*** -2.64*** -.44*** -.13 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
Note:  Significance denotes probability that the proportion of online news users using the 
specified source type is different than the proportion using the reference category, indicated by 
the column heading.   Statistical tests are based on GEE analysis to control for repeated subject 
measures, using Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
Though comparatively small, the number of individuals using partisan sources is 
nontrivial.  About one third of respondents for whom the Internet was a primary news 
source reported using each of the three sources about which we asked.  The question, 
then, is whether individuals are substituting these more partisan outlets for the 
mainstream news media, or if the two types of sources are complementary.  To assess this 
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question, I examine the extent to which partisan news users also reported obtaining news 
from mainstream news media.  These individuals have successfully identified a source of 
partisan political information, and could therefore more easily abandon use of the more 
balanced mainstream.   
The results are shown in Table 20.  Proportions are reported using 95% 
confidence intervals instead of sample statistics in order to estimate the prevalence of use 
within the overall population of American adults.  The data are consistent with the 
hypothesis that those who use partisan sources also use mainstream sources; this holds 
true in almost every case.  The vast majority of individuals who use online partisan news 
sources also use less partisan sources such as newspaper , television, or web sites of the 
major news organizations, confirming hypothesis H5b.  Nearly every one of these 
individuals had used at least one of these three sources. 
Table 20. Use of mainstream news outlets by alterna tive news users 
Source used (n) Newspaper Television 
Web site of a 
major news 
organization 
At least one 
mainstream 
source 
Alternative news site (109) 78% – 92% 78% – 92% 85% – 96% 97% – 100% 
Ideologically-oriented site (164) 80 – 91 85 – 94 78 – 90 96 – 100 
Party-affiliated site (128) 85 – 96 85 – 96 74 – 88 95 – 100 
Source: Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
Note:  95% confidence interval shown. 
Table 21 compares individuals’ use of partisan web sites with their levels of 
partisanship.  This allows me to examine the extent to which supporters of each candidate 
use sites that support and challenge their viewpoint.  Hypothesis H1b predicts that when 
selecting among one-sided partisan sources, individuals’ will tend to use sources that 
support their viewpoint more than those that do not.   
The support for this hypothesis is mixed. First, note that undecided voters’ use of 
candidate web sites provides a useful baseline, showing relatively uniform usage levels 
across the different site types.  In terms of support-seeking behavior, the data show that 
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the stronger an individual’s preference for a candidate, the more likely s/he is to have 
visited a site supporting this candidate.  For example, strong Bush supporters were more 
likely to have visited a Republican site than their l ss partisan counterparts (p<.05). viii  
Similarly, strong Kerry supporters used sites of the Democratic Party more often than 
weaker supporters (p<.05).  On the other hand, the data suggest that strength of 
partisanship may be positively related to use of viewpoint-challenging sites.  The percent 
of strong Bush supporters who reported using a democratic site was larger than the 
percent of weak Bush supporters, though the difference was not significant.  Strong Kerry 
supporters were even more likely to have used viewpoint-challenging sites.  They 
reported using a conservative site more often than weak supporters (though again the 
difference was not significant after adjusting for the multiple comparisons), and were 
about as likely as trong Bush supporters to use these conservative sites. 













Strong Bush 304 4.9% 4.3% 14.7% 15.1% 
Weak Bush 142 6.4 2.1 9.9 4.9 
Other  96 10.5 6.3 7.4 3.2 
Weak Kerry 263 12.9 10.2 7.6 6.1 
Strong Kerry 138 20.9 20.9 13.0 5.8 
Undecideds 59 5.2 4.6 5.2 2.9 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
The tendency of strong democrats to look at conservative sites provides evidence 
for another hypothesis.  Hypothesis H5c asserts tha individuals only use dissonant 
information sources if they also use sources of consonant information.  To assess this 
hypothesis, I consider the relationship between the use of viewpoint-supporting and 
                                                




viewpoint-challenging party-affiliated sites.  As shown in Table 22, almost no one visited 
the site of a candidate they opposed without visiting heir favored candidate’s site as well. 
Table 22. Use of viewpoint-challenging sites by use rs of viewpoint-supporting site 
 
(n) 
Percent of those 
who used preferred 
candidate’s site 
who also used 
opposing 
candidate’s site 
Percent of those 
who did not use 
preferred 
candidate’s site but 
did use opposing 
candidate’s site Chi-square df 
Kerry Supporters (376) 40.0 0.9 115.45*** 1 
Bush supporters (376) 20.4 2.1 33.062*** 1 
Source:  Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
In terms of their source selectivity, online news users are not employing the 
control afforded by the medium to exclude sources representing other viewpoints.  To the 
contrary, the vast majority of these individuals continue to rely on the less-partisan 
products of major news organizations for their information.  Furthermore, when choosing 
among exclusively partisan sources, such as the sites of the major U.S. political parties, 
many individuals opt to view content generated by both sides.   
Content selectivity 
Although there is little evidence that individuals re selecting news sources that 
systematically screen out other perspectives, it is s ill possible that partisan selectivity is 
influencing individuals’ acquisition of information online.  It may be that people prefer 
the mainstream news media for reasons unrelated to the mix of viewpoints they represent, 
and that they are using technology to enhance their abil ty to avoid viewpoint-challenging 
information on a story-by-story basis.  To examine this possibility, let us turn our 
attention from the sources people use to the arguments with which they are familiar.   
The survey asked respondents to indicate their familiarity with eight opinion 
statements about the leading candidates in the 2004 presidential election.  Table 23 shows 
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the percent of respondents who recalled hearing these statements either frequently or 
sometimes. 
Table 23. Percentage of respondents who have heard arguments for and against each 
candidate 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004 
Table 24 shows that overall supporters of both candidates knew more on average 
about their preferred candidate than about the challenger.  This suggests a relationship 
between partisan preferences and individuals’ exposure to campaign information. 







George Bush is a stronger leader than John Kerry in the war 
on terrorism 42% 28% 
John Kerry changes his positions on the issues when he 
thinks it will help him win the election 
42 28 
The Bush administration’s policies have helped the economy 
begin to recover 39 37 




The Bush administration misled the American public about 
the reasons for going to war about Iraq 74% 20% 
Some Bush administration policies are a threat to basic civil 
rights and civil liberties 30 32 
John Kerry has a better strategy than George Bush for 
creating peace in Iraq 
20 33 
John Kerry will end special treatment for corporations and 
wealthy Americans 18 32 
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Table 24. Levels of consonant and dissonant informa tion exposure for supporter of both 
candidates 







 (n) Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) t df 
Bush supporters (694) 3.04 (1.074) 2.41 (1.193) 14.171*** 693 
Kerry supporters (676) 2.83 (1.057) 2.33 (1.359) 10.537*** 675 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
In light of this, the question is, what mechanisms contribute to creating the gap 
between exposure to viewpoint-supporting information and viewpoint-challenging 
information?  And will new technologies cause this gap to grow? I have suggested that 
although individuals do seek support, they do not actively screen out all dissonant 
information.  On this view, I predict that individuals who have more control over their 
information diet will be familiar with more of the arguments supporting their position 
(H1a), but the influence on exposure to viewpoint-challenging information will be slight.  
Among nonconservatives, I do not expect exposure control to be correlated with the 
number of opinion-contrary perspectives with which an individual is aware (H2a).  
Conservatives, and those who frequently engage in rligious activities, however, are 
expected to be slightly less aware of challenging arguments (H3a, H4a).  There are 
numerous other factors that are expected to influence familiarity with political arguments, 
which must be controlled when testing these predictions. 
To look at what accounts for difference in voters’ exposure to political arguments, 
I constructed a series of regression models of argument familiarity.  As reported in 
Chapter 3, the distribution of argument familiarity varied depending on which candidate a 
voter supported, so Bush and Kerry supporters were tr ated separately.  For each group of 
supporters, there were two types of models, one predicting familiarity with viewpoint-
supporting arguments, and the other predicting famili rity with viewpoint-challenging 
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arguments. ix  Each of these four models (two supporter groups by two types of exposure) 
was constructed in two stages.  First, I regress exposure on several potentially influential 
variables that were unrelated to respondents’ control over their information environment.  
Second, I add the Internet factors, which are expected to enhance information exposure 
control. 
Factors predicting similar changes in consonant and dissonant exposure 
The results of the first stage models are shown in Table 25 and Table 26.  These 
models explained between 20% and 25% variation in respondents’ argument familiarity.  
Consistent with prior research, I found that several factors are associated with increased 
exposure to both types of arguments.  For Bush and Kerry supporters, education, age, 
political enjoyment (one of the measures of open-midedness), and following the 
campaign closely all have significant positive coefficients in the models of the two kinds 
of exposure. There were a few instances where factors influenced consonant and 
dissonant information exposure differently.  For example, men were more likely than 
women to be familiar with the arguments supporting heir preferred candidate, but there 
was no gender effect on exposure to challenging arguments.  None of the factors I 
examined, however, were associated with a simultaneous increase in consonant and 
decrease in dissonant information exposure.  These results support the baseline 
                                                
ix Although OLS regression assumes that the dependent variable is continuous and 
unbounded, the exposure scores used here range from one to four.  There are several 
reasons that linear regression is employed despite this. First, the residual diagnostics 
suggest that the relevant regression assumptions have been met.  Second, though there is 
a cut off on the dependent variable, it is not right-censored data in the traditional sense.  
Had the scale been based on more items, individuals who did not receive the maximum 
score might also have scored higher.  Finally, tobit analyses, which would be appropriate 
if the data were right-censored, yield comparable results; most importantly, the overall 
effect of Internet use was the same in the OLS and tobit models. 
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assumption that many factors influence consonant and dissonant information exposure 
similarly. 
Religious service attendance, however, was not found to have a significant 
influence on exposure.  The variable did not improve the overall fit of any of the models, 
and was dropped from the analysis.  Thus, hypothesis H4a is rejected. 
Table 25. Models of exposure to consonant and disso nant information – Bush supporters 
 Bush supporters 
 Consonant Exposure Model 1 Dissonant Exposure Model 1 
 Coefficient (s.e.) β Coefficient (s.e.) β 
Decides quickly  -.037 (.047) -.029  .025 (.054) .017 
Reads a lot  .104* (.046) .084  -.008 (.053) -.006 
Information causes 
indecision 
 -.029 (.035) -.030  .030 (.041) .028 
Seldom changes 
mind 
 .076 (.041) .066  -.047 (.048) -.037 
Enjoys politics  .183*** (.043) .168  .149** (.050) .122 
Education  .123** (.047) .095  .231*** (.055) .159 
Age  .011*** (.002) .177  .010*** (.003) .145 
Sex  .163* (.075) .076  .162 (.087) .068 
Hispanic  -.106 (.149) -.026  -.110 (.173) -.024 
Black, not Hispanic  -.834*** (.237) -.123  -.251 (.276) -.033 
Number of offline 
news sources used 
 .071* (.031) .082  .086* (.036) .088 
Following 
campaign closely 
 .342*** (.088) .154  .554*** (.102) .222 
Strong candidate 
support 
 .202* (.080) .092  .077 (.093) .031 
Constant .980** (.283)   .778* (.329)  
R2 .253  .200  
(n) (648) 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
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Table 26. Models of exposure to consonant and disso nant information – Kerry supporters 
 Kerry supporters 
 Consonant Exposure Model 1 Dissonant Exposure Model 1 
 Coefficient (s.e.) β Coefficient (s.e.) β 
Decides quickly  .028 (.046) .023  .098 (.058) .061 
Reads a lot  .123* (.050) .099  .089 (.063) .055 
Information causes 
indecision 
 .018 (.035) .019  .057 (.045) .047 
Seldom changes 
mind 
 -.017 (.037) -.017  -.073 (.047) -.057 
Enjoys politics  .061 (.042) .063  .225*** (.053) .178 
Education  .173*** (.049) .140  .162* (.062) .101 
Age  .009*** (.002) .154  .019*** (.003) .253 
Sex  .219** (.080) .104  .100 (.101) .037 
Hispanic  .307** (.117) .102  .131 (.148) .034 
Black, not Hispanic  -.329** (.104) -.121  -.455** (.133) -.129 
Number of offline 
news sources used 
 .053 (.030) .067  .052 (.038) .050 
Following 
campaign closely 
 .346*** (.097) .150  .376** (.123) .126 
Strong candidate 
support 
 .087 (.087) .039  -.089 (.110) -.031 
Constant 1.287*** (.280)   -.023 (.356)  
R2 .201  .236  
(n) (632) 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
 
Internet access associated with increased exposure to both types of information  
The online news environment affords individuals a wide array of news outlet 
choices, and many mechanisms for finding and filtering information for which there is no 
offline equivalent.  To examine the influence of these capabilities, I add two measures of 
Internet use, online news use and experience using the Internet, to the models described 
above. x  I also tested the significance of high-speed access, but omitted it from the final 
model because it is highly correlated with Internet experience, which has greater 
                                                
x I excluded four respondents from the analysis who reported using the Internet for 30 
years or more.  Construction of the Internet infrastructure did not begin until 1969 
(Abbate 1999: 64), and the network did not achieve widespread use until much later. 
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explanatory power.  All variables from the first model have been retained, including 
education, news surveillance levels, and the five indicators of open mindedness.   
The results are shown in Table 27 and Table 28.  Adding the Internet factors 
produced a statistically significant improvement in hree of the four models, with the 
expanded models explaining up to 27% of the variation.  Only Bush supporters’ exposure 
to dissonant information was unaffected.  As the positive significant coefficients indicate, 
online news use is broadly associated with increasing exposure to both types of 
information.  Among Bush supporters, the number of years a user has been online is 
positively correlated with familiarity with viewpoint-reinforcing arguments.  For Kerry 
supporters, the frequency of use is the significant predictor, and it is associated with an 
increasing familiarity with both viewpoint-reinforcing and viewpoint-challenging 
arguments. 
In sum, the hypothesis that individuals are using technology-afforded control to 
increase their exposure to consonant information is supported, confirming hypothesis 
H1a, but support for the predictions regarding dissonant information exposure is mixed.  
Contrary to hypothesis H2a, nonconservatives saw an increase in exposure to other 
viewpoints as their exposure control increased.  Hypothesis H3a was also disconfirmed:  
conservatives saw no change in their exposure to opinion-contrary information.  It is 
interesting to note, however, that the relationship between conservatives and 
nonconservatives is consistent with the prediction.  Compared to conservatives, 




Table 27. Influence of Internet use on exposure – B ush supporters 
 Bush supporters 
 Consonant Exposure Model 2 Dissonant Exposure Model 2 
 Coefficient (s.e.) β Coefficient (s.e.) β 
Decides quickly  -.037 (.046) -.029  .027 (.054) .019 
Reads a lot  .087 (.046) .071  -.015 (.054) -.011 
Information causes 
indecision 
 -.005 (.035) -.005  .039 (.042) .037 
Seldom changes 
mind 
 .075 (.041) .066  -.046 (.048) -.036 
Enjoys politics  .192*** (.043) .177  .146** (.051) .120 
Education  .056 (.050) .043  .208*** (.059) .143 
Age  .014*** (.002) .215  .011*** (.003) .158 
Sex  .135 (.075) .063  .149 (.088) .062 
Hispanic  -.086 (.148) -.021 -.110 (.173) -.024 
Black, not Hispanic  -.788** (.235) -.116  -.234 (.276) -.031 
Number of offline 
news sources used 
 .057 (.031) .066  .081* (.037) .084 
Following 
campaign closely 
 .311*** (.087) .140  .536*** (.103) .215 
Strong candidate 
support 
 .178* (.079) .081  .067 (.093) .027 
Internet 
experience  .032** (.010) .133  .007 (.012) .024 
Frequency of 
online news use  .036 (.029) .048  .038 (.034) .045 
Constant  .790** (.284)  .719* (.334)  
R2 .271 .202 
∆R2 after adding 
Internet factors 
.017** 
(F=7.523, df1=2, df2=631) 
.003 
(F=1.023, df1=2, df2=631) 
(n) (648) 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
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Table 28. Influence of Internet use on exposure – K erry supporters 
 Kerry supporters 
 Consonant Exposure Model 2 Dissonant Exposure Model 2 
 Coefficient (s.e.) β Coefficient (s.e.) β 
Decides quickly  .042 (.046) .034  .115*** (.058) .072 
Reads a lot  .118* (.050) .094  .085* (.063) .053 
Information causes 
indecision 
 .020 (.035) .021  .058 (.045) .048 
Seldom changes 
mind 
 -.013 (.037) -.014  -.070 (.047) -.054 
Enjoys politics  .051 (.042) -.053  .215 (.053) .170 
Education  .149** (.053) .121  .141*** (.067) .088 
Age  .010*** (.002) .163  .020* (.003) .258 
Sex  .202* (.079) .096  .080*** (.101) .029 
Hispanic  .320** (.117) .107  .140 (.149) .036 
Black, not Hispanic  -.341** (.104) -.125  -.474 (.132) -.134 
Number of offline 
news sources used 
 .046 (.030) .058  .043*** (.038) .042 
Following 
campaign closely 
 .311** (.097) .135  .335 (.123) .112 
Strong candidate 
support 
 .098 (.087) .044  -.078** (.110) -.027 
Internet 
experience  -.006 (.011) -.027  -.013 (.013) -.043 
Frequency of 




-.048 (.358)  
R2 .213 .246 
∆R2 after adding 
Internet factors 
.011* 
(F=4.477, df1=2, df2=615) 
.010* 
(F=4.287, df1=2, df2=615) 
(n) (632) 
Source : Pew Internet & American Life Project survey, June 2004. 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
Discussion and conclusion 
Self-reported preferences, news media use, and argument repertoires all support 
my assertion that people desire exposure to multiple o inions and the rationales that 
support them (see Table 29 for a summary of results).  The findings presented here 
suggest that people are not using the unprecedented opportunity to screen out other 
perspectives.  Individuals who get political news and information online continue to use 
sources that represent a diverse range of political opinions, and they are in many cases 
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more knowledgeable about the arguments circulating in the media on both sides of an 
issue.  Even among conservatives, a group that has been shown to engage in selective 
avoidance of viewpoint-challenging information in the past, going online is uncorrelated 
with exposure to other opinions.   
Table 29. Summary of survey results 
Hypothesis Supported? Page 
H1a. Individuals who have more control over their news diet will 
have greater familiarity with the arguments supporting their 
viewpoint than those with less control. 
Yes 88 
H1b. Individuals who use online partisan sources will prefer those 
that support their viewpoint to those that do not. 
Mixed 80 
H2a. Nonconservatives who have more control over their news diet 
will have the same level of familiarity with the arguments 




H3a. Conservatives who have more control over their news diet will 
have slightly less familiarity with the arguments challenging 




H4a. Individuals active in religious social networks will have slightly 
less familiarity with opposing opinions than those who are less 
active. 
No 86 
H5a. Online news users will prefer nonpartisan sources to otherwise 
comparable partisan sources. 
Yes 78 
H5b. Individuals who use online partisan sources will generally also 
use sources that provide more balance. 
Yes 80 
H5c. Individuals who use online partisan sources will only use 
viewpoint-challenging information if they also use viewpoint-
supporting information. 
Yes 81 
I should also note that by focusing on self-reported familiarity with the 
arguments, I have excluded from the analysis a number of interesting and important 
considerations.  First, I cannot differentiate between selective exposure and selective 
retention using these data.  Though this is a limitation, it does not substantially affect the 
conclusions regarding the role of the Internet in shaping political debate.  The Internet is 
not reducing people’s perceived exposure to politica  arguments with which they 
disagree.  Second, the data do not allow me to assess individuals’ comprehension or 
evaluation of the political information.  Recalling exposure to the arguments I asked 
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about does not mean that the individual has critically engaged the content.  Exposure is 
necessary but not sufficient to ensure that an indiv dual integrate the arguments into their 
broader political understanding.  Finally, these data do not allow me to assess the effects 
of exposure on political opinion.  Specifically, I am unable to determine whether the 
purposeful exposure to dissonant information as well as consonant information changes 
the strength or direction of individuals’ attitudes toward the candidates. 
These findings are encouraging; however, it may be that online news users simply 
do not have as much control over their exposure as I h ve suggested.  Chapter 5 looks at 
the decisions that individuals make when choosing among articles with differing amounts 
of viewpoint-reinforcing and viewpoint-challenging information.  These results will help 
us understand the extent to which individuals exhibit a ideologically-motivated bias in 
their selection of specific news content, and will give some insight into how they may 





The online news environment has made it more feasible than ever before for 
people to limit their exposure to viewpoints that differ from their own.  The survey data, 
however, shows that Americans who use the Internet to get their news are not 
experiencing less exposure to political ideas that differ from their own, and that for some, 
use of the technology is associated with increased familiarity with other viewpoints.  
These findings run counter to predictions that the Int rnet would encourage political 
isolation and balkanization.   
It would be premature, however, to conclude that new information technologies 
pose no threat to political communication:  they may yet be used to filter out viewpoint-
challenging information.  Though individuals are not using the technology to enhance 
their ability to engage in ideologically-motivated selective exposure today, the analyses 
presented in Chapter 4 do not address the reasons for this behavior.  One possibility is 
that people have no aversion to political ideas that differ from their own.  In this case, I 
would argue that control-enhancing technologies would not inherently be associated with 
a fundamental shift in exposure to political difference.  On the other hand, contemporary 
practice may be substantially constrained by limitations, both technical and social, which 
make ideological filtering infeasible.  Given more control, people might exhibit different 
exposure preferences–such as a desire to filter out other viewpoints–than are currently in 
evidence.  Distinguishing between these two explanatio s for current behavior is critical 




I designed a web-based experiment in order to understand better individuals’ 
underlying preferences regarding ideological information exposure, and what they might 
do under conditions of more effective exposure control.  As described in Chapter 3, this 
experiment presents subjects with a politically diverse set of news stories, and measures 
their perceptions and use of the content of these it ms.  The following section provides an 
overview of the demographic characteristics of the experimental subjects.  Next, I 
examine the factors that influence individuals’ overall news exposure.  I find that 
individuals who are politically active and those who are more liberal tend to read more 
news items than others, even after controlling for significant demographic characteristics 
such as age and education.  Finally, I consider subjects’ perceptions regarding the 
political content of news stories, and use statistical techniques to examine the extent to 
which these perceptions influence the use of individual stories. I find that perceptions of 
the political viewpoints represented significantly influences usage patterns.  Consistent 
with the survey findings, subjects exhibited a prefe nce for examining stories that 
contain viewpoint-reinforcing information; however, they also exhibited a relatively 
weak aversion to viewpoint challenge.  The slightly lower likelihood of reading news 
items containing challenging information is offset by increased attention to those items 
that were read.  Nearly every subject encountered some amount of challenging 
information, and the more contrary the information, the more time they spent reading.  I 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings. 
Data 
All subjects, whether recruited through liberal or c nservative sites, were similar 
in terms of a few key demographics.  Both groups ranged in age from 18 to about 80, 
with average age of just under 50 years (see Table 30 for details).  More than 85% were 
white, and less than 5% identified as Black or Hispanic.  Participants in this study were 
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highly educated, with more than half having completed a college degree.  There were, 
however, several demographic differences as well.  Those recruited via the conservative 
site were disproportionately male, and those recruited via the liberal site 
disproportionately female, compared to the national average.  Conservative-site recruits 
tended to be less educated: slightly more than half had completed a college degree 
compared to about 7 in 10 of those recruited from the liberal site.  They also tended to be 
slightly wealthier, with about one in six reporting an income under $30,000 while more 
than one-quarter of the liberal site recruits reported an income in this range.   
As expected, these groups also differed significantly i  terms of their political 
affiliation and ideology.  More than half of those recruited from the liberal site identified 
themselves as Democrats, with very few Republicans.  This pattern was reversed among 
conservative site recruits.  A more pronounced pattern is evident when looking at 
political ideologies: about 9 in 10 identified with t e ideology corresponding to that of 
the recruiting news site.  It is also noteworthy that participants were more strongly 
committed to their particular political ideologies than most Americans.  Three-fifths 
described themselves as strong partisans, about three imes the proportion that identified 
as such in the telephone survey described in the previous chapter. In other words, subjects 
are using partisan news sites that favor their viewpoint.  
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Table 30. Subject demographics 
 Liberal site Conservative site 
(n) 358 369 
Age - mean (s.d.) range 49 (14) 19 – 81 48 (13) 18 – 82 
Male 39% 72% 
Female 62 28 
Race/ethnicity   
White 87% 85% 
Black 1 1 
Hispanic 4 2 
Other 7 10 
Education   
High school or less 5% 4% 
Some college 26 41 
College grad or more 70 55 
Income   
Less than $30K 28% 16% 
Between $30-$50K 22 21 
Between $50-$75K 19 27 
More than $75K 28 31 
Party Affiliation   
Democrat 56% 1% 
Independent 27 24 
Republican 4 60 
Other/no party 13 15 
Political Ideology   
Very liberal 61% 1% 
Somewhat liberal 28 2 
Moderate 8 6 
Somewhat conservative 2 32 
Very conservative 1 60 
Differences in overall attention to news 
A variety of factors shaped these partisan news users’ overall attention to the 
news.  There were two measures of news attention: how many news items a subject read 
and subjects’ total time (in seconds) reading those items.  There was high variance in 
both measures.  Subjects read between 0 and 5 articles - about 2 on average.  Among the 
67% who chose to read at least one news story, the to al read time ranged from 10 
seconds to about 87 minutes (5232 seconds). The average amount of time spent was 4 
minutes 30 seconds, and the median time was 3 minutes 20 seconds. Only nine subjects 
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spent more than 16 minutes reading.  I suspect that factors outside the context of the 
experiment (e.g., an interruption) influenced these subjects’ read times.  I exclude these 
individuals from the regression analyses in this chapter.  Including them does not alter the 
magnitude or sign of the coefficients; it only reduces the overall fit of the model.   
To examine which factors influenced subjects’ news attention I specified two 
regression models, one predicting the number of storie  read, and the other predicting the 
log of read time (see Table 31).  I transformed read time using a log function in order to 
render the data more compatible with linear regression assumptions–particularly the 
assumption that the error term is normally distributed.  Figure 3 shows read time 
distribution of residuals for the regression of overall read time before the transformation: 
the residuals are skewed, with a long tail on the right.  Figure 4 shows a much more 
normal distribution for the residuals of the model for the transformed data. 
Figure 3. Histogram of read time regression residua ls 













Figure 4. Histogram of log of read time regression residuals 










The explanatory power of these models is limited (R2 = .05 and R2 = .11).  This is 
due in part to the omission of influential variables r lated to the quality of the articles that 
were not of theoretical interest.  Nevertheless, the c aracterization of individuals’ overall 
news use provides context for the analyses that follow.  The predictors included in the 
models can be divided into two categories.  The first category includes demographic 
variables.  Older Americans tended to look at fewer news items but to spend more time 
reading on average.  For example, a typical 30-yearold would spend about 2 minutes 
(116 seconds) reading two stories, while an identical 50-year-old would spend about 2 
and a half minutes (144 seconds) reading 1.8 storie n average. This suggests that as 
Americans age, their strategy for gathering political nformation evolves from a rapid 
review of many items to a more careful examination of a few.  Education only influenced 
read time:  a typical college grad typically spent three-quarters of a minute less reading 
than someone who only held a high school diploma (141 seconds versus 188 seconds).   
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The second category includes factors related to politics.  Individuals who 
identified themselves as liberals read more stories and spent more time reading.  
Continuing the example, a liberal 30-year-old would spend almost three minutes reading 
(164 seconds for a liberal, 177 for a strong liberal)–nearly a minute longer than if he were 
a moderate or a conservative.   
The models also included several factors pertaining to issue activity.  The more 
news about the issue the subject had read in the past, the more news items he read, 
although total read time was not significantly relat d.  According to this model, those 
with the lowest level of exposure would typically read about one story fewer than those 
with the highest.  I suspect that the correlation between prior reading and the number of 
items read is spurious.  That is, prior reading about a topic is an outgrowth of interest, 
which also motivates subsequent reading.  This seem plausible given the evidence that 
topic interest and attention are positively correlated (Iyengar et al. 2003; Knobloch et al. 
2003).  This does not, however, explain the lack of influence of prior reading on read 
time.  One possible explanation for this is that individuals who are well read on the topic 
can process relevant new articles more quickly because the information being presented 
is already familiar (McGraw et al. 1990; Fiske and Kinder 1981).  These more politicaly 
sophisticated individuals focus on skimming for new information and situating it relative 
to their prior understanding, not on making sense of a large volume of new information.   
On the other hand, more issue-related political activity was associated with more 
time reading, but was unrelated to the number of stories read.  A highly active individual 
would read for about half a minute longer than one who was politically inactive (139 
seconds versus 110 seconds).  A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that 
politically active individuals read for a different purpose than individuals engaging in 
general news surveillance.  They could, for example, sp nd more time reading because 
they are more invested in understanding and internalizi g the arguments that might be 
useful to them in future actions (Canon 1964; Freedman 1965).  All of these factors, 
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which are unrelated to news items’ political content, u derscore the fact that individual 
differences influence people’s news reading behaviors.  Age, political ideology, and 
issue-related activities all shape individual’s atten ion to issue-related news. 
Table 31. Factors influencing number of news items read and log of time spent reading 
news items (regressions) 
 Number of news items read  Time spent reading news items 
 Coefficient (s.e.) Std. 
Coefficient 
Coefficient (s.e.) Std. Coefficient 
Issue-related news 
exposure 
 .279* (.123) .088  -.006 (.075) -.004 
Issue-related political 
activity 
 .036 (.043) .034  .059* (.025) .109 
Stable position?  -.016 (.125) -.005  -.117 (.075) -.071 
Age  -.011* (.004) -.094  .011*** (.003) .179 
Male (dummy)  -.071 (.123) -.024  -.139 (.074) -.089 
Education  -.021 (.054) -.015  -.096** (.032) -.138 
Income  .044 (.029) .059  -.019 (.017) -.051 
Strong liberal 
(dummy) a 
 .499* (.244) .153  .418** (.153) .254 
Liberal - not strong 
(dummy) a 
 .372 (.265) .088  .344* (.165) .157 
Conservative - not 
strong (dummy) a 
 .013 (.258) .003  .235 (.164) .110 
Strong conservative 
(dummy) a 
 .003 (.246) .001  .131 (.157) .078 
Issue=civil rights b  .012 (.142) .004  -.181* (.084) -.116 
Issue=gay marriage b  .128 (.164) .036  -.112 (.098) -.061 
Constant  1.199* (.604)   5.279*** (.360)  
R2 .046 .107 
(n) (695) (493) 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
a. Reference category is moderate. 
b. Reference category is social security reform. 
Perceptions of ideological content 
As explained in the methods chapter, subjects were ask d to assess five current 
issue-relevant news items in terms of their ideological political content. xi  Overall, 
                                                
xi See the Chapter 3 for a description of how these variable were measured. 
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subjects espousing all political ideologies anticipated encountering moderate levels of 
supporting and challenging information in the news items presented (see Table 32), 
although they perceived significantly more information that challenged their viewpoint 
than reinforced it). xii 
Table 32. Overall anticipated viewpoint-reinforcing  and viewpoint-challenging information  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
All subjects      
Viewpoint-reinforcing 
information 2903 2.00 10.00 6.25 1.92 
Viewpoint-challenging 
information 2903 2.00 10.00 7.18 1.66 
Difference t = -17.24, df = 2,890, p<.001 
AlterNet subjects 
Viewpoint-reinforcing 
information 1466 2.00 10.00 6.41 1.77 
Viewpoint-challenging 
information 
1463 2.00 10.00 7.01 1.62 
WorldNetDaily subjects 
Viewpoint-reinforcing 
information 1437 2.00 10.00 6.09 2.06 
Viewpoint-challenging 
information 
1440 2.00 10.00 7.36 1.68 
Comparison of means – AlterNet subjects versus Worl dNetDaily subjects  
Viewpoint-reinforcing 
information t = 4.3751, df = 2,901, p<.001 
Viewpoint-challenging 
information 
t = -5.7792, df = 2,901, p<.001 
                                                
xii This was not predicted:  the hypotheses laid out in the Chapter 2 focus on individuals’ 
exposure decisions, and do not address overall their perceptions of bias.  The finding is, 
however, consistent with the hostile media thesis, which suggests that individuals tend to 
overestimate the extent to which information presented by the news media is biased 
against their political viewpoint (Vallone et al. 1985).  On the other hand, it is possible 
that the news media presents viewpoints with which bot  liberals and conservatives 




Influence of ideological content 
Do expectations about the political content of news stories influence subjects’ 
news exposure choices?  One way to look at this quetion is to examine the subset of 
news items that subjects selected.  If prospective perceptions of story ideology matter, 
then the subset will tend to contain different perceived levels of viewpoint reinforcement 
and challenge on average than the complete set of five stories presented. 
Subjects who assessed all the news items presented (n=453) can be divided into 
three broad categories based on their behavior. xiii   Almost half the subjects (46%) 
disproportionately selected storied favoring their viewpoint.  That is, the ratio of expected 
viewpoint-reinforcing to expected viewpoint-challengi g information was higher in the 
subset of stories they selected than in the five stories overall.  The next largest group, 
representing about a third of the subjects (33%), chose a subset of stories that was 
comparable to the complete set in terms of the views presented: the ratio of expected 
support to expected challenge was the same in the selected group. Finally, about a fifth of 
subjects (22%) chose a subset of stories in which te perceived proportion of viewpoint-
reinforcing information was lower.  The proportion f individuals selecting a more 
favorable subset is significantly larger than the proportion who choosing one that was 
relatively less favorable (p<.001).  These results support the general expectation that 
ideology influences individuals’ attention to news. 
Preference for viewpoint reinforcement 
I use regression analysis to examine how subjects take their viewpoint into 
account when deciding whether to read specific news items.  Two measures of news use 
                                                
xiii  Many subjects chose not to assess all five stories. I omit these individuals from this 
analysis because a decision not to assess may be systematically related to the subject’s 
perception of the story.   
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function as the dependent variables in these analyses.  First, the data collection tool 
tracked whether or not each subject expressed interest in reading each of the five news 
items.  This dichotomous variable reflects the item’s appeal.  Subjects expressed interest 
in about half (52%) of the 3635 news items presented (727 subjects each selecting up to 
five news items).  A regression on this variable is the basis for evaluating the hypotheses 
related to item selection.  The hypotheses state tht item selection is more likely when 
more reinforcing information is present (H1c); unaffected by the presence of viewpoint-
challenging information for nonconservatives; and less likely when conservatives, issue 
activists, or frequent participants in religious activities perceive more challenging 
information (H2b, H3b, H4d).  
Second, the time spent reading each item (in seconds) provides a measure of 
subjects’ willingness to invest effort in reviewing an item.  Subjects read 1442 news 
items, about three-quarters (76%) of those they expressed interest in reading, and spent 
between 1 second and 76 minutes (4,554 seconds) reading individual news items. The 
single highest outlier, with a read time of over 75 minutes, was excluded from this 
analysis.  Excluding items with read times greater than 15 minutes (11 items)–as noted 
above, such read times are more likely the result of interruption or some other external 
factor–yields comparable results.    The mean time reading each story was a little over 
two minutes (134 seconds), and the median was about a minute and a half (100 seconds).  
The regression model of time is used to test hypotheses related to read time.  These 
hypotheses state that the time a subject spends reaing n item is (H1d) longer when 
more reinforcing information is present; (H2c) unaffected by the presence of viewpoint-
challenging information for nonconservatives; and less likely when (H3c) conservatives, 
(H4c) issue activists, or (H4e) frequent participants i  religious activities perceived more 
challenging information. 
To assess which factors influence item selection I constructed a logistic regression 
model, clustering the data by subject ID to account for he fact that there were repeated 
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non-independent observations (each subject could select up to five news items).  Several 
types of predictors were represented in the model.  Based on the hypotheses, I included 
subjects’ perceptions of the political content, their political ideology, and their political 
and religious activity.  I also examined the influenc  of interactions between news-items’ 
political content and subjects’ religious and political activity.  The model also controlled 
for subjects’ familiarity with the events reported in each news item and the personal 
relevance or salience of the events, as well as the issu  selected, the stability of subjects’ 
position on the issue, and subjects’ prior exposure to the issue.  Finally, there were 
demographic controls for age, education, and gender.  I had complete data for 2,833 news 
items for this analysis.  Table 33 presents the model coefficients, which correspond to the 
effect of each independent variable on the probability that a subject will select a news 
item.   
Several factors unrelated to the views expressed in an item exert a significant 
influence on selection.  Conservative subjects were less likely to select a news item on 
average, while those who had been following the issue most closely and who had been 
most active in issue-related politics were more likly to select it.  These findings reflect 
the overall usage trends described above.  It is also worth noting that individuals 
interested in the gay marriage issue were more likely to read a relevant story than those 
interested in other topics (p=0.05).  This may reflect the high media profile of this topic at 
the time of the study.  News related to this topic made the headlines more often than the 
other topics during the time that the research was conducted.  As a result, familiarity with 
these stories may have been perceived as important both in relation to the specific topic 
and to news surveillance more generally. 
Controlling for these factors, the perception that a news item will contain political 
information significantly influences the likelihood that it will be selected.  As described 
in the methods chapter, perceptions of consonant and dissonant information were 
measured using a summative scale that ranged from tw  to ten points.  The higher the 
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score, the more supportive or challenging the subject considered the article to be.  The 
analysis reveals that subjects were more likely to select items with higher reinforcement 
scores.  For example, the probability that a typical non-conservative subject would select 
a news item with neutral support and challenge scores f six was 67%.  If the item 
provided strong viewpoint reinforcement, with a score f ten, the probability increased to 
78%.  Challenge scores, on the other hand, were negativ ly correlated to selection 
probability.  The less challenging information a subject detected in a news story, the more 
likely s/he was to express interest in reading it, bu  the effect was smaller.  For example, 
if the challenge score dropped by four points, to a score of two, the probability only 
increased to 74%.   
These results support the first hypothesis, H1c, which predicted that the 
anticipated presence of viewpoint-reinforcing information would be positively correlated 
with article selection.  The expectation that conservative and nonconservatives behave 
differently was not supported.  The data show that all subjects–not just conservatives–are 
more likely to avoid items the more viewpoint-challenging information they contained, 
though this effect is much smaller than the effect of viewpoint-support.  Thus, hypothesis 
H3b is supported and hypothesis H2b is rejected.   
Issue activity and religious activity were also predicted to interact with the 
measure of dissonant information, but these interacions are both non-significant.  The 
interactions were omitted from the final model because they reduced the significance of 
the other factors without contributing to the model’s overall fit.  Thus hypotheses H4b 
and H4d are rejected. 
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Table 33. Factors influencing probability of item s election (logistic regression with 
clustering) 
 Coefficient (s.e.) 
Expected reinforcement 0.142 *** (0.026) 
Expected challenge -0.083 ** (0.030) 
Conservative? (dummy) a -0.410 ** (0.135) 
Issue-related political activity 0.033 (0.038) 
Religious activity 0.057 (0.060) 
Issue = civil rights? (dummy) b 0.124 (0.124) 
Issue = gay marriage? (dummy) b 0.286 (0.149) 
Familiarity with events reported 0.065 (0.038) 
Salience 0.147 ** (0.049) 
Prior exposure to news about this issue 0.255 * (0.110) 
Stable issue position -0.148 (0.108) 
Male (dummy) 0.032 (0.109) 
Age -0.007 (0.004) 
Education -0.014 (0.046) 
Constant -1.098 (0.591) 
Observations 2833 
Wald Chi-square 97.96 (p<0.001) 
Pseudo R-square .0407 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
a. Includes weak and strong conservatives 
b. Reference category is social security reform 
To assess which factors influence news item read time I utilized linear regression, 
again employing clustering to account for the repeated measures contained within the 
dataset.  A total of 1,069 read times were included in the analysis, representing the 
behavior of 488 subjects who assessed all the news it m presented.  The coefficients 
shown in Table 34 correspond to the magnitude of the change in the dependent variable, 
the natural log of item read time. 
As before, I included many of the same theoretically interesting variables, 
including subjects’ perceptions of views expressed in a news items, their political 
ideology, their political and religious activity, and the relevant interactions.  The controls 
that were used in the model of selection were included as well.  One key difference is that 
in this model, there were separate measures for anticipated perceptions of political 
content, based on the item synopses, and experience p r ptions, which subjects provided 
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after view the news items.  As I noted in the Chapter 3, these items could not be reliably 
combined.  I also considered abandoning one of the ass ssments pairs, but could not do 
so without significantly reducing the explanatory power of the model.  I even explored 
creating a new measure based on the maximum of either the prospective or retrospective 
scores, but this strategy also yielded a worse fitting model. 
Some of the control factors were found to have a significant influence on read 
time.  Age and the perception that the subject had le rned something from the news item 
were both correlated with greater read times.  These findings are consistent with the 
tentative explanations regarding overall read time off red above.  That older Americans 
spend more time on individual articles may reflect a difference in their approach to news 
reading.  Similarly, the effect of learning on read time lines up well with the earlier 
finding that individuals who have read more, and who therefore have less to learn, spend 
less time.  It also supports the interpretation that individuals who are politically active 
read for longer because they are more invested in retaining the information they 
encounter.  The number of stories read prior to the current item was also associated with 
increased read time, though the overall number had a negative influence.  That is, 
individuals who chose to read more stories spent less time on each, but the later they read 
the item, the more time they spent on it.  Fatigue would seem to be a likely explanation 
for this phenomenon.  Individuals whose attitudes rega ding the issue had not changed in 
the past year tended to spend less time reading, as did men and those with more 
education.  Finally, those interested in gay marriage tended to spend less time on each 
article they chose to read.  The high media profile f this topic, noted above, would 
suggest that these subjects were generally more familiar with the relevant issues, and 
therefore required less effort to process the news. 
As noted above, there were two sets of predictors related to subjects’ perceptions 
regarding consonant and dissonant information.  Theresults suggest that subjects’ 
expectations and the attitudes they encountered in the article (which were not highly 
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correlated) each had important effects.  The viewpoints that subjects encountered in a 
news item they read significantly influenced read time even after controlling for the 
factors described above.  On the other hand, the information that subjects anticipated 
encountering had no significant effect by itself, but its interaction with readers’ ideology 
was significant.   
For liberal and moderate subjects, political information was an unqualified 
incentive to read.  The more viewpoint-reinforcing or viewpoint-challenging information 
they encountered, the more time they spent reading on average.  It is also interesting to 
note that among these individuals, the presence of hallenging information had a larger 
influence than supporting information on read times.  For a typical non-conservative, an 
increase in support from average (seven) to high (ten) was associated with a 13% increase 
in read time (from 108 seconds to 122 seconds); a similar increase in the amount of 
challenging information produced a 24% increase, almost twice as large (to 134 seconds). 
These results support the hypothesis H1d, which predicted that the more 
viewpoint-supportive information an individual encountered, the longer s/he would spend 
reading it.  Hypothesis H2c and H3c, however, are not supported: the presence of 
dissonant information was significantly correlated with read time for both conservative 
and nonconservatives.  Unlike the findings regarding item selection, which suggested that 
individuals exhibit an aversion to challenge, the read time analysis implies no tendency 
for avoidance.  To the contrary, individuals are willing to engage with challenging 
information even if it requires addition time and attention. 
Though the main effects of expected viewpoint reinforcement or viewpoint 
challenge were insignificant, there were significant interactions with these factors.  
Specifically, this relationship seems to be different for conservatives and non-
conservatives.  For conservative subjects, expecting viewpoint-relevant information of 
either type was negatively correlated with read time, which appears to partially counteract 
the positive correlation between encountered viewpoint-relevant information and read 
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time.  For example, a typical conservative who anticipated and experienced a story to 
have consonant and dissonant content scores of seven would spend about 92 seconds 
reading.  If both viewpoint-support scores increased by three points while holding all 
other factors constant, the read time would stay the same.  The positive correlation 
between viewpoint-challenging information and read time is not completely absent for 
conservatives, but it is much smaller.  A three-point increase in both viewpoint-
challenging scores yields an estimated read time of about 108 seconds, a 17% increase.  
Though still an increase, this effect is not as large as it was for nonconservatives.  On the 
whole, the more challenging information an article contains, the more conservative read 
times drop relative to that of nonconservatives.  The interaction between being 
conservative and expecting to encounter dissonant iformation, unlike the main effect of 
dissonant information, is in the direction predicted in hypothesis H3c.   
As above, interactions between the measures of consona t and dissonant 
information and other the social networking factors (is ue activity and religious activity) 
were omitted because they reduced the overall fit of the model.  Thus hypotheses H4c 
and H4e are both unsupported. 
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Table 34. Factors influencing natural log of item r ead time (linear regression with 
clustering) 
 Coefficient (s.e.) 
Expected reinforcement 0.023  (0.020) 
Expected challenge 0.020 (0.018) 
Experienced reinforcement 0.039 ** (0.014) 
Experienced challenge 0.072 *** (0.014) 
Expected reinforcement X conservative -0.065 * (0.026) 
Expected challenge X conservative -0.080 ** (0.027) 
Experienced reinforcement X conservative 0.000 (0.021) 
Experienced challenge X conservative 0.041 (0.025) 
Conservative? (dummy) 0.573 (0.366) 
Frequency of issue activity 0.016 (0.019) 
Frequency of religious activity -0.004 (0.029) 
Issue = Civil right? -0.103 (0.064) 
Issue = Gay marriage? -0.195 * (0.078) 
Seen news elsewhere? -0.022 (0.020) 
Salience 0.017 (0.022) 
How much learned from news item? 0.047 * (0.022) 
Number of news items read prior 0.059 * (0.023) 
Total number of news items read -0.109 *** (0.024) 
Prior exposure to issue news -0.071 (0.076) 
Stable issue position (dummy) -0.137 ** (0.052) 
Male (dummy) -0.096 (0.051) 
Age 0.004 * (0.002) 
Education -0.062 ** (0.022) 
Constant 4.302 *** (0.399) 
Observations (subjects) 1,069 (488) 
F-statistic F( 23, 487) = 6.86 (p<0.001) 
R-square .1307 
* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
a. Includes weak and strong conservatives 
b. Reference category is social security reform 
Discussion and conclusion 
Subjects’ perceptions of the viewpoints a news item supports and/or challenges 
play a small but important role in determining how they attend to it.  Though these 
factors do not explain much of the variance in peopl ’s readership decisions, they are 
consistently statistically significant.  Overall, these results support the conclusion that 
people desire viewpoint-supporting information (see Table 29 for a summary of results).  
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The more support a reader expects to find, the more interested in it he will be and the 
more time he will spend reading it.  The results also suggest that people are more 
selective about viewpoint-challenging information, but the influence of this aversion is 
small compared to the draw of support.  Furthermore, nce they actually begin reading 
news items containing challenging information many individuals spend additional time 
examining them. 
Table 35. Summary of experiment results 
Hypothesis Supported? Page 
H1c. The more viewpoint-reinforcing information a news item 
contains, the more likely an individual will be to look at it. 
Yes 81 
H1d. The more viewpoint-reinforcing information a news item 
contains, the more time an individual will spend reading. 
Yes 108 
H2b. The presence of viewpoint-challenging information does not 
influence the likelihood that a nonconservative subject will read 




H2c. The presence of viewpoint-challenging information does not 





H3b. The presence of viewpoint-challenging information reduces the 
likelihood that a conservative subject will read a news item. 
Yes 105 
H3c. The presence of viewpoint-challenging information reduces the 




H4b. Individuals active in issue-based activism will be less likely to 
examine a news item with which they disagree. 
No 105 
H4c. Individuals active in issue-based activism will spend less time 
reading a news item with which they disagree. 
No 109 
H4d. Individuals active in religious social networks will be less likely 
to examine a news item with which they disagree. 
No 105 
H4e. Individuals active in religious social networks will spend less 
time reading a news item with which they disagr 
No 109 
The apparent discrepancy between the negative influe ce of challenging 
information on story selection and its positive influence on read time is compelling.  
Assuming that read time corresponds to subjects’ engagement with the material, the 
question is why people exert additional effort thinking about news items that they were 
initially prone to avoid.   
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There are three theoretically motivated explanations f r the discrepancy between 
news item selection and read time.  All three explanations assume that individuals 
experience some aversion toward examining viewpoint-challenging information.  The 
first possibility is that, despite this aversion, idividuals may actually consider it 
important to be familiar with other perspectives.  Thus, they are selective about which 
items they read, but once they commit to reading one they are willing to make a 
significant investment to understand it.  They spend xtra time on an item that contains 
more challenging information because it creates a larger cognitive load–it takes more 
work to understand–and because they are invested in making sense of, and subsequently 
critiquing, the new information.  The second possibility is that, contrary to their 
expectations, individuals find other perspectives interesting.  On this view, the extra time 
spent on viewpoint-challenging items is the result of this unanticipated interest, which 
they discover only after starting to read an item.  A third possibility is that the more 
viewpoint-challenging information a new item contais, the higher its quality must be 
before the individual will look at it.  As a consequence, among selected news items, 
dissonant information and news-item quality will be highly correlated.  If this were the 
case, then the extra time subjects spend on challenging information is actually motivated 
by the quality of the news item. 
A fourth possible explanation is based on a methodological issue.  It could be that 
the study created an artificial incentive to attend to selected news items.  Individuals may 
have felt obliged to read the news more thoroughly because they were participating in an 
academic study.  This would be a typical example of a Hawthorne effect (Roethlisberger 
and Dickson 1939).  If this is the case, then increased read time still indicates that 
attending to challenging information is more difficult.  The difference is in the 
motivation.  If it were not for the read-incentive created by the experimental setting, 
people might have abandoned reading items that required more cognitive processing, 
rather than spending extra time on them. 
 
113 
Though the last explanation is possible, I believe the study provides reasonable 
evidence of individuals’ commitment to understanding other viewpoints.  I did not 
provide an incentive for subjects to understand the viewpoints in the article, and the 
directions explicitly encouraged subjects to read only as long as they were interested in 
the item.   
Though these attributes of the study reduce the risk that this was a Hawthorne 
effect, it is not possible to eliminate it in this design.  Another design would be needed in 
order to rule this possibility out more completely.  For example, researchers could ask 
users of a real online news service to report their attitudes regarding a variety of 
contemporary political issues and to allow their use of the service to be observed.  The 
researcher could then automatically log the content of the articles that subjects read and 
how long they spent reading them over the course of s veral weeks.  Though subjects 
would know of the surveillance, it is unlikely that this knowledge would have a sustained 
influence on their behavior.  To analyze this data, the researcher would code the 
viewpoints represented in the stories subjects chose to read.  Comparing these to opinion 
statements given at the start of the project, the res archer could arrive at a measure of 
consonant and dissonant information, which could be used to predict read time. 
The survey results presented in Chapter 4 demonstrate th t Americans are not 
using technology to engage in significant ideologically-motivated selectivity today.  This 
may be a consequence of the limits of contemporary technologies and the ways in which 
people use them.  The “Daily Me” does not yet exist, and the tools that are available for 
filtering individuals’ exposure to news are not widely employed.  New technologies and 
evolving social practice are likely to make such exposure control an increasingly 
common phenomenon.   Technologies for filtering based on ideology are on the horizon.  
At the same time, people are becoming more skilled at working online, and online tools 
are increasingly integrated into social practice.  It is likely that over the next several years 
people will come to take some form of ideological selectivity for granted.  Research on 
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how to identify the political orientation of news content is underway (Efron 2004).  The 
evidence that news seekers want to take their own opinions into account when selecting 
their information sources provides a strong incentive for online news services, which are 
fiercely competing for audience share, to offer ideologically-based personalization 
services.  This study, which focuses on the choices people make in an online news 
environment that allows them to easily choose among alternatives that vary in terms of 
their viewpoint-reinforcing and viewpoint-challengi information, provides insight into 
underlying preferences about political information.  To the extent that new technologies 
allow us to act on these preferences, the results here suggest what news exposure might 
look like in the future.   
The data show that when forced to select among a variety of news items 
representing a range of political viewpoints, indivi uals consistently seek support for 
their own positions.   They are more likely to look at information that reinforces their 
opinion, and they spend more time reading it.  Individuals also exhibit an aversion to 
viewpoint-challenging information, though the effect is substantially smaller.  Thus, 
despite the aversion, newsreaders prefer articles that include a large amount of supportive 
and challenging information to those that offer more moderate amounts of each.  Among 
nonconservatives, there is a tendency to spend moretime looking at the viewpoint-
challenging news items they do choose to read, and this extra investment of time reflects 
their willingness to engage with other perspectives.  Overall, these results provide further 
evidence that individuals desire viewpoint-reinforcement, but they do not desire to screen 




The central objective of this research was to understand individuals’ propensity to 
engage in ideologically-motivated selectivity, and the implications this has for their use 
of technology-mediated sources of political information.  The work was intended to 
assess whether online political information seekers will use the capacities available to 
them to shape their exposure to political controversy to more closely resemble their 
opinions and predispositions. 
Ideologically-motivated selective exposure has been a topic of debate for more 
than half a century, and the significance of the Int r et has moved to the fore in the last 
five years.  Some scholars argue that citizens’ political opinions fundamentally influence 
their information exposure choices (e.g., Frey 1986), and that individuals systematically 
use media-enabled exposure control to seek out viewpoint-reinforcing information to the 
exclusion of other types of information (Mutz and Martin 2001; Sunstein 2001).  Other 
scholars hold that citizens’ political opinions are insignificant to exposure decisions (e.g., 
Sears and Freedman 1967; Chaffee et al. 2001), and that technology-enabled exposure 
control will have little influence on individuals’ exposure to diverse political ideas 
(Iyengar et al. 2003; DiMaggio and Sato 2003). 
The research described here was designed to reconcile these contradictory 
conclusions.  By disaggregating the two forms of ideologically-motivated selective 
exposure, treating reinforcement seeking and challenge aversion as independent 
phenomena, I sought to explain why prior research on selective exposure has failed to 
yield consistent results.  I proposed several hypotheses based on the premise that citizens 
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consistently desire to engage in the former behavior, but that a preference for the latter is 
less common and its influence less significant.  Thus, given more control, I expected that 
exposure to viewpoint-reinforcing information would increase, while exposure to 
viewpoint-challenging information would remain stable or drop only slightly. 
I used two studies to test these arguments.  The first examined how citizens’ 
overall exposure to political arguments changes in the presence of enhanced control.  To 
do this, I looked at which political information sources online news-seekers used, and 
compared Internet users to nonusers in terms of the number of viewpoint-consistent and 
viewpoint-contrary arguments they knew.  In the second study, I examined the 
relationship between individuals’ perceptions of the viewpoints expressed in political 
news items and their choice of items to read and how long to spend reading them. 
In the next section, I review and discuss the findings of the two studies, 
highlighting the ways in which the results are similar and examining their 
inconsistencies.  Next, I consider the significance of these findings in the context of 
designing information systems.  I start with the assumption that facilitating citizens’ 
ability to understand political controversy, allowing them to learn more about their own 
perspectives while preserving exposure the perspectives of others, is desirable.  The 
question then is how the lessons learned here might inform the design of technologies to 
do this.  Third, I describe some of the limitations of these studies, and consider how they 
might be overcome.  Finally, I discuss a number of future research opportunities. 
Findings 
Before turning to their interpretation, let us briefly review the empirical findings.  
The analyses of survey data presented in Chapter 4 make five interrelated points 
regarding citizens’ preferences for the partisanship of their overall political information 
diet.  The first three observations regard the relationship between online news use and 
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argument repertoire; the last two are based on the sources individuals use online.  First, 
individuals who get political information online are consistently more familiar with 
viewpoint-supporting information. Second, nonconservative online news users are more 
familiar with viewpoint-challenging arguments, while conservatives experience no 
change in their familiarity levels.  Third, there is no evidence that citizens are abandoning 
nonpartisan sources, even among online news users who rely heavily on partisan 
alternatives.  Fourth, individuals with stronger political opinions are more likely to 
consult supportive partisan sources.  And fifth, individuals are more likely to seek out 
other view points when they have access to supporting information than when they do 
not. 
The experimental analyses described in Chapter 5 examine the influence of 
ideology on decision-making at the level of individual news items.  These results can be 
organized around three themes.  First, they suggest that newsreaders tend to be drawn to 
viewpoint-reinforcing information, which is consistent with the data on overall exposure 
levels found in Chapter 4.  Specifically, I found tha  the more newsreaders agree with a 
news item, the more likely they are to view it and the more time they spend examining it.  
Second, viewpoint-challenging information influences subjects’ interest in news items in 
a more complicated way.  The more subjects disagree with the viewpoints expressed in a 
news item, the less likely they are to examine it (though this effect is much smaller than 
the effect of viewpoint reinforcement).  On the other and, among the news items they 
view, readers tend to spend more time considering those containing more viewpoint-
challenging information.  Third, I found that although all groups of newsreaders spend 
more time reading news items containing opinion-relevant information, the increase is 




On the whole, this research suggests that individuals’ political attitudes do 
influence their attention to relevant news and information.  The data are also consistent 
with the claim that citizens respond to viewpoint-reinforcing and viewpoint-challenging 
information differently, though my hypotheses regarding challenge avoidance appear to 
have been incomplete. 
The results regarding individuals’ preference to examine viewpoint-reinforcing 
information appear unambiguous.  Individuals seeking political information in an online 
environment that facilitates ideological selectivity (1) seek out sources that support their 
political viewpoints; (2) are more likely to attend to and spend more time considering 
news items with which they agree; and (3) have a larger repertoire of arguments with 
which to justify their opinions. 
The results regarding viewpoint-challenging information are not as 
straightforward.  Speaking broadly, the results suggest that citizens do not seek to entirely 
exclude contact with challenging information.  Evidence for this claim takes several 
forms.  In terms of their overall information exposure, Internet users are not less familiar 
than non-Internet users with arguments justifying other perspectives.  To the contrary, 
Kerry-supporting Internet users were more aware of the rationales for supporting Bush 
than Kerry supporters who had less experience with the technology.  In terms of their 
news-item exposure decisions, I found that newsreaders are slightly more selective about 
items containing viewpoint-challenging information.  This does not necessarily mean that 
they seek to exclude other perspectives.  The bias ag inst challenging information was 
slight:  large increases in the degree of opinion-ctrary information present had only a 
small effect on the likelihood that a reader would examine an item.  Furthermore, readers 
spent extra time on the challenging items they did consider, suggesting that the exposure 
was valuable enough to merit expending additional time and energy. 
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Nevertheless, it is worth examining possible explanations for the differences 
between the survey and experimental results:  why did respondents in the first use 
additional control over their information environment to maintain or increase their 
familiarity with other viewpoints, while subjects in the second chose to filter out other 
perspectives?  I consider two types of explanations; the first is based on a revised 
theoretical model of individual preferences, while th second is methodological in nature. 
The first possibility is that the additional attentio  that newsreaders give to 
challenging news items counteracts their bias against selecting them at the individual 
psychological level.  Subjects look at fewer items with which they disagree, but exert 
additional energy attending to those they do consider.  On this view, I would argue that 
citizens want to be aware of the arguments favoring other viewpoints, but they don’t want 
to encounter these arguments any more than they have to.   Thus, given more control, I 
would expect individuals to be more selective, avoiding repeated exposure to arguments 
with which they disagree.  Nonetheless, they want to be aware of other perspectives, and, 
having identified a novel argument, they make an effort to understand it.  This takes more 
time than reading viewpoint-supporting information because the perspective and claims 
are less familiar and because the reader may be motivated to identify flaws in the 
arguments.  A variation on this explanation is thatindividuals have a slight propensity to 
avoid opinion-contrary information because they expect it to be objectionable.  Looking 
at such information, however, they discover that other viewpoints are interesting, and as a 
consequence spend more time reading.  In either cas, the increased exposure time found 
in the experiment could be the cause for the overall increase in familiarity with other 
viewpoints found in the survey. 
A second theoretically-motivated explanation is that individuals have a higher 
quality threshold for the viewpoint-challenging news items they are willing to examine.  
An article that represents another viewpoint must be very compelling before someone 
will look at it, and the extra time spent on the items reflect their overall quality, not the 
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viewpoints expressed.  Though the motivation would be different, increased exposure 
time could again explain why these individuals were more familiar with opposing 
arguments. 
The remaining explanations are grounded in methodological issues.  First, the 
differences might be related to differences in the sample.  As previously observed, 
experimental subjects were more ideologically extreme than most Americans, and the 
topic was one that they indicated was of interest to them.  Both of these factors are 
associated with a greater tendency to be selective (Frey 1986; Chaiken and Stangor 1987: 
580).  Second, the different results could reflect the different information environments in 
which the studies took place.  Though the experiment relied on existing online tools to 
retrieve politically diverse news items, few Americans regularly use these capacities 
(Fallows 2005; Hargittai 2004).  Thus, it could be that online news users responding to 
the survey are not filtering out other viewpoints because they have not yet developed the 
habits or skills in using the technologies that would let them do so easily and efficiently. 
Although these methodological issues are undeniable, they are an insufficient 
explanation for the differences observed.  Neither  uniquely partisan subject pool nor 
the enhanced control provided explain why these individuals spent extra time viewing 
information with which they disagreed.  Thus, I conlude that a revised theoretical model 
that treats selection and subsequent engagement separat ly is necessary.  This revised 
model needs to account for the simultaneous aversion to and interest in viewpoint-
challenging information. 
Another remaining question about the results pertains to the ways in which other 
factors, including political ideology and religious and political activity, influence 
selective exposure behavior.  As predicted, both studies showed that conservatives pay 
less attention to other viewpoints than nonconservatives.  The survey results suggest that 
conservatives who use the Internet are no more familiar with opinion-contrary arguments 
than those who do not use, while liberal Internet users do realize an increase in familiarity 
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with such arguments.  The experiment went on to show t at conservatives spend less time 
reading viewpoint-challenging information than noncservatives (although all subjects 
take longer reading such items than reading viewpoint-reinforcing items).  The reasons 
for the lesser engagement of conservatives with challenging information are unknown.  
One factor deserving more attention is the social networks in which conservatives are 
embedded.  Strong social ties are an effective means of conveying normative pressure on 
individual behaviors (Portes 1998).  If conservatives tend to belong to groups that 
devalue exposure to other viewpoints, then it could be group norms, and not the 
conservative ideology, that generate increasing selectivity.   
In contrast to the findings regarding conservatives, the results about the influence 
of religious and political activity were both insignificant.  There was no correlation 
between religious attendance and either form of selective exposure.  This could indicate 
that religion is simply unimportant, but there is another explanation to consider.  
Research on the political influences of religion has suggested that attendance is often not 
the most effective predictor of political behavior.  Religious ideology, specifically 
theological conservatism, may have more explanatory p wer when examining issues 
related to political tolerance (Ellison and Musick 1993). 
Similarly, the frequency with which an individual is politically active may be the 
wrong dimension of activism to consider when looking for selective exposure effects.  
Much like with religion, the type of political group may have a more pronounced 
influence on selectivity than the frequency of participation.  Some groups may encourage 
isolation while others focus on interaction.  Furthe more, frequent participation could be 
associated with either of two opposite effects.  On one hand, active participants could 
find other viewpoints more dissonant, increasing the incentive to avoid them.  On the 
other hand, these citizens may be motivated to understand what those viewpoints are so 
that they can engage in the political debate.  Thissuggests that the type of activity in 
which the individual participates may also be important. 
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Designing online news services 
The results of these studies suggest that evolving search and filtering capacities in 
the news landscape have a significant influence on people’s exposure to political 
information, but it is a mistake to claim that these capacities inevitably extinguish 
exposure to other viewpoints.  How citizens’ exposure to political information changes in 
the future will depend on the interaction between their exposure preferences and the 
information environment.   
Different technical configurations will lead to different outcomes depending on 
the kinds of information search processes they facilit te.  If technologies facilitate 
searches generating results in which supportive and challenging information are 
simultaneously presented, then users are likely to continue to encounter other viewpoints.  
On the other hand, if technologies encourage individuals to choose between exclusively 
supportive or exclusively challenging information, those who use them will experience 
declining diversity of exposure. 
If we want to foster continued engagement with diverse political ideas it would be 
a mistake to ignore ideology when building online news tools.  The capacity to assess 
ideology is on the horizon, and given what we know of its influence on people’s attitudes 
toward the news, it seems very likely that this capacity will become an integral part of the 
news environment in some form.  Rather than deny its significance, we should encourage 
a news media landscape in which people can find support for their own views, however 
radical, without abandoning exposure to other perspectives. 
A number of strategies are possible if we take for granted the ability to correctly 
measure ideology.  Imagine a nonpartisan news searching service that aims to promote a 
well-informed citizenry.  Much like the news search services available today, the service 
would allow users to get an overview of the top news stories or to search for topics of 
personal interest.  The key difference lies in how results are ranked.  In its simplest form, 
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we could envision an approach to searching that assume  nothing about the user.  This 
naïve approach would generate results that rank mixed viewpoint content above single-
viewpoint content, but makes sure that extreme views are also represented in early 
results.  A more sophisticated approach would be to employ dynamic user models.  Such 
a system could, for example, assume that the first items a user selects will tend to be 
supportive of his or her opinion.  Using this information, the system could rank 
subsequent results so that items that clearly offerviewpoint reinforcement, but which also 
include a significant amount of challenging information are presented first.  The results 
could continue to be modified as the subject views more items, slowly increasing the 
prevalence of the less-viewed perspective, thereby using the powerful desirability of 
novelty to offset the subtle aversion to difference.  We can further imagine a system 
utilizing user models that are maintained across multiple search sessions.  Recognizing 
that attitudes about individual issues are often clustered ideologically, it should be 
possible to make educated guesses about people’s preferences regarding new topics.  
Again, the purpose of this assessment would be to ensur  that balanced news items with 
clearly identifiable supportive information are ranked most highly.  
Designers have two incentives for participating in such an undertaking.  First, 
some may be motivated by a concern for democracy and the deliberative process.  A 
system that effectively promotes a more complete understanding of the various 
perspectives on controversial political issues would yield many social benefits, including 
a more tolerant citizenry that engages in more thorough exploration of possible solutions 
to social problems.   
Second, this is a marketable service.  This strategy for ranking news items should 
produce results that more closely reflects users’ preferences, and it seems reasonable to 
expect that users would be more satisfied with the services as a consequence.  The online 
news search market is a competitive space, with several major service providers–among 
them Google, the Microsoft Network (MSN), and Yahoo–c mpeting for market share.  
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These companies are exploring ways to provide personalized news services in order to 
attract and retain users.  Google allows users to create personal profiles that reflect the 
categories of news that interest them.  For example, a user might choose to see more 
national than international news, to exclude entertainment news, or to see only sports 
news.  One of MSN’s news services tracks the stories that a user selects, revising search 
results based on these choices.  Yahoo allows usersto select a group of news services 
from which to create a personalized news product.  Services that tailor results as 
suggested here could potentially realize a marketabl  product while facilitating 
democratic deliberation. 
The most significant implication that this research has for news service design 
regards the use of information about users’ political predispositions.  The ranking 
strategies suggested here stand in contrast to apprches typical used in consumer 
recommendation systems (Schafer et al. 1999).  For example, having identified a 
consumer’s preferences regarding music styles it is appropriate for a system to filter out 
music that the user is known to dislike.  The differences is that in the case of political 
information, individuals’ political predispositions and their exposure preferences are not 
synonymous.  To effectively meet users’ needs, news services’ user models must account 
for people’s preference for novelty and awareness of other perspectives as well as their 
desire for viewpoint reinforcement. 
Limitations of this study 
This survey and experiment both provided useful insight into individuals’ 
preferences regarding political information, but each involved trade-offs.  Survey 
respondents were nationally representative, suggestin  that it is appropriate to generalize 
about the implications of the finding for the U.S. citizenry.  In exchange, the observed 
variation in respondents’ exposure control was not as large as it may be in the future.  At 
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this point, mechanisms for engaging in viewpoint selectivity over the Internet are limited 
and largely unused.   The experiment, on the other hand, afforded subjects more control 
at the expense of generalizability.  Allowing subjects to participate in the study from their 
own computer on their own schedule allowed for experience that more closely resembles 
their normal online news-reading practices; nevertheless, it was still an artificial 
environment targeted to partisan, politically-interested newsreaders.  Collecting data on 
the use of a selectivity-enhancing information system by a representative sample over an 
extended period would represent the best of both worlds.  Such an approach would 
provide more accurate and more representative data about item-level and aggregate 
information exposure. 
A second limitation of the work regards the hypotheses and data collected 
regarding factors that interact with selective exposure behavior.  As described in the 
previous section, religious and political activity may both be related to challenge 
avoidance, but not at the level of participation frequency.  Future research should focus 
on the ideologies of the groups with which individuals interact, not just the activity 
levels.  When considering religion, it may also be us ful to consider theological 
conservatism, which has been a better predictor of tolerance than religious affiliation in 
some studies (Ellison and Musick 1993). 
There are also several more minor limitations.  In its present form, the study 
includes no mechanism for checking the accuracy of respondents’ self-reported candidate 
preferences or argument exposure.  Regarding the former, it is known that respondents 
often give opinions in surveys that are generated on-the-fly, and do not necessarily reflect 
a deep commitment to the stated position (Zaller 1992).  Thus, this survey data may 
overestimate respondents’ level of candidate support.  To discriminate between stable 
supporters and those generating opinions in the moment, it would be useful to ask 
respondents about their candidate preferences before and after asking about the argument 
exposure.  Individuals whose positions changed as a re ult of exposure to the arguments 
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listed could then be treated separately from those whose positions remained unchanged.  
To test the validity of the argument exposure measure, it would be interesting to split the 
sample and ask a relatively small minority of respondents a series of open-ended 
questions about their argument exposure.  These responses could then be hand-coded and 
compared to those generated via the closed-ended questions. 
Another minor limitation regards the collection of usage information about 
specific sources of online information.  The survey asked people about their use of the 
Internet as a source of news “ever” and “yesterday”, but only asked about their use of the 
specific types of sources in the past year.  Given th  substantial numbers of online news 
users, it would be interesting to collect more detail d usage information. 
Future research questions 
The results of this research suggest three areas that merit future consideration.  
First, future research could be designed to reconcile the findings on item-level 
preferences and overall exposure.  As discussed above, the differences in these results 
could be the product of a more complex set of preferences than originally anticipated.  
My interpretation is that citizens want to be familiar with arguments on both sides of a 
controversy, but they want to avoid repeated exposure to opinion-contrary views.  
Individuals therefore look at fewer sources of viewpoint-challenging information, but 
they consider the sources they do choose carefully enough to achieve at least a 
rudimentary understanding of the opposing arguments.  There are, however, a number of 
alternate possible interpretations, including that extra time spent reading reflects a 
tendency to find other viewpoints more interesting, or that newsreaders only expose 




Further survey and experimental work could be employed to distinguish between 
these alternatives.  In terms of individuals’ overall exposure, it should be possible to 
collect survey data to examine the influence of online news use on the frequency with 
which users encounter other viewpoints, not just their awareness of them.  Turning to 
item-level exposure decisions, researchers could examine the influence of the interaction 
between argument novelty and viewpoint alignment on use while controlling for news 
item quality.  If my assertion regarding individual political exposure preferences is 
correct, individuals will be more likely to examine ws items containing novel 
arguments with which they disagree than comparable items in which the arguments are 
familiar.  Furthermore, having decided to consider a news item, the length of time the 
individual spends reading it will be positively correlated with the amount of novel 
challenging information it contains. 
The second area for future research regards the specific circumstances under 
which citizens are selective in their exposure to viewpoint-challenging political 
information.  Other research has established that there are many circumstances under 
which individuals actually prefer dissonant information.  These circumstances can be 
organized around two themes.  First, individuals are motivated to look at opinion 
challenges when they are secure that they will not be swayed from their own beliefs.  For 
example, research has shown that individuals find arguments that are weakly critical of 
their views or that are easily refuted to be as desirable as strongly supportive information 
(Lowin 1967; Lowin 1969; Kleinhesselink and Edwards 1975; Canon 1964; Freedman 
1965; Frey 1981b; Frey 1986: 52-56).  Similarly, individuals who have reason to be 
confident of their position, as when they have justseen supportive information, prefer 
dissonant information to consonant information (Frey 1981b; Frey 1986: 57-58).  Second, 
individuals will seek out viewpoint-contrary information when it is useful to some future 
task.  Thus, an individual preparing for a political debate is more likely to look for 
information representing the other side’s arguments (Canon 1964; Freedman 1965; Clark 
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and Wilson 1961).  Additional research on the signif cance of these factors in the context 
of online political information seeking could further enhance our ability to foster diverse 
political exposure.   
The final area of research regards the influence of political ideology.  We need a 
better understanding of the reasons and mechanisms leading conservatives to be less 
attentive to opinion-contrary information than liberals.  I have suggested above that this 
tendency may be a product of pressures exerted via soci l networks.  It would be 
interesting to determine if the tendency of conservatives to be less drawn to opinion-
contrary information is grounded in the ideology itself, or in the social practices common 
among conservatives. 
Conclusion 
Exposure to political difference is a crucial part of democratic deliberation.  A 
communication environment that allows individuals to exclude other viewpoints 
potentially threatens citizens’ ability to understand those who disagree with them and to 
find common ground, ultimately contributing to political polarization.  New information 
technologies, including email, the web, blogs, and the myriad information processing 
services accessible via the Internet, make realizing a communication environment such as 
this increasingly viable.  Using capabilities available today, individuals can significantly 
stem their exposure to viewpoint-challenging information.  A steady flow of technical 
advances in information filtering and retrieval arelik ly to enhance these capabilities.  
Under these circumstances, it is critically important that we understand whether people 
want to avoid contact with viewpoint-challenging information, and the extent to which 
they are using new technologies to achieve this end. 
This study provides important insight into the relationship between selectivity-
enhancing technology and political information exposure.  The idea that people who get 
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political information online are building echo chambers in which the only other voices 
they hear are reflections of their own has gained significant momentum in the past several 
years.  News reports present compelling narratives describing the actions of these 
individuals, and scholars have suggested theoretical grounds for these behaviors.  The 
consequences of such a transformation of the political landscape would be dire.  Effective 
political deliberation requires a communication environment in which differing views are 
expressed and heard.  I believe, however, that scenarios described to date have tended to 
be overly dystopian.  Some individuals undoubtedly do engage in these troubling 
practices, using the Internet to filter out all disagreement, but empirical evidence shows 
that the majority of Americans do not. 
In this dissertation, I have argued that citizens do seek support for their own 
beliefs, but not to the exclusion of other opinions.  When given more control over their 
political information environment, individuals continue to expose themselves to 
arguments and attitudes with which they disagree.  I have suggested that this reflects a 
preference among most Americans to be familiar withmultiple perspectives.  At the same 
time, I believe that citizens do seek to limit repeated exposure to viewpoints with which 
they disagree.  Most people are satisfied with hearing an argument for the other side only 
occasionally.  Thus, in a future in which citizens can exert a strong ideological influence 
on their political information exposure, polarization is not inevitable. 
These results are encouraging, but I do not wish to suggest that new technologies 
are a panacea.  Under some circumstances, the preferences I have described could still 
lead to polarization.  I have suggested that people’s willingness to encounter political 
difference is contingent on first finding adequate support for their own viewpoints.  
Individuals who fail to find support for their views in the more balanced news media may 
ultimately abandon them in favor of more biased alternatives as a byproduct of their 
search for political reinforcement.  Whether indiviuals continue to get their news from 
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mainstream of more alternative sources, the ability to easily acquire a moderately 



















PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 
PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 
 




N=1,500 adults 18 and older, 750 Form A/750 Form B 




* indicates a PIAL trend question 
** indicates a PRC trend question 
 
Hello, my name is _______________ and I’m calling for Princeton Survey Research.  We’re conducting a 
survey to find out what Americans think about some important issues today, and we would like to include 
your household.  May I please speak with the YOUNGEST MALE, age 18 or older, who is now at home?  
(IF NO MALE, ASK:  May I please speak with the OLDEST FEMALE, age 18 or older, who is now at 
home?)   
 
AFTER RESPONDENT IS ON THE PHONE AND INTRODUCTION HAS BEEN READ:  This 
interview is completely voluntary. If we should come to any question you don't want to answer, we can 
skip it.  Just let me know and we will go on to the next question.  The answers you give will be kept  
confidential.  Here’s my first question… 
 









9 Don’t know/Refused  
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Q2 I’m going to read you a few statements.  For each one, please tell me if this describes you very 
well, somewhat well, not too well, or not at all. (READ; ROTATE)  (FOR FIRST ITEM THEN 
AS NECESSARY: Does this describe you very well, somewhat well, not too well, or not at all?) 
 
a. After I gather all the facts about something, I make up my mind pretty quickly 
b. I like to read about a lot of different things 
c. I find it difficult to make up my mind when I have too much information about something 
d. Once I have my mind made up about something, I seldom change it 
e. I enjoy hearing about politics and world affairs 
 
1 Very well 
2 Somewhat well 
3 Not too well 
4 Not at all 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
*Q5 Turning to a different topic… do you use a computer at your workplace, at school, at home, or 




9 Don’t know/Refused  
 




9 Don’t know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6=1); NON-USERS GO TO Q18: 
*Q12 About how many years have you had access to the Internet? 
 
 ____ RECORD NUMBER OF YEARS 
0 Under a year 
99 Don’t know/Refused  
 
IF ONLINE UNDER A YEAR (Q12=0): 
*Q12.1 About how many months is that? 
 
 ____ RECORD NUMBER OF MONTHS 




ASK ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6=1): 
*Q16 About how often do you go online from… (INSERT IN ORDER) – several times a day, about 





1 Several times a day 
2 About once a day 
3 3-5 days a week 
4 1-2 days a week 
5 Every few weeks 
6 Less often 
7 (VOL) Never 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
*Q17 How much, if at all, has the Internet improved… (INSERT FIRST ITEM; ROTATE) — a lot, 
some, only a little or not at all?  How much has the Internet improved... (INSERT NEXT ITEM) – 
a lot, some, only a little, or not at all?   
 
a. your ability to complete everyday tasks like shopping or paying bills 
b. the way you pursue your hobbies or interests 
c. your ability to do your job 
d. your ability to get news and information that you can’t get elsewhere 
e. your ability to keep in touch with friends and family 
  
 1 A lot 
 2 Some 
 3 Only a little 
 4 Not at all 
 5 (VOL) Does not apply to me 
 9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
ASK ALL: 
Q18 Next...Please tell me if you ever get news or information from each of the following sources.  
(First/Next)… (INSERT IN ORDER).  Do you EVER get news or information from this source?    
 




c. Magazines  
d. The radio  
e. Friends and family 
ASK f-g LAST, IN ORDER, OF INTERNET USERS ONLY: 
f. The Internet 




9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
IF YES TO ITEM ABOVE: 
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9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
SPLI T FORM Q20/Q21 
FORM A ONLY: 
**Q20 Thinking about the different kinds of news available to you, what do you prefer… (READ AND 
ROTATE 1-2) 
 
1 Getting news from sources that SHARE your political point f view (or) 
2 Getting news from sources that DON’T HAVE a particular political point of  
view (or) 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
FORM B ONLY: 
Q21 Thinking about the different kinds of news available to you, what do you prefer… (READ AND 
ROTATE 1-3) 
 
1 Getting news from sources that SHARE your political point f view (or) 
2 Getting news from sources that DON’T HAVE a particular political point of  
view (or) 
3 Getting news from sources that CHALLENGE your political point of view  
(or) 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
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IF GET NEWS ONLINE (Q18f=1 or Q18g=1): 
**Q22 Which of the following comes closest to describing why you go ONLINE to get news and 
information?  (READ, RANDOMIZE 1-3)  
 
1 Because you can get more IN DEPTH information on the Web 
2 Because getting information online is more CONVENIENT for y u 
3 Because you can get information from a WIDER RANGE OF VIEWPOINTS  
on the Web 
4 (VOL) Some other reason (SPECIFY) 





**C1 Suppose the election for president were being held TODAY and the candidates were… (INSERT 
CHOICES BELOW – ORDER ROTATED BY FORM)?  Who would you vote for?  
 
FORM A: George W. Bush, the Republican; John Kerry, the Democrat; and Ralph Nader, an Independent 
candidate 






4 (VOL) Other candidate 
5 (VOL) Wouldn’t vote 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
ASK C2 IF DO NOT SUPPORT BUSH, KERRY, OR NADER IN C1 (C1=4-9): 
**C2 As of TODAY, do you LEAN more toward...(INSERT CHOICES BELOW—ORDER 
ROTATED BY FORM)? 
 
FORM A: Bush, the Republican; Kerry, the Democrat; or Nader, th  Independent  





4 (VOL) Other candidate 




ASK C3 IF SUPPORT BUSH, KERRY, OR NADER IN C1 (C1=1-3): 
**C3 Do you support (INSERT C1 CHOICE: Bush/Kerry/Nader) STRONGLY or only moderately? 
 
1 Strongly 
2 Only moderately 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
ASK C4 OF ALLWHO DO NOT SUPPORT/LEAN TOWARD BUSH OR KERRY (C1=3 OR C2=3-9) 
C4 Suppose there were only two presidential candidates on the ballot and you HAD TO CHOOSE 
between... (INSERT CHOICES BELOW – ORDER ROTATED BY FORM). If the election were 
held TODAY, who would you vote for?  
 
FORM A: George W. Bush, the Republican; and John Kerry, the Democrat 




3 (VOL) Other candidate 
4 (VOL) Wouldn’t vote 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
**C5 How closely have you been following news about the upcoming Presidential election?  (READ 1-
4) 
 
1 Very closely, 
2 Somewhat closely, 
3 Not too closely, or 
4 Not at all closely? 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
ASK INTERNET USERS (Q6=1); NON-USERS GO TO C8: 
C6 Do you ever get news or information about the candidates and the campaign on the Internet or 








ASK IF C6=1: 
C7 How often do you get news or information about the candidates and the campaign on the Internet 
or through email – everyday or almost everyday, several times a wek, several times a month, or 
less often? 
 
1 Everyday or almost everyday 
2 Several times a week 
3 Several times a month 
4 Less often 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
ASK ALL: 
**C8 Where have you gotten MOST of your news and information about the presidential election 
campaigns?  From television, from newspapers, from radio, from magazines, or from the Internet 
and email?   (ACCEPT TWO RESPONSES; IF ONLY ONE RESPONSE IS GIVEN, PROBE 




3 Radio  
4 Magazines 
5 The Internet and email  
6 (VOL) None of these/Someplace else (SPECIFY) 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
C9 In the way they cover the presidential race, do you think the news media are biased in favor of 
John Kerry, biased in favor of George W. Bush, or don’t you think they show any bias one way or 
the other?  
 
1 Kerry bias 
2 Bush bias 
3 No bias 
4 (VOL) Biased both ways, sometimes for Kerry and sometimes for Bush 
5 (VOL) Depends on media source 




C10 I’m going to read different arguments people make about the Presidential candidates and their 
policies.  Please tell me how often you have heard or read each argument – frequently, just once in 
a while, or never.  Here’s the (first/next) one… (READ; ROTATE)  AS NECESSARY: Is this 
something you hear frequently, just once in a while, or have you never heard this argument?   
 
IF HEAR FREQUENTLY/ONCE IN A WHILE, ASK C11 FOLLOW UP BEFORE MOVING TO NEXT 
ITEM   
 
ROTATE BLOCKS; IF SUPPORT BUSH (C1=1 OR C2=1 OR C4=1), ASK a-d FIRST, IF SUPPORT 
KERRY/UNDECIDED (C1=2 OR C2=2 or C4=2-9), ASK e-h FIRST.  ROTATE ITEMS WITHIN 
BLOCKS. 
 
a. The Bush administration’s policies have helped the country’s economy begin to recover 
b. George Bush is a stronger leader than John Kerry in the war against terrorism 
c. John Kerry changes his positions on the issues when he thinks it will help him win an election 
d. John Kerry has a history of accepting money from special interest groups 
 
e. John Kerry will end special treatment for corporations and wealthy Americans 
f. The Bush administration misled the American public about the reasons for going to war with Iraq  
g. John Kerry has a better strategy than George Bush for creating peace in Iraq 
h. Some Bush administration policies are a threat to basic civil rights and civil liberties 
 
1 Hear this frequently 
2 Hear this once in a while 
3 Have never heard this 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 




3 Haven’t thought much about it 




ASK ALL INTERNET USERS; OTHERS GO TO DEMOS: 
INT1 In the past 12 months, did you happen to visit any of the following websites?  Just tell me yes or 
no.  (READ; ROTATE WITHIN SECTIONS)  IF NECESSARY: Did you happen to visit this kind of 
website in the past 12 months? 
 
 ASK a-f OF ALL; ALWAYS ASK a-c FIRST, IN ORDER: 
a.  The website of a major news organization, such as cnn.com or  
msnbc.com  
b. The website of an INTERNATIONAL news organization, such as the BBC  
or Aljazeera (AL-ja-ZEE-ra) 
c. The website of an ALTERNATIVE news organization, such as AlterNet.org  
(ALL-ter-net-dot-org) or NewsMax.com (news-max-dot-com) 
e. The website of a politically LIBERAL organization, such as People for the American Way or 
Moveon.org (move-on-dot-org) 
f. The website of a politically CONSERVATIVE organization, such as the  
Christian Coalition or the American Enterprise Institute 
ASK g-i OF FORM A ONLY 
g. GeorgeWBush.com (George-W-Bush-dot-com), the President’s official reelection website  
h. JohnKerry.com (John-Kerry-dot-com), the official website of the Kerry campaign 
 ASK j-l OF FORM B ONLY: 
j. RNC.com (R-N-C-dot-com), the official website of the Republican National Committee 





9 Don’t know/Refused   
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PIAL STANDARD DEMOGRAPHICS: 
 
(READ) Now a few last questions for statistical purposes only… 




9 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know/Refused 
 
AGE What is your age? 
 
_________ years (97=97 or older) 
98 Don't know 
99 Refused 
 
EDUC What is the last grade or class you completed in school? (DO NOT READ, BUT CAN PROBE 
FOR CLARITY IF NEEDED). 
 
1 None, or grades 1-8 
2 High school incomplete (grades 9-11) 
3 High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate) 
4 Technical, trade or vocational school AFTER high school 
5 Some college, no 4-year degree (includes associate degree) 
6 College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree) 
7 Post-graduate training/professional school after college (toward a Master's degree or Ph.D., Law 
or Medical school) 
9 (DO NOT READ) Don't know/Refused 
 








6 Never been married 
8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 




EMPL Are you now employed full-time, part-time, retired, or are you not employed for pay? 
 
1 Employed full-time 
2 Employed part-time 
3 Retired 
4 Not employed for pay 
5 (VOL) Disabled 
6 (VOL) Student 
8 (VOL) Other 
9 Don’t know/Refused 
 
ASK IF EMPL DOES NOT EQUAL 6: 
STUD Are you also a full- or part-time student? 
 
1 Yes, full-time 
2 Yes, part-time 
3 No 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
ASK ALL: 
HISP Are you, yourself, of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, 




9 (DO NOT READ) Don't know/Refused 
 
RACE What is your race?  Are you white, black, Asian, or some ther race? 
IF R SAYS HISPANIC OR LATINO, PROBE: Do you consider yourself a WHITE (Hispanic/Latino) or a 
BLACK (Hispanic/Latino)?  IF R DOES NOT SAY WHITE, BLACK OR ONE OF THE RACE 
CATEGORIES LISTED, RECORD AS “OTHER” (CODE 6) 
 
1 White 
2 Black or African-American 
3 Asian or Pacific Islander 
4 Mixed race  
5 Native American/American Indian 
6 Other (SPECIFY) 









4 No party/Not interested in politics (VOL.) 
5 Other party (VOL.) 
9 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know/Refused 
 
POLID Would you say your views in most political matters a e very liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, 
somewhat conservative, or very conservative? 
 
1 Very liberal 
2 Somewhat liberal 
3 Moderate 
4 Somewhat conservative 
5 Very conservative 
9 Don't know/Refused 
 
VOTE These days, many people are so busy they can’t find time to register to vote, or move around so 
often they don’t get a chance to re-register.  Are you NOW registered to vote in your precinct or 
election district, or not?   
 
1 Yes, registered voter 
2 No, not registered voter 
3 (VOL) Don’t have to register 
9 Don’t know/Refused  
 




2 About once a week, 
3 About once a month, 
4 Several times a year, OR 
5 Don’t you go to worship services? 




D7 What is your religious preference -- Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, an Orthodox 
Church, or some other religion? 
 
1 Protestant (includes Baptist, Christian, Episcopalian, Jehovah’s Witness, Lutheran, Methodist, 
Presbyterian, etc.) 
2 Roman Catholic/Catholic 
3 Jewish 
4 Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) 
5 Orthodox Church (Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, etc.) 
6 Islam/Muslim 
7 Buddhist 
8 Hindu  
9 Other religion (SPECIFY – BACK-CODE AS APPROPRIATE) 
97 (VOL.) No religion/Atheist/Agnostic 
98 Don’t know  
99 Refused  
 
ASK D8 IF OTHER RELIGION/DK/REF (D7=9,98,99): 




9 Don't know/refused 
 
ASK D9 IF PROTESTANT OR CHRISTIAN (D7=1 or D8=1): 




9 Don't know/Refused 
 
ASK ALL: 
INC Last year, that is in 2003, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes.  Just 
stop me when I get to the right category…  (READ 1-8) 
 
1 Less than $10,000 
2 $10,000 to under $20,000 
3 $20,000 to under $30,000 
4 $30,000 to under $40,000 
5 $40,000 to under $50,000 
6 $50,000 to under $75,000 
7 $75,000 to under $100,000 
8 $100,000 or more 




ASK IF GO ONLINE AT HOME (Q16a=1-6): 
*MODEMDoes the computer you use at home connect to the Internet through a dial-up telephone line, or 
do you have some other type of connection, such as a DSL-enabled phone line, a cable TV 
modem, a wireless connection, or a T-1 or fiber optic connection? 
 
1 Standard telephone line 
2 DSL-enabled phone line 
3 Cable modem 
4 Wireless connection (either “land-based” or “satellite”) 
5 T-1 or fiber optic connection 
6 Other (MAKE SURE NOT ONE OF ABOVE) 
9 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know/Refused 
 
ASK IF GO ONLINE FROM WORK (Q16b=1-6):  
*BBW Do you happen to know what kind of Internet connection y u have at WORK, a high-speed 
connection or dial-up connection through a modem?  
 
1 High speed 
2 Dial-up 
3 (DO NOT READ) None/Does not apply 
9 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know/Refused 
 
IF HAVE BB AT HOME (MODEM=2-5); OTHERS GO TO BB8: 
*BB2 About how many years have you had high-speed Internet service at home? 
 
_____  RECORD NUMBER OF YEARS 
0 Under a year 
99 (DO NOT READ) Don't know/Refused 
 
IF HAVE BB LESS THAN A YEAR (BB2=0) ASK: 
*BB3 About how many months is that?   
 
_____  RECORD NUMBER OF MONTHS 





ASK BB8-BB9 IF HAVE DIAL-UP AT HOME (MODEM=1): 
*BB8 Assuming cost was not an issue, would you LIKE to have a faster, “high-speed” connection at 




9 (DO NOT READ) Don't know/Refused 
 




9 Don’t know/Refused  
 
THANK RESPONDENT:  Thank you very much for your time.  The results of this survey are going to be 
used by a non-profit research organization called the Pew Internet & American Life Project, which is 
looking at the impact of the Internet on people's lives, and by researchers at the University of Michigan.  A 
report on this survey will be issued by the Pew Internet Project in a few months and you can find the results 
at its web site, which is www.pewinternet.org [w-w-w dot pew internet dot org].  Thanks again for your 





COMPARING SOURCE USE PROPORTIONS 
 
In order to assess differences in respondents’ use of n ws sources online and off, I 
used a procedure that facilitates the comparison of multiple proportions.  This appendix 
describes the procedure in detail. 
The original dataset describing respondents’ source se includes one case per 
respondent and one variable per source type.  The valu  of each variable corresponds to 
the respondent’s use of that source.  For example, data corresponding to five respondents 
might look like this: 
 




Party site Partisan 
news site 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4 1 1 0 1 0 1 
5 1 0 1 0 0 0 
  I transformed the dataset so that there is one cas for each source-respondent 
combination.  In the transformed dataset, a series of dummy variables indicate which 
source is being described, and a new dichotomous variable represents the respondent’s 
use of that source.  Thus, in the revised dataset there were six times as many cases.  For 
example, a single respondent who got news via television and the newspaper, but did not 








Party site Partisan 
news site 
Use 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Next I constructed a logistic regression model predicting use by media type.  For 
example, the following model compares use of partisn news sites to the other five news 
sources: 
logit (use) = α + β1 (television) + β2 (newspaper) + β3 (ideological) + β4 (party) 
The overall Wald statistic is an indicator of the significance of source type as a predictor 
of use.  A significant coefficient on a source type dummy indicates that use of that source 
is significantly different than use of the referenc category source.  In the example given 
above, the significance of β2 indicates whether newspaper usage is different tha t e use 
of partisan news sites.   
In order to evaluate the differences between other sou ce pairs, I performed a 
series of post-hoc multiple comparisons, modifying which source was treated as the 
reference category.  For example, if partisan news site was the reference category in the 
first model, party site might be set as the reference category in the second, ideologically-
oriented site as the third, and so on.  This was done five times in order to compute 
coefficients corresponding to every source pair.  A Bonferroni adjustment was used to 
account for multiple comparisons.  Thus, to achieve significance at the .05 level, the p 
value had to be less than .01. 
There is one final note about the analysis.  Usage levels for all six source types 
are based on responses from a single group of respondents.  Since some respondents may 
be more inclined to get news than others, individuals’ responses may be clustered.  In 
order to account for this possibility, the logistic regression referred to above was actually 
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a generalized estimating equations (GEE) with a logistic link function and robust 
standard errors.  This quasi-likelihood method produces coefficients that are comparable 
to logistic regression, but that are adjusted for the clustering that occurs when repeated 






Email and web-site posting: 
An important study is being conducted at the University of Michigan on access to 
political information. Do people use the internet to learn about political perspectives not 
well-represented in the mainstream media, or do they us  it to insulate themselves from 
opinions they don't agree with? Or both? Help U. Michigan researchers figure it out: 
Participate in this study and be entered to win a $100 gift card from Amazon.  
Project web site 
Thank you for your interest in this research project. 
 
Your input is very important, and participation is easy. If you choose to be 
included in the study, you will be given access to a secure web site that will lead you 
through a brief experiment. In this experiment, youwill be asked a series of questions 
about news stories related to a political issue of interest to you. The experiment will take 
about 30 minutes and no further participation is required. 
 
Please be assured that your answers are confidential. The data collected during the 
experiment will not be linked to personally identifying information and no individual 




We highly value your contribution. As a reward for participating, you will have 
the opportunity to be entered in a lottery for a $100 gift certificate to Amazon.com. 
To participate, please enter your email address into the box below, and click 
submit. You should receive detailed instructions for accessing the project web site within 
a few days. If you have any questions about the project, please email Kelly Garrett 
<garrettk@umich.edu>. 
 
You must at least 18 years old to participate. 
 
Please enter your email address here: ______________ 
 
Notes: 
•  Your browser must support cookies and pop-ups in order to access this site.  




University of Michigan 
School of Information 
Directions for participating 
Subject: U-Michigan Research on Online News 
 
Thank you for your interest in participating in this online experiment examining 
the factors that shape people’s news preferences.  Your participation is very important.  
Please be assured that your answers are confidential. No individual person’s answers will 
ever be identified in any report.  
 






Or you can copy the URL and paste it into your browser.  If you have any 
difficulty logging in, please reply to this message for assistance. 
 




University of Michigan School of Information 
Directions for participating 
Subject: U-Michigan Research on Online News 
 
You recently participated in a telephone survey where you indicated that you 
would be willing to hear more about an online study.  This message describes that study, 
and explains how you can be involved. 
 
The study is being conducted at the University of Michigan and it examines how 
people use online news.  The purpose of the study is to understand the factors that shape 
people’s news preferences. 
 
Your input is very important, and participation is easy. 
 
If you choose to be included in the study, you willbe given access to a secure web 
site that will lead you through a brief experiment.  In this experiment, you will be asked a 
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series of question about news stories related to a political issue of interest to you.  The 
experiment will take about 30 minutes and no further participation is required. 
Please be assured that your answers are confidential.  The data collected during 
the experiment will not be linked to personally identifying information and no individual 
person’s answers will ever be identified in any report. 
 
As a reward for participating, you will have the opp rtunity to be entered in a 
lottery for a $100 gift certificate to Amazon.com.   
 




Or you can copy the URL and paste it into your browser.  If you have any 




University of Michigan School of Information 
Directions follow-up 
I recently sent you an email providing information about how to participate in a 
Web-based experiment examining the factors that shape people’s news preferences being 
conducted by researchers at the University of Michigan. 
 
As I said in that message, your input is very important.  Participation is easy, and 
participants can enter in lottery for a $100 gift certificate to Amazon.com.  I hope you 








Or you can copy the URL and paste it into your browser.  If you have any 






















































ISSUE SELECTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Please choose one issue from the list below: 
1 Civil liberties 
2 Gay marriage 
3 Social security reform  
 
In the past 12 months, how much have you heard or read about the issue? 
1 A lot 
2 Some 
3 A little 
4 Nothing at all 
 
In the past 12 months, how often have you participated in meetings, demonstrations, or other 
activities related to the issue? 
1 Never 
2 1 time 
3 times 
4 3-5 times 
5 More often 
 
Have you always held the same position regarding this issue, or has your opinion changed over 
time? 
1 I have always held the same position 
2 My opinion has changed over time 
 
NEWS ITEM ASSESSMENT – PROSPECTIVE 
 




This is the first time I have answered questions about this news report. 
1 Yes, it is the first time. 




I have heard about the events reported here before. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
I expect the events reported here to affect me personally. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
I expect the news report to describe arguments supporting my political viewpoint. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
I expect it to demonstrate that others support my political viewpoint. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
I expect it to describe arguments opposing my politica  viewpoint. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
I expect it to demonstrate that others oppose my political viewpoint. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
NEWS ITEM ASSESSMENT – RETROSPECTIVE 
 




This is the first time I have read this news report. 
1 Yes, the report was new to me. 
2 No, I have read this report before. 
 
164 
I learned something from this news report. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
The news report described arguments supporting my political viewpoint. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
It demonstrated that others support my political viewpoint. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
It described arguments opposing my political viewpoint. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
 
It demonstrated that others oppose my political viewpoint. 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 
4 Disagree 






Where did you first hear about this study? 
1 AlterNet email 
2 Moving Ideas email 
3 The Washington Dispatch email 
4 WorldNetDaily email 
5 Telephone Survey 
 




What is your age?  _____ 
 
What is your zip code?  ____ 
 




What is the last grade of class you completed in school? 
1 None, or grades 1-8 
2 High school incomplete (grades 9-11) 
3 High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate) 
4 Technical, trade or vocational school AFTER high sc ool 
5 Some college, no 4-year degree (includes associate degree) 
6 College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degre ) 
7 Post-graduate training/professional school after college (towards a Masters degree or 
Ph.D., Law or Medical school) 
 
Are you married, living as married, divorced, separated, widowed, or have you never been 
married? 
1 Married 




6 Never been married 
 
Are you now employed full-time, part-time, retired, or are you not employed for pay? 
1 Employed full-time 
2 Employed part-time 
3 Retired 
4 Not employed for pay 
 
Are you also a full- or part-time student? 
1 Yes, full-time 





Are you, yourself, of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, 




What is your race? Are you white, black Asian, or sme other race? 
1 White 
2 Black or African-American 
3 Asian or Pacifica Islander 
4 Native American/American Indian 
5 Other:  ________ 
 




4 Other:  ________ 
 
Would you say your views in most political matters a e very liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, 
somewhat conservative, or very conservative? 
1 Very liberal 
2 Somewhat liberal 
3 Moderate 
4 Somewhat conservative 
5 Very conservative 
 
These days, many people are so busy they can't find ime to register to vote, or move around so 
often they don't get a chance to re-register. Are you now registered to vote in your precinct or 
election district, or not? 
1 Yes, I am a registered voter 
2 No, I am not a registered voter 
 
How often do you go to church, synagogue, or some oth r place of worship? 
1 Daily 
2 About once a week 
3 Several times a year 




What is your religious preference? 
1 Protestant (includes Baptist, Christian, Episcopalian, Jehovah's Witness, Lutheran, 
Methodist, Presbyterian, etc.) 
2 Roman Catholic/Catholic 
3 Jewish 
4 Mormon (Church or Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 




9 Other religion:  ________ 
 
Last year, that is in 2003, what was your total family income from all sources before taxes? 
1 Less than $10,000 
2 $10,000 to under $20,000 
3 $20,000 to under $30,000 
4 $30,000 to under $40,000 
5 $40,000 to under $50,000 
6 $50,000 to under $75,000 
7 $75,000 to under $100,000 
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